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EAST WIND WEST WIND

ACCORDING to the Soviet version the Sino-Soviet conflict dates from the publication in Peking of the collection of articles 'Long Live Leninism' in April 1960; according to the Chinese version—from the publication in Moscow of the Tass statement (*Pravda*, 10 September 1959) criticising the Chinese. Our own editorial of five years ago [1] (*Survey*, July-September 1958) noticed the special vehemence of the Chinese attack on the Yugoslavs: while the Peking *Jen Min Jih Pao* (5 May 1958) considered the 1948 Cominform resolution 'basically correct', *Pravda* (8 May 1958), still spoke of a 'period of unjust isolation [of the Yugoslav communists] from the international communist movement'. But it is futile to try to attribute the beginning of the conflict to any precise date. The two protagonists chose their own dates for tactical reasons; it is the other side which must be blamed for the split.

As its causes have been analysed frequently and at length, there is no need to dwell upon the subject here. But little that goes beyond the most obvious short-term effects has yet been said about the new perspective opened by this historical event. Comments on the Sino-Soviet doctrinal exchange too often tend to take ideological rationalisations and propagandist distortions at face value. Yet it should be obvious that literal juxtapositions of Soviet and Chinese doctrinal pronouncements, whether on revolutionary strategy or on peaceful coexistence, are not a sufficient indication of the meaning of the controversy. Unless they are related to their background, they are no more enlightening today than would be the theological debates of Reformation or Counter-Reformation, if taken without reference to their wider historical context.

THE struggle between the Soviet Union and China for the world communist movement and the sympathies of the newly independent countries will now enter a more acute phase. But these parties and countries, however small, are not only objects of world politics; to a larger extent than hitherto they will be able to follow an independent line. The implications of this new stage will be discussed in the next number of *Survey*; all that one can do now, admittedly at some risk, is to

[1] 'In future the communists' *raisons d'état* may be even more difficult to reconcile with the *raison d'être* of the communist movement. The idea of a unified communist world belongs to the same category as the dreams of universal empires in the past. When in 1945 communist regimes were imposed on Eastern Europe, the problem arose of the nature of the relationship between the communist states, but it was shelved for the time being. . . . The emergence of Communist China underlined its reality. It is clear that the problem of relationships between sovereign communist states does not differ in principle from that of their nature between any sovereign states; the cement of solidarity is very thin and relations may easily be strained. If anything the dictatorial character of these states may only aggravate frictions arising from divergence of interests and from historical causes. The doctrinal legitimation of power in these states tends to transform all serious conflicts into "theological" disputes.'

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point to some of the emerging trends. Such a discussion might take as its starting point the celebration in Yenan of the twenty-second anniversary of the October revolution, when Mao Tse-tung in a long speech declared that ' the interests of the Soviet Union will never clash with the interests of China's national liberation; on the contrary, they will always coincide ' (*Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniya*, Moscow 1959, p. 190).

Nor was Stalin always right about China; in fact, at the two critical junctures of recent Chinese history, in 1925–27 and 1948–49, his appraisal proved to be wrong. Stalin has remained the best friend of the Chinese people because he disappeared in time; before 1953 China was not in a position to challenge the Soviet Union.

Was such a challenge bound to come? Satisfied nations with a liberal world outlook and a live-and-let-live approach may coexist peacefully; but the idea that two big nations imbued with missionary zeal, proclaiming a militant doctrine and possessing dynamic leaders would co-operate permanently was from the very outset somewhat fanciful. It cannot perhaps be too strongly emphasised that it was never really a question of personalities. A change in the Chinese leadership today would certainly make no difference in Chinese policies towards Russia.

Inside the communist camp (and perhaps outside it, too) there will be jockeying for position and influence. The nationalist element in Chinese policy, at present overshadowed by the verbiage of proletarian internationalism, will grow stronger. In the Soviet Union, too, there have been unmistakable signs of a nationalist revival; it is a small but still significant fact that Mr. Khrushchev's favourite movie is called ' Russian Miracle '. China at first glance seems to stand a much better chance of success in the underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa, and even Latin America. In some of these countries there are the elements of ' a revolutionary situation ', and Chinese militancy has therefore a greater appeal than the gradualist Russian approach. Moreover, the Russians attract some of the odium directed against white men in general. But other factors are less propitious for China. Some of her neighbours—such as India and Outer Mongolia—are suspicious of Peking's territorial ambitions; and Ho Chi Minh, too, appears to be a reluctant fellow traveller. Alleged Chinese successes in Africa have largely proved to be a myth; perhaps the Chinese are too self-centred to be good propagandists. In any case, Africa's leaders do not want to be lectured even if China does have 700 million inhabitants.

IT seems therefore likely that Peking's slogans of Asian, or Afro-Asian solidarity, will have only limited effect. The smaller and less influential a communist party, the more likely it is to follow an ' adventurist course '. The New Zealand CP may be convinced that Tito is a capitalist and atomic war an imaginary danger, but a political party that aspires to make a political impact cannot afford this kind of imbecility. For that reason most Asian, African, and Latin American communist parties will

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probably try not to get too closely identified with one side or the other. Communists in Japan may gravitate to Peking; those in the Middle East may be more inclined to follow Moscow.

The conflict has not only shattered the unity of the camp; it is also proving a divisive factor *within* the various parties. 'Polycentrism' may seem at present still a misnomer, since there are only two powers strong enough to contest the leadership of the camp. But at some future date another country, or more probably an alliance of parties, may well appear as yet another independent factor. Meanwhile there are factional disputes within the different parties, and even those which have so far been spared internal conflict find themselves able to follow a more independent line. This applies to parties in both the Western world and Eastern Europe. Mr. Gheorgíu Dej recalled that old Rumanian proverb about the mice playing while the cat's away; whether this play takes the form of a rapprochement with Peking or with Washington is immaterial in this context. What matters is that Tito's special position has been a source of envy for a long time. Why cannot other countries have the same degree of elbow-room, or perhaps even more? All this indicates a growing trend towards independence and growing disunity in Eastern Europe, though not necessarily an advance towards liberalisation.

The position of the West European communist parties is different. It is even conceivable that one, or a few of them, such as the Italian party, may undergo a democratic transformation, though not within a year or two. Those communist parties which are unable to adjust themselves to the changed conditions will stagnate and eventually lose any influence. There may be a future for totalitarian parties in other parts of the world, but not in the old continent. There is not much future for revolutionary parties there, with the possible exception of Spain.

All these parties will continue to subscribe to the same sacred writings, and this, in its turn, will be sufficient to induce a dwindling number of Western observers to believe that there are no basic differences of opinion between them. But since these writings are of less and less relevance to present day problems, the parties will have to provide their own answers and interpretations and as a result will grow more and more apart.

WHATEVER may be the kernel of truth in the Chinese contention about their Leninist purity, their attachment to orthodoxy, now as in the past, is heavily overdrawn. Mao, as we know, was no more inhibited in applying Marxism to Chinese conditions 'creatively' than were Lenin or Stalin, or for that matter Khrushchev, in adapting it to the Soviet scene. Clearly, the Chinese revolutionary platform is understandable in the context of Asian economic backwardness, just as the Soviet determination to rely on its economic growth is comprehensible in the light of its own history. But granted these basic facts, there is still room for manoeuvre and for tactical flexibility. The Chinese have also made moves from the soft to the hard line, and vice versa. Although

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in the present situation their basic appeal is to the revolutionary attitudes in the underdeveloped countries, they may well try to use other appeals to weaken their opponent in their struggle for hegemony in the international communist movement.

On the Party level, the split does not just create two camps within the communist movement. The Rome-Byzantium analogy is of limited relevance. The effects of the split in the immediate future may tend to accentuate the affinity of the more radical parties with Peking, and of the more 'reformist' parties with Moscow, but later the situation is bound to become more complicated and the internal heterogeneity of the pro-Peking and pro-Moscow parties to become more marked. The degree to which they may become autocephalic is impossible to predict, but it is already clear that no serious analysis of their position is possible without a more careful examination of the local factors. Both Moscow and Peking are bound to stress the immaculate character of their orthodoxies, but here Moscow is in a greater dilemma than Peking. In the USSR the point has been reached when the demands of Party ideology and Soviet state interests may become more and more incompatible.

The root of the dilemma was always there, but could be concealed through the identification of the Soviet state with the interests of the communist movement in general. Now that this is no longer possible, the identification of the Party and the State is also put in question, and the internal problems of maintaining Party control may be aggravated by some difficult choices in international relations; in such circumstances the position of the Soviet state may one day require the sacrifice of ideological purity to a far greater degree than at present. The split undermines the ideology in a more direct way as well. Communist ideology is ultimately rooted in a belief in the objective laws of history, of which the 'correct' Party line is the embodiment, even though the Party may from time to time commit certain errors. But two opposite Party lines cannot at the same time correctly implement the movement of history. The universality of religion can in principle be maintained even after the church is split, because it is concerned with transcendental matters; but the existence for any length of time of two great parties claiming Marxist universality in itself denies the validity of such claims. And once the cornerstone of universality is removed from a historicist ideology it becomes vulnerable on other counts as well.

IN this respect the present split differs from the one with Yugoslavia in 1948. The Yugoslavs, though excommunicated, did not really try to raise their doctrinal modifications to the level of universal Marxist-Leninist truths. True, they stressed their orthodoxy, but in effect claimed only the limited goal of applying it in the specific conditions of 'the Yugoslav road to socialism'. The Chinese have gone beyond this. Even in the forties they stressed Mao's creative contribution in applying Marxism-Leninism to Chinese conditions, and after gaining power they claimed validity for their tactics in the struggle for power for all the

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underdeveloped countries, particularly in Asia. With the development of the Sino-Soviet debate, the claims of the Chinese have been raised to a universal level. Not only was the Italian party criticised for its ideas on ' structural reforms '; in the 14 June letter the unlimited character of Chinese ideological pretensions was made clear by the criticism of the internal policies of the Soviet Party itself.

Here the Chinese, despite their economic weakness and relative political isolation outside the Asian parties, enjoy some advantages over their Soviet ideological rivals. They claim that, like Lenin at the beginning of the century, they are a minority which is bound to become a majority, that in time the revisionist traitors will be cast off, just as the Comintern superseded the ' yellow ' Second International. In this way they can claim to embody the movement of history itself; Mao's assertion (devoid—according to the Soviet theoreticians—of any class content) that ' the East wind prevails over the West wind ' expresses in a different form an idea formulated after the Russian revolution by a prominent Bolshevik, who said that the revolutionary wave had moved eastwards, and that after the English, the French, and the Germans, it was now the Russians who constituted ' the revolutionary salt of the earth '. Evidently it is now the turn of the Chinese to occupy that position.

However, even the most limited analogies with respect to other historical splits break down when it comes to the problem of nuclear power. Here the situation is clearly unprecedented, and after years of talmudic hairsplitting the Soviet Party has at last explicitly admitted it. The limited test ban reflects this (which is not to say that it is the only reason why it has been concluded). But although it represents a move from ideology to reality, it carefully excludes the international control which would be a real test of the erosion of ideology in the USSR. And Mr Khrushchev told the Chinese: ' The struggle for peace, for peaceful coexistence, is organically bound up with the revolutionary struggle against imperialism. It weakens the front of imperialism, isolates its more aggressive circles from the masses of the people, and helps in the struggle for national liberation.' So long as the reasons are less than compelling, the Soviet *apparatchiki* will go on trying to evade the harsh choices they have to face in the thermonuclear age. Making these choices easier or unnecessary only delays the evolution of Soviet society from ideological insanities towards a more mature attitude to international relations in this dangerous age.

IT is interesting to speculate in this context not just on the immediate political consequences of the Sino-Soviet split, but on the consequences of the eventual acquisition of atomic weapons by communist China.

The problem of the n-th state has bedevilled the political thinking of the West for too long. It should have been clear from the outset that in a world of sovereign states there is no way of preventing the spread of atomic weapons. Whether China will have them ' in the not too

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distant future', as asserted by Mr Kuo Mo-jo, or will not have them for 'a long, long time', as Mr Khrushchev believes, is really less important than the fact that all concerned seem to agree about the outcome.

It is obvious that the test ban agreement cannot prevent the dissemination of nuclear weapons; neither is it an instrument for controlling the destiny of the world by a small number of countries, as the Chinese imply. A thermonuclear Soviet-American condominium is a very unlikely outcome of the 'first step on the 5,000 miles march to peace'. The Soviet Union may point out the similarity of Chinese and French reactions in rejecting the test ban, but very little can be done about it. It is ironical that when that part of Stalin's testament (*The Economic Problems of Socialism*) which refers to 'Western contradictions' acquires a semblance of reality, Khrushchev is faced with the Chinese repeating Stalin's remark about atom bombs in a thermonuclear context: '[They] are intended to frighten the weak-nerved but they cannot decide the outcome of war' (*Pravda,* 25 September 1946). That did not prevent Stalin from striving to acquire them as soon as possible, and the same applies to the Chinese. Indeed, it was the Soviet government's refusal to provide the Chinese with the bomb, which accelerated the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations. For the Chinese the Camp David visit was a consumation of this 'betrayal'; but the Soviet government, whatever its initial attitude, was not ready to promote the rise of a nuclear China on its eastern flank—which would, moreover, have certainly been followed by the granting of nuclear arms to Western Germany. But, whatever the delay, China, on the road to great power status, will eventually acquire its bomb.

Several questions must be asked about the likely effect of this development. First, what the effect may be on the question of peace; second, how it will affect the international balance of power; third, how the Soviet position will be affected; and fourth, what are its implications for the West.

Disregarding the question of the date when the Chinese acquire thermonuclear weapons (and the means of delivery and the whole industrial background necessary to maintain such weapon-systems, which is a matter of decades perhaps), it would seem an error to view the problem simply in the light of the present war-like pronouncements in the Chinese ideological missiles. For one thing, it is far from certain that they reflect the degree of knowledge about the facts of the age of overkill among the more sophisticated Chinese communist leaders. For another, it is more than probable that during the period of atomic apprenticeship such knowledge is bound to be acquired by those Chinese leaders who do not yet possess it. There is thus a chance that the interests of self-preservation will in time affect the Chinese communists as they have already affected the Russians, and will eventually lead them

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also to recognise this one common interest with the 'imperialists', or for that matter with the 'revisionists'. This is a more likely development than either the voluntary abandonment of the nuclear great power status symbol, or the prevention of its acquisition by others, or mutual suicide through war after its acquisition. The difficult evolution to some sort of international agreement of which the present test ban treaty may be a forerunner seems a more probable outcome.

The acquisition of the bomb by the Chinese is of course bound to affect the international balance of power, but it is the Soviet Union which has most reason to be concerned about it. On the other hand, given the present balance, it is the Soviet Union and not China which has the capacity to threaten the West.

In the situation when Soviet foreign policy will increasingly have to face a world no longer polarised, but one in which it confronts the East as well as the West, the preoccupation with the present disarray of Western unity may well be exaggerated. Paradoxical as it may seem, there may even be advantages in the long run in temporarily facing the Sino-Soviet split with not too great a degree of Western unity. This is not only because the closing of the ranks on one side may help to consolidate the other. For this it may be too late, as the Sino-Soviet conflict has perhaps already gone beyond the point of return. But there is another reason, which may be a blessing in disguise, whatever the difficulties raised by de Gaulle's policy and however unrealistic those parts of his 'grand design' which are rooted in the French nationalism of the eighteenth century. This is that at present his opposition hampers Russia in consolidating its East European empire, and increases Moscow's preoccupation with both its Eastern and Western flanks. On the other hand, one should neither take the present isolation of China, nor her present ideological posture, as eternal. Although any serious attempt to exploit politically the Sino-Soviet split at this early stage may be premature, in the long run it is no doubt what is to be expected. In such a perspective patience may well be the West's most important political virtue.

In a multicentrist world the West, too, will have to learn to conduct a more sophisticated policy—and one less fettered by clichés—if it is to retain its position. But it is far better endowed to tolerate divergences within its ranks. For the West, unlike the East, has always been essentially polycentric.

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COMMUNIST RIVALRIES IN ASIA

Francis Watson

POLITICS is about power, and Marxists would be the last to discredit the truism. It applies to the unfolding history of Sino-Soviet relations whether one is discussing the dialectics of polycentrism, or the geopolitics of Eurasia, or questions of leadership down to their most personal aspects. The discovery of normal political motivations within the communist camp is not particularly startling. But the process by which they have been allowed to break through the dialectical crust has certainly been striking and seems now irreversible. Its cumulative effect, even in the not impossible event of a new type of accord between Moscow and Peking, is bound to be great. Former patterns of communication between communist parties have been superseded as the two major contestants, manoeuvring for support, have sought the fullest publicity for documents which, even a year ago, would have been circulated clandestinely if at all. And within the parties the position of the expert dialectician may well be shaken by a new licensed *realpolitik*. Any shift of this kind would be particularly significant in the traditionally intellectual politburos of Asian communism.

On the face of things the argument from concrete issues might have been expected to serve the Soviet case, which in the terms of strict orthodoxy is widely regarded as the more vulnerable. Indeed, the CPSU central committee came near to admitting this in its heavily publicised open letter, released (13 July) during the Sino-Soviet talks in Moscow. The Chinese party leaders, said the Russians, had used polemics and Marxist formulations to camouflage the weakness of their own position, lending a 'scholastic' air to a dispute which really centred upon 'vital interests of the peoples' and would be conducted as such by Moscow. But this strongly worded letter marked a new turn in the Soviet tactics. The open introduction of issues between states into an ideological discussion—an improper move in itself—had been a Chinese initiative. In the two remarkable broadsides discharged by Peking before the temporary truce arranged in early March, the world had been apprised of (i) a calendar of specific international grievances against 'certain comrades' from September 1959 to January 1963, and (ii) the existence of unresolved frontier problems between China and the Soviet Union.

Plausible, if not necessarily reliable, 'inside reports' would have it that the Chinese miscalculated in raising the territorial issue—or, rather in serving a warning that it could be raised if the need should appear. It is seldom the best way of undermining a government, and Mr Khrushchev's hold on Soviet leadership and policy was in fact reported to have improved from that point. But in a broader, more fundamental context, one can appreciate the Peking *People's Daily's* need 'to discuss a little of

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the history of imperialist aggression against China ', and without excluding Russia's prominent part in the story. Quite apart from the provocation of Khrushchev's sarcastic references to Taiwan, Hongkong, and Macao in December 1962 (themselves a riposte to Chinese exploitation of the Cuba crisis), it was inevitable that Peking's long campaign in the role of Asian champion should at some stage lay bare this contentious subject.

THIS is the challenge—Chinese leadership in Asia, and by extension in the ' anti-colonial ' continents of Africa and Latin America—which Moscow has at last taken up. Next to the forthright presentation of a ' cardinal ' difference on peace and war, and attached to it, the strongest line developed by the CPSU open letter of 13 July was the charge of racial and geographical power-politics. What are the Chinese after, it asked, when they ' stubbornly propagate the slogan, deprived of any class meaning: " The Wind from the East prevails over the Wind from the West " '?

The question might well be considered overdue. A date can be found for the introduction of this Chinese slogan, to which the terminological confusions of the cold war lent a serviceable ambiguity. It was produced by Mao Tse-tung, and in Moscow, in November 1957, in an address to Chinese students in the Soviet capital during his momentous visit for the 40th anniversary celebrations of the Bolshevik revolution.

The implications at that time were, of course, sufficiently correct. Soviet leadership of the communist camp, Soviet material and technological advance symbolised by Sputniks I and II, were acclaimed by Mao as portents of victory over the once dominant ' West '. His unpublicised differences with Khrushchev amounted at this early stage to a criticism of the policies of the Soviet leadership, but not to a claim to share or usurp that position. The possibility of applying a Chinese corrective to Soviet ineptitude, at a critical juncture, was sufficiently demonstrated at that 1957 General Synod of Communist Parties for Peking to take a firm stand on the principle of monolithic solidarity, as against the polycentrism which had reared its dangerous head in Eastern Europe (and up to a point with unmistakable Chinese encouragement) after the death of Stalin.

At the same time, however, the closing of the ranks in November 1957, to the extent that it was accomplished by Chinese intervention, marked the increasing potential stature of the Asian partner. There was more than a hint of patronage in Mao's assertion—after months of upheaval in the Kremlin, after rebellion in East Germany, Poland, and Hungary—that the communist camp and movement must have a leader and that that leader was the Soviet Union and its Party. As a symbol of renewed confidence the East Wind could be expressed as the wind of united communism. But Aeolus lived, albeit frugally, in Peking.

If the Moscow Statement of November 1957 was exalted by the Chinese communists, from April 1960 onwards, to the status of a key document, it was as much for this reason as for the ideological value of

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its pronouncements on revolution. And its value was enhanced rather than diminished by the facts that the Chinese Party itself had been convulsed by 'contradictions', and that Mao had executed a political *volte face* to achieve his moment of triumph in Moscow.

In the heightened polemics of the past summer the Chinese reminded Moscow and the movement at large of their rescue act of 1957 in the re-establishment of 'correct' policies. But they have longer memories than that. And the heroic years which are deliberately recalled in their internal and external propaganda, the years of which Chairman Mao and other leaders are still living symbols, were marked in political tactics by a peculiar and successful empiricism. To put it very shortly, Mao extricated his Party from the disasters of Stalin's miscalculations by the device of accepting Stalinist dogmatism in theory and disregarding it in practice. In the result the power to which he fought his way had within it a reserve of independence from Moscow, to be drawn upon as and when circumstances should require. That circumstances pointed strongly, when power was within his grasp in July 1949, to a policy of 'leaning to one side' no doubt proved agreeable to communist theory. That does not diminish the element of pragmatism in Mao's choice of Sino-Soviet partnership and an international united front as means for the consolidation of victory. And the choice had to be publicly justified as based on experience—'the forty years experience of Sun Yat-sen and the twenty-eight years experience of the Chinese Communist party'.

IF this appears to be overstating the pragmatic element, it is because the open course of the Sino-Soviet dispute for a long time tended to submerge it. To be represented as fanatically obstinate purists has to a great extent suited the Chinese, at all events in the primary struggle within the world communist movement. The thunder against Yugoslav revisionism in its first phase, as Belgrade was not slow to point out, provided serviceable cover for the fact that the lines of the Chinese advance were being decided by Mao rather than by Marx. And as the split widened, impelling the Chinese to find a rallying-point that could rival that of 'the historic party of Lenin', a proclaimed cult of orthodoxy was the obvious, indeed the only, expedient. In the technique of Chinese communist polemics—as in the style of Mao himself—one is frequently struck by a kind of dialectical judo, in which the opponent's attacking lead is appropriated for his own discomfiture. So it has been with the charge of dogmatism, and the ideological follow-through in which 'certain comrades' have been invited to trip themselves up in their own 'creativeness'. It was only in a recent round that the Soviet Party turned strongly to a changed offensive, asking at last what private ends of State power the Chinese were pursuing under an appearance of doctrinal orthodoxy.

Some, at least, of the seventy or eighty statements in that Soviet letter which Peking has undertaken to refute will no doubt have been dealt with before the present article is in print. And such refutations, it may also be predicted, will in their broad effect confirm certain key items

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in the Soviet exposure of the character of Chinese deviation—or, to put it another way, of Chinese assets in the struggle for dominant communist influence. Among these items are the Soviet charges of theoretical distortion, conspiracy within the movement, and the advancement of national, regional, or even racial policies summed up in the heretical 'East Wind' slogan and in the indictment that 'the Chinese comrades apparently wish to win in the easiest way popularity among the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America'.

The direct language of the CPSU letter was quite new to Soviet tactics. The initiative in acknowledging a split, and interpreting it in terms of State relations, had been taken six months earlier by the Chinese—who, on the face of it, would seem to have most to lose by allowing the Sino-Soviet association to deteriorate. The testing of that association by Peking, the processes of calculation (with a moistened finger, as it were, held up to the Wind from the East), could be observed from time to time in different fields. In the summer of 1962, for example, Peking's sudden crisis-propaganda (with North Korean collaboration), alleging an imminent 'imperialist' threat to the Chinese mainland, was clearly angled for a Soviet assurance of full military support. In the event the terms in which Moscow reaffirmed its obligations as an ally were rather less than satisfactory. In October of the same year the violent turn given by the Chinese to their conflict with India—complex as were its motives—could be observed to follow closely upon the airing in Peking of two particular points of political sensitivity. One was in respect of Chinese isolation, publicly refuted by Chou En-lai. The other was revealed in the gratuitous emphasis laid by the Chinese upon the suggestion made by Tito, in an interview with an American correspondent, that Moscow had been restraining Peking from aggravating the dispute with India. Seen as a proof that China was not a Soviet satellite, Chinese action on the Indian frontier was an essential prelude to the revelation of attempts to make her so. Peking's policy towards India had not been modified in response to pressure from Moscow. On the contrary, Moscow was being challenged to change its own attitude in regard to the Sino-Indian confrontation, or else be manoeuvred into a dangerously revisionist position in the theoretically basic conflict between 'imperialism' and 'the oppressed peoples'.

A striking indication of Peking's self-assurance *within the framework of communism* was the readiness to enumerate the opposition parties and to publish their outspoken criticisms, often without reply, as 'negative examples'. Only one of the communist parties thus pilloried by publicity was Asian. This of course was the Communist Party of India. But the Chinese picture of a solitary outcast is obviously no guide to the complex, uncertain, and shifting pattern of Asian communism in relation to the Sino-Soviet dispute. What it illustrates, in conjunction with the list of European and other comradely slanderers, is Peking's preparedness to face a rift within the movement along broadly East-West lines. It is

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significant that the notable defection of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party has thus far been treated with comparative stoicism by the Chinese, no doubt on the assumption that it is not irrevocable.

Yet at present the adhesion of Outer Mongolia and its Party to the Moscow line shows no wavering. First of the communist satellites in Asia, it is at the same time a Soviet creation and a substantial piece of China *irredenta*. If the relinquishment of formal Chinese suzerainty over the territory which Stalin extracted from Chiang Kai-shek has not been challenged by the Chinese communists, that is no doubt because no reality could have been given to a title which had become purely nominal without a direct infringement of Soviet interests: whereas acceptance of the separation enabled Peking to establish diplomatic relations with Ulan Bator and develop cultural and economic links. The latter in particular have been used to such purpose that the Mongolian People's Republic is the most heavily subsidised, from both rival sources, of all the communist satellites. Nor, it seems, have the Chinese reduced their contributions in aid and technicians since the Mongolians, at the 22nd Soviet Party congress, stood with Moscow in the momentous battle of the personality cult.

Yet the attack on the personality cult, in its least ambiguous form, has demanded of the Mongolians a sacrifice of which the implications are highly curious. Last year they were compelled, under Soviet pressure, to correct the errors made in commemorating their greatest national hero Genghiz Khan—the Mongol wind having historically blown, of course, most notably from East to West. The exaltation of Genghiz Khan, indeed, was criticised by the Soviet Party as a *Chinese* impropriety in its letter of 13 July 1963—presumably in reference to publicity in Inner Mongolia, where the Chinese have gone to the length of establishing a rival mausoleum for the Great Khan (the place of whose death is unidentified, but traditionally sited near his birthplace in Outer Mongolia). The Mongols in Chinese territory and in the USSR (in the Buryat, formerly Buryat-Mongol ASSR) have suffered alike from deliberate 'assimilation' policies. But in the wariness towards both neighbours which the Mongols of the People's Republic share with other Central Asian peoples, it is suspicion of the Chinese which evidently—and probably correctly—tips the balance. Under Soviet sponsorship the MPR has acquired membership of the United Nations, which won no congratulations from Peking, and of Comecon, which Peking heavily hints to be a device for Soviet exploitation. The rapid conclusion of a Sino-Mongolian frontier treaty at the end of last year was in its way a spectacular development—not merely because the Chinese relinquished certain claims, but because the hitherto undefined status of the frontier had been a constant reminder that Mao himself, before attaining central power in China, had ranked the whole of Outer Mongolia with Tibet and the Japanese-occupied provinces as targets for liberation. It was apparent that the main Chinese motive for this settlement, as for that concluded with Pakistan at the same juncture, was the 'moral isolation' of India.

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But a weakening of the Moscow-Ulan Bator axis may well have been within Peking's hopes. One may at all events suggest that Prime Minister Tsedenbal would not have been given the open audience of a Peking public rally on the signing of the agreement if it had been known that he would mingle with his formal compliments a renewed endorsement of the Soviet ideological position.

THE Mongolian example has been cited to show that the factor of nationalism in Asia does not necessarily produce, in the communist context, a preference for the Chinese as against the Soviet side of the split. It would be absurd to suggest that communist parties and their executives are intentional or satisfactory guardians of nationalist ideals. The establishment of the communist regime in Outer Mongolia was effected in June 1921 by Soviet Government forces, called in by Mongolian communists to destroy a comparatively genuine national autonomy which had been briefly restored by expelling the Chinese. Thereafter the close reproduction of the Soviet pattern in Mongolian political institutions provided a link which still shows its strength. But it may be worth noting that in the widely different conditions of North Vietnam, where the communists took control, with Chinese support, of a nationalist struggle against a Western colonial power, Peking's new East Wind has not obliterated the annual celebrations, under official auspices, of 'a glorious page in Vietnam's history'—the defeat of 200,000 invading Chinese troops at Dong Da in 1789.

This year the patriotic commemoration coincided with the January visit to Hanoi of President Novotny of Czechoslovakia. This produced a joint statement which in important points approved the Soviet position in the communist dispute. In May no less a person than the Chinese head of State, Liu Shao-chi, undertook an apparently hurriedly-organised South-East Asian tour (hot on the less resounding heels of Marshal Malinovsky, the Soviet Defence Minister). In North Vietnam his mission to line up Ho Chi Minh and his Party in open support of Peking was barely concealed and only partially successful. In the following month the attempt was resumed, this time by proxy, when a delegation from Peking's now firm North Korean ally arrived in Hanoi for a highly publicised series of functions in which, however, Ho Chi Minh took no part.

Why should the North Vietnamese communists still waver when the North Koreans seem to have finally abandoned their own uncommitted gestures? Asianism operates on both. Both have unfulfilled southward ambitions of 'reunification', postulating a dynamic revolutionary programme and the extreme of hostility towards the United States. Both are economically primitive, at a Stalinist phase of development which finds its models more readily in China than in the Soviet Union. Both depend upon both Moscow and Peking for economic aid. And in the historic source of power, which is where the parallel ceases, the debt of the North Korean Communist party is in fact to Moscow and the Red Army. The decision to default on this debt was one of the confirmations, at the time

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of the abortive Sino-Soviet talks in Moscow, of the North Korean move into the Chinese camp. Publicity from Pyongyang on the theme of self-sufficiency—a campaign of Chinese inspiration embodying criticism of the operation of Soviet aid within the bloc—produced a new image of self-liberation for the record. It was no longer thanks to the Soviet Army's victory-march in the Far East that a communist administration was established in Pyongyang after World War II. It was the culmination of fifteen years of struggle by the 'anti-Japanese partisans headed by Comrade Kim Il-sung'.

It is in this leadership-factor that at least a part of the difference between North Korea and North Vietnam can be studied. An overt neutralism and an anxiety to mediate between Peking and Moscow sit naturally on the venerable shoulders of Ho Chi Minh, one of the most respected figures in the communist world, who is in fact senior in experience to both Khrushchev and Mao, and enjoys the prestige of having known Lenin. Now a corollary of such neutralism is the existence within a communist party of pro-Moscow and pro-Peking factions. The stature of Ho Chi Minh has enabled him to stand above his Party to an extent that is unique; his long avoidance of any personal endorsement of the North Vietnamese attacks on Tito, which was ended only during Liu's visit to Hanoi last June, is one example of this. Kim Il-sung, on the other hand, seems to have consummated his remarkably complete dictatorship in North Korea by eliminating from his Party all factions, whether looking to Moscow or to Peking, except the Praetorian Guard of his own tried supporters. Successive purges after the achievement of power had appeared, on balance, to leave the Soviet influence predominant. Since the 22nd CPSU congress Kim's gradual move from apparent neutralism to support of Peking has thus been presented as a move on his own terms.

AMONG the 75 fraternal Parties throughout the world which do not enjoy State power, it is as broadly true of Asian communists as of others that neutralism as between Moscow and Peking has been the most natural policy so long as it could be maintained; and that its corollary of an internal split has kept alive the argument over tactics in a given situation on the hard road to power. It is not, after all, a counting of heads at the next general assembly of communist parties—if it ever takes place—that is the issue. In those terms Moscow retains its majority, Peking disdains it, and the custom of 'unanimous decisions' affects to ignore it. It might be noted that the only Asian fraternal Parties in which Chinese subversion was complained of in the July CPSU letter were those of India—where the pro-Chinese faction has made its direct challenge—and the special case of Ceylon.

Ceylon is a special case in the sense that its multiplicity of communist and near-communist groupings has included self-proclaimed Trotskyists. This source of weakness in the movement took on an intriguing aspect when the attitude to destalinisation emerged as a test of loyalty. A

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Trotskyist is simply not a Stalinist. But a show of firmness by the Ceylonese Communist Party in support of Khrushchev's line at the 22nd CPSU congress, led by its pro-Soviet General Secretary Peter Keunemann, had the effect of challenging the Trotskyist opposition to decide what it was opposing. A subsequent unprecedented appearance of unity among the communists caused them to move hopefully at last in the direction of a united front with other elements against a Government which is itself left-wing in character. But this is not the end of it. The CPSU letter suggests that disunity among Ceylon's communists is at least as valuable to Moscow as a proclaimed pro-Soviet line, since it is Trotskyism, the most damaging label of all, which is now to be applied to the Chinese.

The significant evidence of the Chinese line at work in Ceylon is not in 'subverting' a loyal Communist Party but in consolidating the invasion of 'front' organisations. Peking's activities among Afro-Asian institutions in particular were the one subject on which the Soviet Party allowed itself to speak strongly during the professed phase of 'avoiding open polemics' before the Sino-Soviet talks. And the Soviet charges against Peking of splitting the communist movement among 'all peoples' along unorthodox geographical and racial lines finally revealed an accumulation of taunts and slanders against the Russians for being not only relatively rich but also white-skinned.

It is here, rather than in a struggle of intrigue to capture this or that communist executive, that the battle has been joined. The widely reported Sino-Soviet clashes in the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organisation when it met at Moshi (Tanganyika) in February 1963, were not the first of their kind. Their significance was seen even more clearly two months later when the Chinese, with Indonesian and other assistance, succeeded in reducing to observer status the Soviet delegation to the Afro-Asian Journalists Conference in Djakarta. Following this the Chinese aim of setting up a rival Afro-Asian trade union federation to counter Soviet domination of the World Federation of Trade Unions was brought fully into the open. And the record of Chinese discomfiture in other 'front' organisations, for instance the World Peace Council and the Women's International Democratic Federation, points, for Peking, to a similar solution.

The short way of putting it would be to say that the Wind from the East began to blow at Bandung in 1955. The Bandung Conference, of which for eight years the Chinese have been vainly seeking a successor on their own pattern, assembled to assert the right and capacity of independent Asian Governments to settle Asian affairs instead of accepting hand-outs, however satisfactory, from Geneva. The success of Chinese diplomacy on that occasion, such as it was, was achieved in the absence, for obvious reasons of political geography, of the Soviet Union (and for that matter of the Mongolian People's Republic). The few African delegates, admitted in somewhat subordinate status, were a pointer to the potential influence of Asian liberation movements in another continent. The attempt to capture for the communist cause the

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dynamism so generated was made from outside, by Moscow, beginning with the conference in Delhi called (to the Indian Government's annoyance) just before legitimate proceedings opened in Bandung.

So long as the weight of the Soviet Union and its bloc was of prime importance to the Chinese in developing the possibilities opened out at Bandung, Peking assisted the Soviet take-over of the Afro-Asian idea. That meant arguing that Soviet representation in such assemblies and organisations was properly based on the fact of the Soviet sprawl across Asia to the Pacific. In at least one case (in May 1959, in the Afro-Asian Organisation for Economic Co-operation) a Chinese delegate sponsoring the Soviet partner found himself angrily in a minority of one, and walked out. The end of Peking's support for a Soviet presence in Asia, manifest when the Afro-Asian Journalists were manoeuvred at Djakarta, had in fact been signalled even more clearly four months earlier by the Chinese decision to revive in public the question of the Sino-Soviet land frontiers: that is to say, to prepare the ground for an eventual placing of the present Moscow régime among the stubborn legatees of imperialism. It so happened that this polemical gambit took place at a time (January 1963) when serious unrest in Sinkiang was once again being plausibly reported to have received support from across the (undemarcated) frontier.

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RUMANIA STEPS OUT OF LINE

J. F. Brown

SINCE Stalin's death the ice in Eastern Europe has cracked in many places. Many factors have caused these cracks to appear; the death of Stalin himself; the conscious and unconscious realisation that his system of empire could not continue; the national, political and economic dissatisfaction which found its outlet after 1953 and its most dramatic expressions in Poland and Hungary in 1956; the genuine realisation by the Soviet Union that a more flexible system of control was necessary; the effects on the area of the Yugoslav example; the repercussions of the Sino-Soviet dispute and the opportunities arising from it; these are just some of the factors. The result is that today one of the Soviet Union's main preoccupations is to prevent any more pieces of ice, like Yugoslavia and Albania, from breaking off. There seems little likelihood of the cracks being frozen over.

It was one of Khrushchev's most statesmanlike achievements to have grasped that, in order to achieve a new workable relationship between the Soviet satellites and Moscow, he must allow the Eastern European regimes a large measure of internal autonomy. This he has done with a fair measure of success; his satellites have certainly benefited and the whole Eastern European system has become more efficient and viable. But autonomy naturally begets diversity, and Khrushchev has not yet been able to devise a new formula which would produce a new unity out of this diversity. Enough evidence has accumulated to show that between the Soviet Union and the East European communist countries, and between these countries themselves, there have been serious differences of opinion and conflicts of interest. In the past few months it has been Rumania, often considered the most servile, which has been pressing diversity to the point of almost open disharmony.

The puzzling non-appearance of Rumania's First Party Secretary at the Ulbricht '70th birthday celebrations' in East Berlin at the end of June was a surprise even to those who had been closely watching Rumanian-Soviet relations and who were convinced that considerable strain had developed between the two countries. What seemed to have been strain over economic questions suddenly assumed a political character, a sure sign of the seriousness of the issues at stake.

Jean Terfve, the Belgian communist theorist, has attributed the divisions in the world communist movement to the 'unevenness of development in the socialist countries . . . evident on several levels: political, economic, cultural, etc.'[1] This is a view which is commonly held, and though it is probably a bit too superficial to explain adequately the

[1] *Drapeau Rouge* (Brussels) 5 January 1962, quoted by Melvin Croan in *Survey*, No. 48, p. 132, footnote 2.

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Chinese schism, it serves, in its reference to differences in economic levels, as a good base from which to discuss the current Rumanian question. For Bucharest's evolution from apparent docility to defiance can in a large measure be explained by two factors; the eagerness of the Rumanian communist leaders to build up a comprehensively industrialised state on the one hand, and the shift in Soviet thinking on East European economic development on the other.

The Rumanian appetite for a many-sided industrialisation probably springs both from a sense of nationalism and from the orthodox ideological conviction that an integrated economy, based on heavy industry, is a prerequisite for the construction of socialism and the eventual attainment of communism. Their appetite has been whetted by the striking successes in industrial development which they have achieved over the past three years. It is too much to talk about an ' economic miracle ' and there are serious doubts about the permanence of such a high rate of development. But in 1961 and 1962 Rumania's rate of industrial growth averaged over 15 per cent and was the highest in the Soviet bloc. Western visitors to the country attest to the atmosphere of dynamism and boom. Rumania's chief economic planners, men like the chief Comecon delegate, Alexandru Birladeanu, the chief of the State Planning Committee, Gheorghe Gaston-Marin, and the Minister of Foreign Trade, Gogu Radulescu, are men of first-rate ability, and there is obviously a good deal of expertise lower down the ladder. Gheorghiu-Dej, for his part, is particularly interested in industrial technique and, if reports are true, has taught himself something about it. The economists, therefore, have the Party's blessing to go full steam ahead in what they regard as both a national and a communist venture.

Rumania's industrial ambitions are formulated in a six-year plan, covering the period 1960 to 1965, and a much more elastic 15-year economic programme covering the period up to 1975. Both the plan and the programme were approved at the Rumanian Communist party's third congress in June 1960. A few basic figures on three heavy industrial items will give an idea of the dynamic optimism of these projects. By 1965 the volume of installed electrical power is planned to reach 18,500 million Kwh or 2·7 times the 1959 figure; by 1975 the volume should be about 10 times the 1959 figure. Iron ore production in 1965 should reach four million tons or 3·8 times the 1959 figures. By 1965 Rumania should be producing 3·3 million tons of steel, which is 2·3 times the 1959 figure; by 1970 it should be producing 7·5 million tons, or 5·3 times the 1959 figure.[2] The main aim in the plans is to develop the metallurgical industries and the greatest single industrial operation in Rumania in the coming years will be the construction of the huge Galati Steel Works which by 1970 is designed to produce 4 million tons of steel out of the 7·5 million planned for the whole country.

[2] The target for steel has been given only for 1970 and not for 1975.

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THOUGH the Rumanian leaders were hoping that the development of the country's own natural resources would cover some of the raw material needs for the plans, it was obvious that Rumania was also banking on substantial supplies of raw material and equipment from her Comecon partners. This readiness to become so dependent was, at the time the plans were drawn up, thoroughly in keeping with the then prevailing philosophy in the Soviet Union on the character of Comecon. For Khrushchev had come a long way from his dictum propounded at the 20th CPSU congress in February 1956, that 'each European country under the rule of the People's Democracy may specialise in the development of those particular branches of industry, in the production of those particular types of products, for which it disposes of the most favourable natural and economic conditions'.[3] This was Soviet policy at that time and the second Rumanian five-year plan, beginning in 1956, was based on this policy. But during 1957 and 1958 Khrushchev woke up to both the political and economic potentialities of Comecon, and began shifting over to a stress on mutual interdependence, a stress which was formulated at the 21st CPSU congress in February 1959 and which was most dramatically expressed in the famous phrase about all socialist countries entering communism more or less simultaneously.[4]

The Rumanians were quick to react to the new line and conceived their new plans in accordance with it. On the eve of their third Party congress, they were arguing thus:

> The expansion and intensification of collaboration between socialist countries does not mean that these countries should develop only those branches of industry for which they possess a raw material base or those types of production for which a professional tradition and qualified personnel exist. The collaboration of the socialist countries assures a multilateral development of their economy and during this process, together with the use of old production traditions, new traditions emerge corresponding to the necessity of the construction of the technical material base of socialism. The multilateral development of each socialist country presupposes, before anything else, the creation and development of the decisive branches of the economy.[5]

But even though the Rumanians were here abiding by Soviet principles, it is probable that, even as early as the spring of 1960, the Soviets had

[3] This extract from Khrushchev's speech was quoted in the Rumanian economic monthly *Probleme Economice* of February 1957.

[4] The phrase about entering communism 'more or less simultaneously' or 'in the same historical epoch' did not figure prominently in the Soviet press or speeches during 1961 and 1962. However, an article by V. Zhamin in *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, No. 6, 1963, did use the phrase. But it seems clear—and the rest of Zhamin's article seems to prove it—that it implies something other than it did in 1959. Now it implies that only through specialisation—some countries concentrating on one industry and others on another—will the whole bloc as a *collective* unit enter communism at more or less the same time. Thus it would not be necessary for each country individually to acquire the classic prerequisites necessary for the attainment of communism. See also Mikoyan's statement on Mongolian anniversary: Radio Moscow, 11 July 1963.

[5] *Probleme Economice*, April 1960.

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become alarmed at the ambitiousness of Rumania's economic plans. This was the crucial period, before the publication and approval of the Rumanian plans at the Rumanian Party's third congress in June of that year, when Birladeanu and a team of Rumanian economists held protracted negotiations in Moscow with their Soviet counterparts, Kosygin and others.[6] The question obviously arose of the extent of Soviet aid, and it is interesting to note that the new Soviet-Rumanian long term trade and economic agreement was not signed until the following November. But agreement in principle on Soviet supplies was evidently reached before June, since, at the congress, Khrushchev himself described the Rumanian plans in the most glowing terms and praised Gheorghiu-Dej as an 'outstanding figure in the international workers' movement'.[7] When it was published, the Rumanian-Soviet trade and economic agreements provided that the Soviets would, up to 1965, supply Rumania with over seven million tons of iron ore, nearly three million tons of coke, and nearly three million tons of rolled ferrous goods. These figures show the dependence of Rumania on outside raw materials if her ambitious iron and steel targets were to be even approached. The Soviet Union also agreed to supply machinery and equipment to the value of about 500 million dollars, and to help the Galati Steel Works between 1961 and 1968 with the construction of a large steel shop, with an annual production capacity of 1·5 million tons equipped with a blooming-slabbing installation and continuous sheet rolling mill.[8]

It was not until June 1962, when Khrushchev made a surprise visit to Rumania, that speculation was aroused once again about economic differences between the two countries. But in the course of 1961 there must have been certain voices raised in Comecon councils urging a kind of international specialisation which Rumania considered harmful to her interests. This idea of international specialisation was obviously Soviet sponsored and had become the prevailing policy at the time of the 22nd CPSU congress in October 1961. Speaking at the Rumanian Party's central committee plenum held in November–December 1961 to hear Gheorghiu-Dej's report on the 22nd CPSU congress, the Rumanian planning chief, Gaston-Marin, cited the CPSU programme to support the Rumanian policy of the 'priority development of heavy industry' and continued:

> Our Party has always resolutely opposed and has always combated from a Marxist-Leninist standpoint those erroneous 'theories' which, while defending the keeping of proportions between the branches of the national economy and the priority development of

[6] The negotiations took place in Moscow and lasted from 14 March to 22 April with Birladeanu making at least one trip back to Bucharest for consultations.

[7] *Scinteia*, 22 June 1960. It is, of course, possible that Khrushchev's ostentatious support for Gheorghiu-Dej at this congress was intended as a demonstration of solidarity against the Chinese delegation with whom the most violent polemics were being exchanged at the conference taking place in Bucharest during the Rumanian congress.

[8] The agreement was carried by Tass, 11 November 1960.

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> heavy industry on the scale of the whole socialist camp rather than within the framework of the individual socialist country, in fact deny the necessity of creating the technical and material base of socialism and present in a distorted manner the principles of specialisation and cooperation within the framework of the socialist international division of labour.[9]

This remark would hardly have been made if the Rumanians had not felt that in terms of this framework of the 'socialist international division of labour', there were interpretations, held probably by the most advanced economic powers, like the USSR, East Germany and Czechoslovakia, which implied a severe curtailment of the comprehensive industrial plans of the less advanced nations, such as themselves. They have never declared themselves against the specialisation concept as such; on the contrary, they have declared their support for it quite openly. But, whereas it has evidently seemed to them that the advanced Comecon members interpret specialisation as being by *industry or groups of industries*, the less advanced Rumania interprets it as specialisation by *branches of industry*. This would, of course, allow the Rumanians to go ahead with their many-sided development, whereas the first interpretation would severely restrict it and would seem dangerously like a return to the 20th CPSU congress concept of bloc economic development. The Rumanian attitude seemed to be that they had made their economic plans, in all good faith, in the spirit of the attitude prevailing at the 21st CPSU congress. Now the whole policy was changing, and was changing detrimentally to those plans. Their concern is easy to understand.

WHATEVER suspicions the Rumanians may have felt in 1961 were certainly increased in 1962. In June of that year a Comecon meeting of first party secretaries was held in Moscow which 'unanimously' approved the principle of the socialist international division of labour, although it failed to give any real criteria on which this division was to be based. The meeting also approved in principle the establishment of a central planning body which would coordinate the long term plans of the member countries.

Immediately after this Comecon summit, Khrushchev made his visit to Rumania for reasons which have never been very clear. But, perhaps impressed by the strength of Rumanian insistence on going ahead with their plans, he seems to have been anxious to allay some of the worst fears of his hosts. On the other hand, in nearly all his speeches Khrushchev emphasised the advantages of bloc coordination and specialisation much more than his Rumanian counterparts did. On his return home he stated that 'the wish of the Rumanian comrades' to fulfil new and higher targets in the development of their economy was 'fully comprehensible to us'. But he did not say that Rumania was fully capable

[9] *Scinteia*, 12 December 1961.

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of this. Instead he returned to the theme of Comecon coordination by saying that the Rumanian communists, 'like the fraternal parties of the other socialist countries, saw great possibilities for the growth of production in the unification of effort on the basis of the intensification of cooperation and the further improvement of the international division of labour'.[10]

Neither on his return nor during his eight day stay in the country did Khrushchev mention anything about the projected Galati Steel Works. His hosts, however, constantly referred to it in their speeches and have done so ever since, stressing their determination to go ahead with it. As recently as February this year Politburo member and central committee secretary Nicolae Ceausescu recalled the Soviet agreement of three years before to aid in the project, and by doing so may have been reminding the Soviets of their obligations.[11] But on this point there is need for some caution. One may accept the contention that the Soviets are not favourably disposed toward the Galati project but there is no evidence yet that they have gone back on their promises in the agreement made in November 1960. The fact that the Rumanians have contracted with a French-British consortium for the construction of a rolling mill at Galati and have been negotiating with other western firms over the construction of the complex's steel mill does not necessarily mean that these contracts replace the Soviet promises. They may simply be designed to complement them. More time is needed to decide on this point. The Galati works are only supposed to begin operation in 1965 and construction had not even begun by the beginning of this year. Only perhaps by next year will the various installations which the Rumanians have been promised be needed for delivery. The same caution is necessary in interpreting Rumania's contracting for increased shipments of iron ore from India and Brazil. These may also be designed to supplement the seven million tons promised by the Soviets up to 1965.[12] This caution may, of course, turn out to have been completely unnecessary. Perhaps the Soviet Union has already intimated that it will boycott Galati. But the only hard fact indicating that this might be so is the report that whereas there are 'hundreds' of western technicians in the country at the present, there are very few Soviet specialists indeed.[13]

In September 1962, just three months after the Khrushchev visit, Ulbricht visited Rumania, and it is probable that part of his mission was to get Rumania to modify its economic outlook. It was a case of a more advanced Comecon partner trying to exert pressure on a less advanced one through bilateral means. In a speech on 17 September

10 Radio Moscow, 2 July 1962.

11 *Scinteia*, 4 February 1963; *Pravda*, 4 February 1963.

12 Rumania's dependence on the USSR for iron ore is shown by the fact that in 1961 she received 1,068,200 tons from the Soviet Union (*USSR Foreign Trade for 1961*, Moscow 1962) while her domestic production in the same year was only about 1,736,700 tons (*Rominia Libera*, 1 February 1963).

13 *Stuttgarter Zeitung*, 14 May 1963.

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1962 the then East German planning chief, Bruno Leuschner, who accompanied Ulbricht, referred to the taking of 'more decisive steps in perfecting the socialist division of labour', and asserted that 'every socialist country will have to learn even better than before how to think and act'. The socialist division of labour, according to Leuschner, would have to 'pervade even more the bilateral relations between socialist states'.[14] The East German delegation seems to have got short shrift indeed from its Rumanian hosts, and relations between the two countries seem to have worsened as a result of the visit. The communiqué issued at the end of it called for further talks on increased trade and economic collaboration, but these talks have not yet been held and the annual trade protocol between the two countries for 1963, signed this April, did not mention any planned increase in volume.

THESE difficulties in relations with East Germany give substance to the reports that it was mainly the advanced Comecon partners like the Soviet Union, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia which were frowning on Rumania's economic plans and had a different interpretation of the concept of the socialist division of labour. At any rate the differences of interpretation evidently came to a head at the meeting of the Comecon executive committee, composed of vice-premiers of the member countries, held in Moscow in February 1963. From 5 to 8 March the Rumanian central committee held an enlarged plenum which seems to have been devoted exclusively to the results of the meeting of this Comecon executive committee. Not only was Rumania the only country to hold a plenum of precisely this character, but at the end of its deliberations the central committee issued a communiqué which contained some odd formulations. It reaffirmed the correctness of the instructions which the Rumanian delegate, Alexandru Birladeanu, had taken with him to the February meeting and congratulated him on the job he had done in Moscow. Now Birladeanu is much too able and confident a person to need a gratuitous boost of this sort. It is probable that all his well known skill and toughness as a negotiator were put to the test during the Moscow meeting and that, when he reported back, his superiors in Bucharest considered that the situation warranted an ostentatious reaffirmation of the Rumanian stand in Comecon and the way Birladeanu had presented, or defended it. The communiqué continued as follows:

> The plenary meeting reasserted its full agreement with the fundamental principles of the socialist international division of labour, adopted by the conference of the representatives of communist and workers' parties of the Comecon countries held in June 1962, in keeping with the main means of successfully developing and deepening the socialist international division of labour and coordination of the national economic plans in the spirit of the principles proclaimed

[14] *Neues Deutschland*, 18 September 1962.

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> by the 1960 Moscow statement, of observance of national independence and sovereignty, of full equality of rights, comradely mutual aid and mutual benefit.[15]

This is a remarkable statement indeed. It adds an all important rider to the basic principles of specialisation, agreed to at the June 1962 Comecon summit meeting, by using the 1960 Moscow statement as an escape hatch for those countries (specifically Rumania) who see their own economic plans threatened by an unfavourable interpretation of these principles and by any attempt at interference by any supra-national planning authority which might come into being. It served notice on all who were interested that Rumania would not, as was reportedly being urged, confine her economic development mainly to exploiting her oil reserves, her petro-chemical industry, textiles, fertilisers, and foodstuffs.[16]

The speeches delivered at this plenum have never been published and one must treat the unofficial reports of what went on with great caution. But several reliable reports agree that full and enthusiastic backing was given to the Politburo's stand and that it was decided to make very strong representations to Khrushchev, warning him that Rumania would refuse any demand that she seriously curtail her all-round economic development. There followed what was probably the most serious move made so far by Gheorghiu-Dej—the decision to inform the basic party organisations of the decisions taken at the plenum and of the whole Rumanian stand.[17] By informing the whole Party Gheorghiu-Dej was burning his boats, staking his whole prestige and making a complete climb down almost impossible.

It was this communiqué on the plenum which really alerted western observers to the strained relations between the Soviet Union and Rumania. (Previously it had mainly been the Vienna correspondent of *The Times* who had been reporting responsibly and accurately on the friction.) Normally Rumania is something of a closed shop to western correspondents, but now Bucharest's officialdom seemed almost to welcome this western interest in its situation. Immediately before the regular fifth session of Comecon's executive committee in Moscow (14–25 April, Gaston Marin gave an interview to the correspondent of the Milan *Corriere della Sera* (16 April 1963). In answer to a question regarding his country's posture vis-à-vis Comecon, Marin declared:

> We are in the phase of bilateral discussion. Rumania has concluded agreements of this type with the Soviets, Bulgarians, and Poles for the manufacture of certain types of machines. Comecon recognises the right of every nation to develop and plan in keeping with its own national interests. Comecon is an organisation of sovereign states.

[15] *Scinteia*, 8 March 1963.

[16] There has never, of course, been any official statement or even hint that Rumania should confine herself to these industries, but these commodities have frequently been mentioned by journalists basing themselves on informal conversations.

[17] This was first reported in the Belgrade *Politika* of 9 April 1963. It was carried in *The Times* the following day.

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This stress on bilateralism came long after the Soviet stress on Comecon had shifted to multilateralism, to coordination and rationalisation. It was out of tune with every other statement on Comecon being made in every other member country.

Marin's statement to *Corriere della Sera* came immediately after the signing of a very important trade agreement between Rumania and Italy involving a big expansion in the volume of trade for 1963. Marin also stated in his interview that at present some 33 per cent of Rumania's trade was with the non-communist world, and this figure might well go up to 40 per cent in the near future. It is quite likely that Rumania's successes in opening up trade with Western Europe has all along been one of the bones of contention between Rumania and the Soviet Union. Important orders for industrial equipment and installations have been placed in practically all major Western European industrial countries, either to complement or replace Soviet bloc orders. The superiority of the Western deliveries over those from the East is admitted privately by all Rumanian officials, who recently have taken the unprecedented step of complaining openly about the quality and late delivery of certain Czechoslovak machinery.[18] Rumania's determination to maintain and increase these trade contacts with the West may have been one of the several aspects of policy which Birladeanu had to defend in Moscow in February.

He was probably also in the dock at the April executive committee session in Moscow, which lasted 12 days, an unusually long time, and ended with a communiqué so tentative and hesitant that it was obvious that very little was achieved. This conclusion received strong circumstantial support by the calling of an extraordinary session of the same committee in Warsaw on 10 May, only 15 days after the regular session in Moscow had ended. (Normally the committee meets every two months.) The Warsaw meeting also evidently failed to solve the existing differences between the member states, and the general complex of problems was referred to a session of the Comecon council, probably to be attended by the First Party Secretaries and presumably to be held some time this summer.[19]

18 *Scinteia*, 24 May 1963. Rumanian complaints on this score were apparently the reason for the visit of a Czechoslovak delegation headed by the Minister of Heavy Machine Building.

19 A summit meeting of First Party Secretaries on Comecon questions has been expected since the beginning of 1963. On 8 January the Hungarian language paper in Novi Sad, *Magyar Szo*, reported on an interview given by Hungary's chief Comecon delegate, Antal Apro, to the Hungarian Party daily, *Nepszabadsag* on 6 January. Apro spoke of the efforts of the Comecon states to accelerate specialisation and integration as being ' accompanied by certain unhealthy symptoms '. He continued: ' It is expected that, at the forthcoming meeting of the First Secretaries of the Communist and Workers' parties, methods will be pointed out serving the purpose of accelerating the integration and breaking down the negative trends '. This statement by Apro which, significantly enough, was not carried by *Nepszabadsag* but only by *Magyar Szo*, implied that a top level meeting was to have been held shortly. The fact that it did not take place indicates the difficulties encountered, and the ' negative trends ' may have been a way of describing Rumania's recalcitrance.

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THE failure of these various Comecon sessions to achieve anything really tangible should not, of course, be attributed solely to Rumania. Each member has its own vested interest in either embracing or shrinking from the establishment of a Comecon supranational authority. Poland, for example, is evidently willing to relinquish some authority over her national economy if she can acquire the capital for the exploitation of her natural resources. She obviously feels that if she were forced to allocate her scanty investment funds to raw material exploitation she would fall short of the capital needed to complete her industrialisation. Czechoslovakia and East Germany resist ideas of earmarking their own capital for the use of investment-hungry countries like Poland, but advocate the 'socialist international division of labour' simply because they, as the most industrially advanced in the bloc, would obviously keep most of their industries intact and would not have to help a less advanced country like Rumania to develop new industries. These are just a few of the many serious problems which must be impeding the successful evolution of Comecon, and obviously Rumania is not at the centre of all of them. But the fact that, only 11 days after the unsuccessful Warsaw meeting (10–13 May), a high level Soviet delegation, headed by Nikolai Podgorny, arrived in Bucharest, certainly suggests that it was Rumania which was causing the Soviet Union most of the trouble.

The importance of the Podgorny visit was made immediately obvious by the fact that he met Gheorghiu-Dej twice within 48 hours of his arrival, and that his delegation included General A. A. Epishev, who until 1962 had been ambassador in Rumania for six years. Evidently a man who understood the inner workings and mentality of the Rumanian leaders, he had been brought along to facilitate the work of the delegation, which was probably to persuade Gheorghiu-Dej into a compromise acceptable to the Soviet Union. But Podgorny met a united front, and, although his visit passed off cordially enough, it became clear that neither side was prepared to give much in order to overcome the difficulty. In Brasov Podgorny made a speech consisting largely of broad generalities about the necessity for each socialist country to arrange its work according to its own objective conditions. He did not touch upon Comecon or international economic cooperation in any great detail. His host, on the other hand, was quite specific. The Rumanian Party, Ceausescu stated, considered Lenin's call for a heavy industry and a developed machine-building industry as obligatory for every socialist country. He continued with the key statement that to 'equalise the levels of economic development of socialist countries was an essential prerequisite for the building of communism'.[20] The message was clear. No socialist countries were to be considered more equal than others. All countries must be allowed to achieve the full, orthodox industrial base. In the speeches exchanged at the end of the visit by Gheorghiu-Dej

[20] *Scinteia*, 30 May 1963.

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and Podgorny, a great deal of praise was exchanged, and Gheorghiu-Dej even allowed himself a broadside at 'certain political circles and some news agencies in the West' who had misrepresented Rumania's economic policy and her attitude to socialist cooperation. But he firmly restated Rumania's case on this socialist cooperation. Rumania was committed to a policy of 'socialist industrialisation', to the principles of 'equality and mutual advantage', and to the Comecon principles of June 1962 which, he said, ensured 'favourable conditions for the evening-up of the levels of all socialist countries'. Podgorny, for his part, was complimentary enough and gave fulsome praise to those examples of Rumanian economic development which he had seen on his tour, but, with an obvious reference to his hosts' determination to go ahead with comprehensive industrialisation, he said :

> The great Lenin taught us that labour productivity—higher by comparison with that found in capitalism—is in the last instance the principal condition of the victory over capitalism. The most rapid solution of this fundamental problem of economic competition between socialism and capitalism is determined by our common interests. Today, this task is much easier to carry out by uniting forces. . . . Such forms of collaboration between socialist states, as for example the coordination of national economic plans, and the specialisation and coordination of production gain special importance.[21]

On this note the Podgorny visit ended. That the visit produced no decisive result, and may actually have aggravated the differences, is suggested by the failure of Gheorghiu-Dej to appear in East Berlin at the end of June or even to send a deputy. Only a considerable rupture of some kind could have caused this, but it is unlikely that economic differences *alone* account for it. To get at the root of the matter one must consider also the methods the Rumanian leader has been using in his dispute with Khrushchev.

GHEORGHIU-DEJ has been leader of the Rumanian Communist party now for close on 20 years. Only Walter Ulbricht, Enver Hoxha, and, of course, Tito can claim similar periods of uninterrupted power. To have survived so long he has needed, among other things, luck and a great deal of political skill both at home and in his intra-bloc relations.

During his long years in power he has acquired a reputation for a non-committal prudence which has done much to keep him in power. Some of this prudence must be an innate part of his temperament and character but some he has acquired from political experience. In domestic politics, from 1948 to 1951 or early 1952, though he was nominally leader of his Party, he was clearly overshadowed by the Muscovite clique led by Ana Pauker. This was the period when 'home' communist

[21] *Scinteia*, 5 June 1963.

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leaders throughout Eastern Europe were pushed into the background, into prison, or on to the gallows. Men like Kostov in Bulgaria and Rajk in Hungary were executed, a man like Gomulka in Poland was hounded into what seemed would be permanent oblivion. But Gheorghiu-Dej, himself a home communist without any Moscow training, held on, and in 1952, even before Stalin's death, was able to break up the Pauker-Luca group and assume a command in his Party which he has been consolidating ever since.

In bloc politics he has in recent years shown a canny grasp of power realities, a grasp which has made him slow to commit himself too far in one direction lest he be caught off balance when that direction was reversed. With the coming of Khrushchev, especially after the reconciliation with Tito in 1955, he saw that the granite-like certainties of the Stalin era were at an end, that nothing was permanent, that if anything happened to Khrushchev his policies might be drastically reversed by his successors, or that even under Khrushchev Kremlin policy could pursue an often bewilderingly zig-zag course. In 1948 under Stalin he had joined eagerly in the attack on the Yugoslavs, to some extent perhaps because he knew he might have been the next outcast if he hadn't, and after May 1955 he embraced Tito probably to keep his name off the Yugoslav leader's demolition list, which included Hoxha, Rakosi, and Chervenkov. But after the Hungarian rising and the quick change-about on Tito, Gheorghiu-Dej became cautious. He was very slow in his criticism of the Yugoslavs after Hungary, and when he did criticise, he was relatively mild. On Albania he has done what was required of him but little more, seeming all the while to prefer to let others make the running. This same caution has just been demonstrated most strikingly on the crucial issue of China. Here again he and his subordinates have done what was required of them, but probably only the minimum and often in a tone perfunctory rather than zealous. Finally, on the new Soviet rapprochement with Yugoslavia, he has been more cool towards Belgrade than any other Soviet ally.

It is on the question of China, however, that he seems to have embarked on a new tactic, to have done more than simply exercise restraint. The implications for intra-bloc relations of the Sino-Soviet dispute must be as obvious to the leaders in the East as they are to the pundits in the West. They now have much more scope for manoeuvre and more opportunity to exercise independence of action than ever before. Khrushchev, for his part, finds himself more desirous than ever of strong support in Eastern Europe, while at the same finding his powers of compulsion less. Gheorghiu-Dej is certainly no Maoist. On the most basic political and ideological issues which divide the Soviet Union and China there seems little doubt where Rumania stands. Ever since 1960 the Bucharest government has followed Moscow closely on questions like peaceful coexistence, the non-inevitability of war, even on aid to the developing countries. But Gheorghiu-Dej has seen Mao as a political instrument to use against Khrushchev in his current

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Comecon struggle. This seems the only explanation for the quiet return of the Rumanian ambassador to Tirana in March [22], and for the signing of a trade agreement with Albania involving a considerable increase in turnover for 1963.[23] It certainly seems the best explanation for the 1963 trade agreement with China,[24] involving a 10 per cent increase in turnover at a time when trade between China and the rest of the East European bloc was either stagnating or seriously deteriorating.

But recently Gheorghiu-Dej took a very serious step indeed and may have gone too far. It was obvious to all that Moscow took the most violent exception to Peking's letter to the CPSU of 14 June, containing the 25 points on which discussions should be based in the bilateral talks between the Parties. Every bloc regime in Eastern Europe, therefore, simply published the Tass statement saying that the letter contained slanders and distortions and would not be published. Every regime, that is, except the Rumanian, which published a long account of the letter itemizing all 25 points in the central newspaper *Scinteia* on 26 June. This was an act of open defiance to Khrushchev, who was to show his great sensitivity on the Chinese letter by expelling three Chinese diplomats in Moscow for distributing copies of it, and was bound to notice that the Chinese and their allies were beginning to take an unwholesome interest in the Rumanian deviation and were indirectly giving it their support.

For example, the Chinese letter of 14 June to the CPSU contained several paragraphs which could be construed as supporting Rumania. The following is the most striking:

> It is absolutely necessary for socialist countries to practise mutual economic assistance, cooperation and exchange. Such economic cooperation must be based on the principles of complete equality, mutual benefit and comradely mutual assistance. It would be great power chauvinism to deny these principles and, in the name of the 'international division of labour' and 'specialisation', to impose one's will on others, to infringe or harm the interests of their people (*People's Daily*, 17 June 1963).

It is, therefore, quite likely that this question of the Chinese letter was closely and immediately connected with Gheorghiu-Dej's non-appearance in East Berlin. Fearing that he would be in a minority of one at any informal summit, he stayed away, revealing in a most striking way what seems the worst rift in Eastern Europe since the Albanian affair.

Gheorghiu-Dej's absence showed, of course, that the whole Rumanian-Soviet issue was political as well as economic, and the question arises whether it *need* have become political. Obviously serious economic questions affecting a country's whole future must assume a political

[22] This was done very quietly and the Rumanians did not announce it. Radio Tirana broadcast the news on 28 March 1963.
[23] Radio Bucharest, 8 March 1963.
[24] Radio Bucharest, 8 April 1963.

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character, but what is meant here is whether the economic difficulties would have become so acute without there being a latent political antagonism to make them so serious. For example, in the case of Bulgaria, which is also an underdeveloped country in the industrial sense and which has also embarked upon a most ambitious 20-year scheme of industrialisation, there seem to be no difficulties with the Soviet Union and no signs that Bulgaria is cutting back on its plans because of Comecon pressure. What explains the difference? Most probably there are differences of policy between Gheorghiu-Dej and Khrushchev on other issues. One of these issues may be the refusal of the Rumanian leader to throw his full weight behind Khrushchev's policy on such intra-bloc matters as Albania, China, and the new rapprochement with Yugoslavia. Another may be Gheorghiu-Dej's clear reluctance to take the lessons of the 22nd CPSU congress to heart and to introduce a policy of destalinisation at home. Of all the Eastern European regimes, Rumania remains the least affected by the winds of change. Khrushchev, for his part, has staked much of his reputation on the success of his internal reforms; his domestic policy has become one of the points at issue with China and he must be anxious for his bloc to follow suit, at least to some extent. Gheorghiu-Dej, perhaps out of some Byzantine fear of the people he is governing, has done practically nothing. The Bulgarian Zhivkov who, unlike Gheorghiu-Dej, has had to depend a great deal on the Kremlin to assert supremacy in his Party, has ostentatiously embraced the Khrushchev policy. This may be one explanation for the different treatment.

WHAT we are witnessing in this Rumanian question is another example of nationalism at work in Eastern Europe, the defence of national interests against what Khrushchev considers to be the interests of the communist bloc in general and the Soviet Union in particular.

In recent years the Gheorghiu-Dej regime has made conscious efforts to identify itself with the nationalist spirit in Rumania, efforts, however, which have fallen short of relaxing the tight security grip on the people. Considerable propaganda has been expended to show that the Rumanian communists, or more correctly the Gheorghiu-Dej 'home' communist group which now holds the supreme power, is the continuation of all that is finest and most progressive in the Rumanian national tradition.[25] These pretensions are, of course, absurd, but the regime is evidently taking its efforts very seriously, and they have led to

[25] These efforts were very conspicuous after the 22nd CPSU congress. At the November-December plenum in 1961, held after the Soviet congress, Gheorghiu-Dej used the issue of 'Rumanianism' to batter the Pauker-Luca 'cosmopolitan' clique, many of whom, of course, were Jewish. All the sins of the personality cult and of stalinism generally he ascribed to this group, thus diverting attention from his own far from perfect record and making it appear that stalinism in Rumania had disappeared with the Paukerites.

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an interesting clash with a Soviet historian which was one of the first outward signs of any kind of dispute between the two countries.

On 17 December, 1962, the Belgrade *Politika* carried a message from the Tanjug correspondent in Bucharest referring to an article in *The Annals of the Historical Institute of the Central Committee of the Rumanian Workers' Party*. This article gave 'an unaccustomed rebuke' to a Soviet historian, V. B. Ushakov, who, in a book published in 1961 called *The Foreign Policy of Hitlerite Germany*, failed to mention the armed uprising in Rumania which followed the overthrow of the Antonescu dictatorship on 23 August 1944. Ushakov had neglected the part allegedly played by the Rumanian Communist party and gave the impression that Rumania's liberation was entirely the work of the Red Army.

This is by no means merely a wrangle between academics. The dispute, as the Tanjug correspondent pleasantly put it, 'has a high content of contemporaneity'. What Ushakov did was simply to give the stalinist version of what happened, a version which was apparently still current in Soviet historiography. But the Rumanian communists now have a version of their own, which is equally false but politically very important. Simply put, this version is that the 23 August coup was staged by 'the democratic forces headed by the communists' with, very recently, King Michael getting a bit of credit for having seen the game was up and for having contacted these 'communist-led' democrats.

This preoccupation with the August coup is, of course, part of the present regime's nationalist propaganda, and no doubt Khrushchev has no strong objection to its trying to make capital out of it. But the public taking to task of a relatively obscure Soviet historian was probably inspired by some political motive, no matter how esoteric the form and the vehicle used. On this question the Rumanians seemed to win their point, for another Soviet historian, E. D. Karpeshchenko, soon set the record straight about 23 August very much in the Rumanians' favour.[26] He ended his essay, however, by a passage on economic coordination in the Soviet bloc which seemed designed to show the Rumanians that, while Ushakov may have been wrong about his history, Khrushchev was right about his economics.

In this 'Rumania first' policy Gheorghiu-Dej seems to have the whole Party behind him. There seems to be little or no serious factionalism on which Khrushchev might play. One may also assume that the population, nationalist and Russophobe by tradition, also support him, despite his regime's oppressiveness and the fact that the advance in living standards has lagged lamentably behind the growth in industrial production. On this issue Khrushchev may be facing a national unity which, coming from Rumania, must surprise him.

* * *

Where will it all lead to? It is a question one must shrink from answering. But (to anticipate a thought which must be in many people's

[26] *Novaya i Noveishaya Istoriya*, No. 2, 1963.

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minds) it is very difficult to see Rumania as another Albania in the making. It is true that the Rumanian leadership seems solidly united, but, unlike Albania, Rumania has a long common border with the Soviet Union, and Gheorghiu-Dej would have to be in a truly desperate situation indeed to consider the ultimate solution which Hoxha sought and found. Up to now his policy has been one of political pressure or blackmail against the Soviet Union. But though he seems to have staked his whole reputation in his country on being allowed to go through with his policy, he knows that the success of that policy still depends to a great extent on imports from the Soviet Union and her Comecon partners. For this is not a question of Rumania going it alone. She has set for herself an economic programme far out of keeping with her own resources. She has thus made herself dependent. Whether she could get from the West or from China, or both, all the material she needs and be able to pay for it, if the Soviets applied economic sanctions, is open to great doubt indeed.

As for Khrushchev, no matter how angered he may be by the boldness of the Rumanian action, he can hardly afford to have another Albania on his hands. Nor can he afford to see Rumania open the gates wide to Western European (or Chinese) businessmen. It seems at present to be a question of whether his nerve can last longer than that of Gheorghiu-Dej. He probably cannot get rid of him and so may well reconcile himself to living with him. And this may mean a compromise which saves the face of both, before the point of no return is reached.

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NELSON

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CROSS-CURRENTS IN PRAGUE

Frank Osvald

CZECHOSLOVAKIA presents a strange paradox to the western observer: in its political and social traditions the most civilised, the most prosperous, and the most 'western' country in the Soviet bloc, it is also the most conservative and totalitarian. There is no obvious explanation for the survival of Novotny's dictatorship, as there is for the Ulbricht regime sustained solely by Russian bayonets; nor can its diehard authoritarianism be attributed to social backwardness, as can Hoxha's tribal despotism. On the contrary, Czechoslovakia is the only country in what is now East Europe which is tied closely to the West by history and way of life; it is also the only communist state with a solid tradition of democratic government, a powerful working-class movement and trade-union organisation. All of these were carried comparatively smoothly into tyranny in what the Czechoslovak Communist party (not without reason) has always prided itself on being the only 'constitutional' coup in the Soviet sphere; what is more to the point, the people of Masaryk and Benes allowed themselves to be cheated just as smoothly of the fruits of destalinisation, while less favoured societies like the Polish, Hungarian, or even the despised Balkans, were carving out for themselves a less restrictive political framework.

What makes the phenomenon more puzzling still is that this indignity (as it is felt to be in Prague) was maintained if not imposed without the more evident trappings of the police state. Prague is still one of the most accessible and comfortable capitals in the communist world. Visitors from the West will find few direct restrictions on travel within the country; they are free to study the neglected farms or the progressive decay of the former Sudeten areas as closely as the manicured elegance of the shopwindows in the capital—though in fact few seem eager to do so. Beyond the complete absence of non-communist newspapers on the stalls, the visitor will not find any very striking evidence of censorship, and though he may notice plenty of queues and other indications of economic stringency, these could at present be paralleled in many other parts of the Soviet orbit. Indeed, the polemics of the last few months have not supported the impression that Novotny's Czechoslovakia is the perfect police state; on the contrary, there is no other recorded case of a communist prime minister being subjected, while still in office, to an apparently unrehearsed attack on his stalinist past.[1]

The CSSR has thus since 1956 presented the curious spectacle to the outside world of a tyranny without victims (at least until the Barak case

[1] Miro Hysko in the Slovak Party organ *Pravda*, 3 June, against Viliam Siroky. *Pravda* subsequently retracted (25 June) after Novotny in a speech in Kosice (12 June) had warned it against becoming a platform of 'hysterical attacks' on the Party; in the course of later polemics, Hysko was accused of repeating what had been discussed at Slovak Party meetings.

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in 1961), whose people submit without visible compulsion or resistance to more crippling restrictions on their freedom than any other in communist Europe. For all that, life in Prague (though not in many provincial towns or in the countryside) has remained western and civilised; abstract art and the twist, if not exactly tolerated, are not exactly persecuted either. Throughout the restalinisation of the past two years, plays continued to appear dealing with such delicate topics as the 'class basis' of selection of students for university study. Kafka can be discussed brilliantly and subtly in the official organ of the Czechoslovak Writers Union —moreover, by a rehabilitated victim of the Slansky purge, and while the secretary of that same Union is a poet and journalist (Ivan Skala) who was the star-reporter at the Slansky trial and in 1952 subjected that same author to a stream of anti-semitic invective. Novotny himself played a prominent part in the case of the now 'legally' rehabilitated Slansky.

Such contradictions make it no doubt more difficult for many Czechs to adopt an unequivocal attitude towards their regime; they have frequently also made it harder for western observers to take up a consistent standpoint. Both the country's high material standards and its totalitarianism have been covered by the label 'model satellite', though it has never been quite certain what Czechoslovakia was supposed to be a model for. The passivity and political quietism of the population has been labelled the 'Good-Soldier-Schweik' attitude; this, according to the writer's taste, could mean either a superior kind of resistance or a degrading servility.

In both labels there is some truth. Prague has served for many years as the showpiece of communist prosperity, although the prosperity existed despite rather than because of communism. Czechoslovak policy has been noted abroad particularly for its subservience to the Moscow line, notwithstanding the discrepancy between its loyalty to Russia on the Sino-Soviet issue and its approach to destalinisation at home. A suggestion of far-reaching differences between Khrushchev and Novotny on this point was even specifically refuted by the latter in his interview in *The Times* on 12 June 1963 but almost immediately confirmed by the belated and almost secretive review of the purge trials undertaken at the same time. The Good Soldier Schweik, again, is not merely a useful journalistic cliché or a national monument, but the focus of an intense debate about the Czech civic ethos, in which he appears not as a funny, but almost tragic figure.[2]

FOR what is happening in Czechoslovakia is a crisis of opposition as well as of leadership. The charges of 'too little and too late' brought in various forms against the Novotny regime for its halfhearted gestures of destalinisation, are echoed by the critics' self-accusations for

[2] Karel Kosik, during a 'Symposium on the Problems of Contemporary Prose', held with the participation of authors from six communist countries (including Yugoslavia) in Prague on 10–11 January 1963 (*Literarni Noviny*, 19 January).

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not having claimed more, and sooner. Through the indictment of the 'personality cult' and its survivals, especially by the Czech and still more by the Slovak authors at their congresses in April and May last year, there runs a bitter undercurrent of shame for having abetted them. The intellectuals' debate has not been less remarkable for its concentration on issues of public and personal morality than for its occasionally fierce assault on the stalinist old guard. Conscience, truth, human dignity, dominated these debates not merely as demands upon the regime, but as the individual's commitment towards himself.

> The worst of it is that we not only struck the word (conscience) from our vocabulary, but also from our thoughts and actions. A friend was arrested and at once one had ready an explanation and justification. 'You don't know they've actually put anyone inside,' one would say; or 'they know what they are doing'. . . . When an honest communist revolted inwardly against an all-too-glaring case, he immediately doubted his own mind—wasn't he perhaps a deviationist himself? a trotskyist? a sentimental bourgeois? Conscience had become a bourgeois survival . . . (Ladislav Mnacko, in *Kulturny Zivot*, 5 January 1963).

True, he also argues that 'honest communists' somehow honestly surrendered their conscience; and he disputes the—as he says—often repeated reproach that 'we were all at that time (i.e. the time of the Slansky purges) cowardly, that we refused to face the truth, that we publicly approved what we were rejecting in our hearts, afraid to express our feelings lest we should share the same fate. . . .' But more important is the admission that the reproach is made. Since January, when the above words were written, it has been repeated in more and more topical contexts. Miroslav Holub, a poet who is also a physician and biologist, ventured the macabre statement at the third Czechoslovak Writers congress in May that in socialist-realist poetry 'joy fluttered like a stuffed humming bird over the trials and the violations of socialist legality' (*Literarni noviny*, 1 June 1963); and in the course of the same debate, another author, Alexander Matuska, declared that 'the cult of personality is not everything . . . we must all share a certain part of the blame' (ibid.), while the editor of the Slovak Youth Union journal, complained of the 'tame and unsubstantial spirit' of the congress of Czechoslovak journalists, traditionally a stalinist stronghold and hitherto immune to self-questioning, which had left the feeling that 'once again, nothing had been solved' (*Smena*, 1 June).

This new spirit of self-analysis among the intellectuals recalls a very similar mood at the second Writers congress in 1956. But their disillusionment catches a much wider feeling outside the intellectual elite, among sections of the population who have nothing like the same chance of making their views known and figure in published materials solely as the object of official refutations. The growing frequency of such refutations of criticism on a variety of subjects, from the breakdown of supplies and services to anxieties about Comecon arrangements and the 'second

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Slansky purge ' against Rudolf Barak and his followers, sets the intellectual ferment in a much wider context of national unrest. And much of this is inspired by the national crisis in selfconfidence no less than by the increasingly obvious incompetence of the administration.

MEASURED by the absence of any organised opposition to its rule, the Czechoslovak regime must be regarded as the most successful in the communist world; measured by the amount of support it enjoys, it must surely count as one of the most miserable, excepting only Ulbricht's in Eastern Germany. Its great achievement was the peaceful transfer of power in a parliamentary democracy; its other claim, however, which follows from the first, that Czechoslovak communism has proved the possibility of building socialism in a highly industrialised country, has largely proved unfounded. In fact the experience of 15 years of communist rule in Czechoslovakia demonstrates the almost exact opposite: that a party of social revolution attempting to rule a country that lacks the conditions for revolution condemns itself to the pursuit of power for its own sake.

Novotny is probably sincere when (as he argued in *The Times* interview) he regards himself not as a stalinist but as a Khrushchevite. He models himself closely on the Soviet leader, down even to echoing his embarrassing explanations about not having known of Stalin's crimes.[3] Novotny, like Khrushchev, is a product of the machine whose stepping stones to power were dead men's shoes—the purge of Slansky in 1952 did the same for the Czechoslovak leader as the liquidation of the Ukrainian ' moderate stalinists ' did for Khrushchev in 1938. The essence of Novotny's policy is clearly an application of the Khrushchev line of extending and strengthening the party's role as the basis of economic and public life, most ambitiously in what has so far been Novotny's crowning achievement, the ' Socialist Constitution ' of 1960.

Novotny can in fact claim with some justice to have been misrepresented when his policies are regarded as the opposite of Khrushchev's. That his efforts have not received their due, may be because the results are so different. Novotny all too obviously lacks his mentor's flair for showmanship and public relations, even for impromptu speechmaking. The contrast between the two men's popularity is glaring. Yet there is more to it than a difference in personality. Khrushchev is not merely one of the few genuinely popular leaders Russia has ever had; his regime rests on a solid base of social support. Novotny has not merely forfeited all hope of ever being popular or even respected by the Czechoslovak public, but the foundations of his power are amazingly narrow—the *apparat* of professional party cadres, regional secretaries, and the secretariat. Even there, backing for the President and first

[3] Novotny in his *Times* interview: ' He had known Stalin as a determined leader, but he had not known of his deeds, and the methods which Mr Khrushchev had revealed. All that had been a great surprise to him.' The parallel with Khrushchev's speech on 8 March is evident.

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secretary seems to be far from unanimous. These party professionals are not, however, a social force; and in a sense Novotny's *apparat* rules against all the rest of society. With the exception of the period of the 'New Course' under Antonin Zapotocky between 1953 and 1957, this has always been so, for reasons probably less connected with the aims or ambitions of Novotny or his predecessors than with the peculiar dilemma facing the Communist party (KSC) when it assumed power in an economically and socially highly developed country. Czechoslovak communism is a revolutionary movement without a revolutionary cause. Unlike most other East European countries, the CSR offered little opportunity for applying the standard communist programme of heavy industrial investment, land reform, and the social revolution. It had no fascist or authoritarian past to live down, no feudal landowner caste to dispossess, no glaring economic mismanagement or social injustice to remedy. From the very first, the post-war Communist party was a naked apparatus for power without a social function. Even its electoral triumph in 1946, when it gained 41 per cent of votes in the Czech provinces (30 per cent in Slovakia) contributed to this character. Whatever the reasons that made people vote communist—among them post-war radicalism and the lowering of the voting age to 18, the communist championship of the 'gold rush' to the Sudeten areas and of anti-German chauvinism, which met a common desire to compensate for wartime collaboration—few were connected with any positive programme. From the first this was a highly efficient but thoroughly demoralised force; it became the recognised refuge of collaborators, its chief stronghold was the 'Wild West' of the evacuated German border areas, it was swamped first by profiteers and later by timeservers. While the wave of post-war idealism soon ebbed and the idealists were either purged or disillusioned, the timeservers remained. The party—the largest after the Soviet and Chinese—has retained this character despite an enormous turnover of membership (having expelled about 900,000 members up till now, according to the Party journal *Zivot Strany* in February 1963), and consists today of a small professional core rather loosely controlling the enormous rank and file, among them the entire elite as well as the much larger number of those for whom a party card is the essential entrance ticket to even a modest professional and social career.

Despite constant purges, it has not been capable of renewing itself like the communist parties of Poland or Hungary. It has often been noted that true revisionists, ready to do battle against superior forces to save the pure and original creed from corruption, are rarer in the Czech party than anywhere else in the Soviet bloc. None of the few potential revisionist candidates, from Clementis to Barak, has been able to rally sufficient support, or to offer a constructive alternative programme. Many Czech and especially Slovak communists are aware of this, and the cult that has grown around the dead Clementis is connected with the widely held belief that he might have become a Czechoslovak Gomulka.

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A REVISIONIST platform in Czechoslovakia meets the almost insuperable difficulty that there is no 'original faith' to fall back on. This is most evident—and most relevant in the present context—in the economic field. In Poland and Hungary, or, mutatis mutandis, in the USSR and even China, the benefits of communist revolution, i.e. the building of an industrial base for economic and social expansion, are evident (leaving aside the irrelevant question whether these might not have been attained more efficiently or with less sacrifice without the revolution). These 'objective results' can be separated from the 'dogmatic' encrustations, the terror, ideological tyranny, the excesses of forced collectivisation, or Soviet colonialism, and can thus provide a platform for reform within the party, and a possible basis for cooperation with the non-communist experts and the masses. It is otherwise in Czechoslovakia. Perhaps the greatest single failure of the party leadership is that it has never been able to strike up a working relationship with the 'new class', and has from the very first been in a state of declared or undeclared war with the experts and managers. Nowhere else has the slogan 'Politics in command', often attributed to China's ideological diehards, been so much the centre of party policy as in Czechoslovakia, the most modern industrial power in the communist world. An absurd situation, but not really mysterious: Alone among the nations of East Europe, Czechoslovakia's economy was not damaged by the war; thanks to German investments and transfers of stock to this safe hinterland, it finished the war richer than it started. The expansion, however, distorted the economy in the direction of heavy industry and the primary sectors to such an extent that the first Czechoslovak post-war plan, the two-year plan of 1947, proposed—with communist support—to dismantle and convert the surplus capacity. Yet shortly after the February 1948 takeover the trend was reversed and the party started upon its familiar 'giganto-maniac' policy from which the economy has never fully recovered (and whose worst excesses, like the Huko steelworks in Eastern Slovakia, it has since been the fashion to blame on Slansky). Most of the difficulties as well as the triumphs of the regime can be seen as stemming directly or indirectly from this source. Lacking a constructive programme for developing the economy in accordance with Czechoslovakia's own needs, the communist leaders had to rely heavily on the Soviet lead, which in effect meant bleeding Czechoslovakia's resources and capacity for the benefit of Stalin's armoury in the early fifties, and for the *tiers monde*, Cuba, and (as the majority of Czechs believe, perhaps not altogether justly) Comecon in the sixties.

Czechoslovak 'dogmatism' is thus the result as much as the cause of planning the economy, as it were, against the grain. Every planning decision involves the ultimate rationale of the regime's power, to which the problem of efficiency, in the final analysis, is nearly always subordinated. This pattern has been broken only once, during the brief Czechoslovak thaw which began abruptly in the summer of 1953 and petered

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out soon after the beginning of full-scale destalinisation elsewhere in 1956.

This was Zapotocky's NEP—the 'New Course', launched after the excesses of the first 'revolutionary' period had brought the country to the edge of catastrophe, necessitating among other restrictions a far-reaching currency reform which—because it robbed a large number of workers of half a month's wages—provoked a series of strikes and demonstrations in Prague and other centres and a shortlived rising in Plzen, home of the Skoda Works and traditionally anti-communist, which held the city for two days. (It preceded the Berlin rising of 17 June 1953 by two weeks.) 'There were even communists who rose against the party and went over to the anti-state position of reaction', wrote *Rude Pravo* on 19 June.

Though much more modest than the Hungarian thaw started at about the same time, the new course had a considerable liberating effect, perhaps out of proportion to the actual extent of the reforms. Zapotocky can be called the Czechoslovak Malenkov to Novotny's Khrushchev (and was severely criticised by his successor for his liberalising tendencies, especially in agriculture, soon after his death), and the author of what has become known in Moscow as the 'Czechoslovak solution', which combined a cautious liberalisation of the economy and concessions to the working class with strict ideological control. It made an effort to win the support of the experts, of economists and the 'new class' in general both by a slanting of the price and tax structure in favour of the privileged groups, and by introducing 'effectivity' as the new economic principle, carried into practice by a series of decentralisation measures. What was perhaps most important, though outside the official sphere of policy, the new course allowed a great deal of muddle and corruption, and the growth of an entire illicit sector of private enterprise which filled the gaps left by socialist inefficiency, especially in the service industries.

For this Zapotocky is still remembered with affection. His chief claim to a place in history is probably that he permitted *blat* to become an accepted feature of the Czechoslovak social scene. In this relaxed climate, the specific Czech trait of 'alibism' flourished (i.e. acting so as to provide an alibi against the possibility of a change of regime, as e.g. by giving jobs to politically discredited persons). Since a large section of the population and more especially the working class were peacefully employed making illicit or semi-legal profits with comparative impunity, it remained politically passive. It was this period that created the peculiar Czech compromise between the dictatorship and its subjects and stamped Czechoslovakia with the stamp of Good-Soldier-Schweik quietism, which even the subsequent dismantling of the modus vivendi has not been able to demolish altogether.

THE demolition started soon after the Hungarian revolt; but the sources of Novotny's neo-stalinism can be traced to the immediate aftermath of the 20th Soviet Party congress which showed that Czech

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quietism held unexpected possibilities of revolt. These extended to the party itself; the demand of 35 party organisations (all of them, however, in Prague) for an extraordinary congress was denounced by the then first secretary Novotny as 'attacks on the foundations of our state and our social order' which had to be given 'triple attention, when they find access to the party' (*Rude Pravo,* 12 June 1956).

The party leadership's counter-attack progressively undermined the various aspects of the social truce established by Zapotocky, but none more completely than the laissez-faire attitude towards planning and thus also the arrangement with the managers. The last triumph of the economists against the *apparatchiks* was the reorganisation of industry based on Khrushchev's reforms of July 1957, which was introduced in Czechoslovakia in April 1958. It is ironic that Novotny made this the main target of attack at the 12th KSC congress in December 1962. The principles of rationalisation, 'commercialisation' (i.e. the so-called economy principle as opposed to that of administrative decision), and the separation of distribution from production, all came under fire as the root of all evil. 'The source of our difficulties', stated the Party Programme for the 12th congress (*Rude Pravo,* 14 August 1962), 'are the errors committed during the realisation of the new organisation of planning put forward in 1958, which . . . led to one-sided decentralisation, especially in central direction (*sic*) and in the competence of the central institutions of the state.' More explicitly than in this somewhat uncouth formulation, the 'politics-in-command' principle was stated by Prime Minister Siroky at the congress itself on 5 December: 'The main prerequisite for strengthening central direction is to give increased responsibility to those comrades whom the Party has entrusted with leading functions in the state and in the economic organs, so that they should approach all problems from a Party point of view.' Another speaker in the same debate, the principal secretary for the South Moravia regional Party organisation Martin Vaculik, demanded that key enterprises vital for the national economy should be directed by the Party's central committee, thus echoing Novotny's earlier proposal (put forward in the Party Programme already quoted) for the central direction of agriculture by a body attached to the central committee.

The difficulties for which these drastic measures were put forward almost as a panacea are of several kinds, whose sum represents what is probably the Novotny regime's gravest trial since its accession to power: the bitter aftermath of the Barak affair earlier in the year, in whose wake the internal conflicts in the Party hierarchy had spread to the mass base in industry, causing a serious decline in discipline; growing restiveness among workers and the broad mass of the public over the food shortages and deflationary measures for which the regime's 'Cuban' and 'Polish' policies (meaning economic aid) are held responsible; above all, the country's severest economic crisis in the post-Stalin era. The economic difficulties are not of course new; in many respects (especially in agriculture) they are chronic. During the past year, however, their cumulative

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effect has in many cases reached the point of virtual economic breakdown.

This is not at once apparent from the official account in the Party Programme, according to which underfulfilment of the third five-year plan's targets during the first six months of 1962 was a modest 0·4 per cent (worse by 0·2 per cent than 1961); however, 'behind this figure there are hidden further deficiencies' (*Rude Pravo*, 14 August 1962). The most momentous of these, especially in its impact on public morale, was undoubtedly the inability to stop the rot in agriculture. According to the Party Programme, in what seems a remarkable understatement, 'the current rate of increase in production by 1 to 2 per cent p.a. is inadequate to sustain the growing needs of our society' (ibid). According to western calculations, the maximum rate of increase over the past ten years has been 1·4 per cent p.a., necessitating large imports of foodstuffs which represented a growing strain on the economy; in 1961, output remained stagnant at the 1960 level, against a planned growth target of 7·1 per cent (*Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 17 May 1963). In the blunt words of a Slovak editorial writer, 'we need one milliard (Kcs) crowns' worth of production above the current plan, if our standard of living is to be maintained' (*Praca*, 16 June 1963). The situation was made worse by the apparent failure of Soviet grain deliveries, judging from a reference by Novotny to the need for purchasing grain 'on the capitalist market' in a speech to the central committee on 12 April 1962.

This speech is of interest because it concerned the decision to scrap the over-ambitious third five-year plan (1961–1965) which, it appears from its belated publication, was taken in secret and kept out of the news for about six months.[4] The reasons adduced by Novotny, moreover, differ considerably from those given officially to the public. According to Prague Radio (8 October 1962), the decision to introduce a stop-gap plan in preparation for a seven-year development programme for 1964–1970 was taken to meet the manpower shortage from which all branches of the economy are suffering. In Novotny's 'secret speech' of last April, this reason is not even mentioned; on the contrary, failures in the 'socialist division of labour' (i.e. the failure of other socialist countries to fulfil their long-term trade obligations to the CSSR) are mentioned as a contributory cause of the economic crisis. The full list of complaints is a jumble of partly contradictory failures, pointing to incompetence by almost all the authorities concerned: over-centralisation and rigidity in trade, the adverse development of some aspects of aid, due both to 'capitalist market conditions' and the poor quality of Czechoslovak goods; 'near-anarchic' conditions in industrial planning and management, for which decentralisation is held responsible, the mounting cost of defence and the misconceived application of workers' participation in management, plus the summer drought, winter frost, and

[4] This previously unpublished speech is contained in *Resolutions and Documents of the KSC* (Prague, 1962).

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influenza epidemics which (during the winter 1961–62) affected three and a half million people.

THE core of the chaos is the virtual collapse of investment policy, the more shocking in view of the very high priority given to new investment under the third five-year plan. In an apparently unguarded statement made by Novotny in the course of his *Times* interview he gave the hitherto secret figure at 'over one third of the national income', adding that 'too often we counted on production which did not come'. On all accounts the Czechoslovak economy is littered with investment ruins whose value was stated by Novotny himself (in his speech of 12 April 1962) at 10 milliard Kcs, by the now ousted central committee secretary Bruno Koehler at ten times that figure (*Priboj*, 15 November 1962). 'Everything seemed to fall on our heads last year,' was how the Czechoslovak President put the situation to *The Times*. What mainly appears to have fallen on the Czechoslovak leader's head, however, is the ambitious and utopian reorganisation of the economic and social structure to which he devoted himself after his election to office in 1957, and for which, he complained to *The Times*, he had been accused of neo-stalinism.

> It is said that we are reintroducing Stalinist efforts at tight control. I am called a Stalinist dictator who is tightening the regime. But our people know why these changes had to be made. What we are assuring is the principle of democratic centralism, strengthening the state system while increasing democratic safeguards through the organs of people's control.[5]

The changes referred to by Novotny are those authoritarian measures concentrating control of practically all aspects of economic, social, and cultural life in the 'central organs' (a euphemism for the Party secretariat), presented to the 12th congress as a new programme and a solution for all ills. In reality the programme is far from new. Its two main headings, one affirming 'democratic centralism' in the economy, and one on 'deepening the political and moral unity of the people . . . and the ideological unity of the Party', are almost wearily familiar. What is new is the situation: five years of Novotny's rule have shown that the dialectical unity which is the magic ingredient in 'democratic centralism' does not work, but tends inevitably to split up into thesis and antithesis; and the attempt to impose it has not only made the lack of 'political and moral unity' between people and Party (and even within the Party) glaringly obvious, but has destroyed the uneasy coexistence of the two that was the foundation of Zapotocky's paternalistic regime. The process by which this has been accomplished has—in political essence if not in physical detail—turned the wheel of Czechoslovak politics almost full circle, back to the fallacies and illusions of the first period of stalinism.

[5] These organs were proposed by the Party Programme (*Rude Pravo*, 14 August 1962) as a 'Central people's commission of control and statistics' of which the former (sic) Central Office of State Control and Statistics would be the executive organ.

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Its stages need only be briefly recapitulated. The total collectivisation of agriculture which *Rude Pravo* (15 August 1962) with apparently unconscious irony calls 'the most decisive triumph' of the regime since the 11th Party congress in 1958; the reorganisation of the local government structure to make it coincide with the Party's; the reintroduction of class bias into education and justice through lay magistrates and comrades courts—all these provided the foundation for the ceremonial promotion of the Czechoslovak People's Republic to the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (CSR into CSSR), embodied in the Constitution of 1960 and the now defunct third five-year plan, as the first fully-fledged socialist country after the USSR.

THE conception was essentially a political one, designed to circumnavigate the dialectical cliff of democratic centralism which poses the insoluble dilemma of economic efficiency (demanding managerial autonomy and flexibility in central direction) versus power (demanding the opposite). Party absolutism was, as it were, smuggled in via the back door of the National Committees, i.e. the local government authorities. These, it was thought, would provide a transmission belt for the Party's will, combining flexibility with rigid control. The 1962 Party Programme is the graveyard of these hopes. The National Committees 'which combine the features of state and social organisation' and were given far-reaching powers, 'have used their resources even in conflict with the state's aims and have been guilty of complete disregard of state discipline'. The reader might not guess that these bodies, condemned for local patriotism and for ignoring the over-riding needs of society, represent Novotny's specific contribution to the withering away of the state and to the communist future. Nor for that matter that the irresponsible managers and planners whose narrow provincialism is denounced as the result of 'misconceived' decentralisation are Party appointees—and Party members—throughout. It is thus Novotny's experiment in Party absolutism that has broken down, and this explains the Programme's return to a byzantine absolutism of the state, the 'state plan as the supreme law', and so forth.

It is doubtful, however, whether this substitution of transmission belts can solve the basic economic problem facing the regime, which is to meet the tasks required of it by Soviet economic strategy; these it is not strong enough either to decline or to put before the people. In many respects the situation resembles that of the Slansky period. Indeed, if one subtracts the ghoulish atmosphere of the terror and the anti-semitism, the present crisis has much in common with that of the first five-year plan, which geared Czechoslovakia's economy completely to Stalin's war machine. It is not without irony that even before the original bourgeois nationalists have been fully rehabilitated, they have already found successors. These have not been purged, nor have their views been published; they figure, however, in most statements on economic policy as anonymous objectors to the socialist division of

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labour within Comecon, and to Czechoslovakia's aid policy to underdeveloped countries. They are 'those who have fallen in love with western technology', victims to the 'prejudices of narrow nationalism and local patriotism', who fear that 'the coordination of [the communist countries'] production and investment plans could harm our economy' (Zdenek Fierlinger, chairman of the National Assembly, in *Mlada Fronta*, 9 May 1963). Their views have been characterised as 'survivals of bourgeois nationalism, expressed in attacks on the intensification of cooperation with the socialist countries', which appeared even in the debates preceding the 12th Party congress. Even Novotny, in a speech at Ostrava, centre of heavy industry (and one of the most loyal regions) deplored the 'anxieties over the specialisation of production and transfers of certain sectors to other Comecon countries' (*Rude Pravo*, 24 March 1963).

How widespread this dissatisfaction is may be judged from the curiously defensive tone in which even specialist articles on the subject are written. The Party's theoretical journal *Nova Mysl* (May 1963), under the title 'In the Spirit of Our Progressive Tradition', devotes most of a long article to a polemic against the 'champions of the capitalist market' who claim that by abandoning its trade with the West, the CSSR will lose the chance of obtaining raw materials on more favourable terms. In its June issue the same journal returned to the attack in an editorial couched in sharper terms, calling for 'a resolute struggle against the residues of bourgeois nationalism and chauvinism' revealed in objections both to Comecon and to 'our relations with the developing countries'. The editorial defends the Party's policy against the charge that it is founded exclusively on ideological considerations and does not make economic sense: 'Those who hold such views (i.e. that restrictions in Czechoslovak production programmes will mean unemployment and financial losses) pretend to be guarding our national interests, but in reality they are trying to destroy the political and moral unity of the people and to bring the workers into conflict with the Party'.

The factual basis of the objections—the extent to which Czechoslovakia will be forced to cut down its western trade, the actual restrictions which specialisation will impose on the range of goods produced, the disproportionate share of aid which it contributes (about 20 per cent of total Soviet bloc aid, while it has only 1·5 per cent of the population)—these are never the subject of discussion. This peculiarity of the official campaign against 'economic chauvinism' no doubt explains why both the planners and economists on the one hand, and workers and consumers on the other, regard Comecon and aid policies as 'dogmatic',[6] a revival of the Soviet colonial exploitation of the early fifties.

[6] In fairness it should be noted that Czechoslovak trade policy is not exclusively dogmatic. Recently there has been an effort to fill the gap in South Africa's arms imports by increasing supplies of small arms (cf. *The Observer*, 30 June 1963).

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THE effect has been to bring the Party Programme into discredit, because it is regarded as the instrument for forcing an economically suicidal policy upon the country. Instead of re-establishing the 'political and moral unity' of the masses, the 12th congress became the signal for a fullscale retreat. This, appearances notwithstanding, is not the outcome of the intellectuals' revolt against stalinism, remarkable though that is; nor is it a consequence of the deep rift between the politicians and the experts in the Czechoslovak establishment. The regime has never been unduly concerned with the opinions and mood of the 'new class' which, though economically and socially privileged, is more impotent politically in Czechoslovakia than in any other communist country, and is cut off by its very privileges from the masses. What turned the Party congress from attack to defence was that Novotny's programme and the countrywide discussion of it seem completely to have failed to rally the disgruntled rank-and-file; well over a million in number, they can be taken as a fairly representative cross-section of the 'working population', subject to the same pressures and conscious of the same daily shortcomings.

Novotny's biggest error was to have misjudged their mood. Nowhere else in the communist orbit is the dream-world of the Party bureaucrats and ideologues quite so far removed from the world of everyday life. What they considered—and Novotny still seems to consider—loyalty was resentful passivity. The past two years have upset the subtle system of balances that maintained this passivity and thereby assured the Prague regime's astonishing stability. For the greater part this quietism is simply due to fatigue. Czechoslovakia is in some well advertised respects a very up-to-date country; in others, including most of the petty details of everyday life, its atmosphere recalls the wartime occupation. The same queues for the same things—meat, vegetables, the laundry, the dentist—assemble outside the same shops. The chronic neglect of public services is of course one of the immutable laws of socialist development; what makes it so peculiarly depressing in Czechoslovakia is the constant and high-powered efforts to improve the situation. Innumerable commissions have studied and reorganised the operation of laundering and dry-cleaning, the production and distribution of nails, the price and supply (as Novotny told the Central Committee in April 1962) of toothpicks, singled out as typical for 'small household articles in short supply'. Sometimes the mystery is impenetrable: large-scale laundering services, which bear the promising name 'Liberated Household', have increased about threefold since 1955. Why, asks the Slovak paper *Praca* (22 May) is 97 per cent of all washing still being done at home? The municipal plumbing and maintenance enterprises calculate their plan-fulfilment in terms of the amount of material and time used (*Praca*, 31 May). Repairs become an obsession; 63,781 TV-sets of a certain brand sold in the course of the past half-year required 94,536 repairs in that same period (*Hospodarske Noviny*, 25 May). Both national and local papers publish a stream of complaints; and in the same papers one finds an equally

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steady account of trial and police reports of cases of illicit private enterprise, mostly to alleviate the shortage of legitimate services. The draconic laws passed against this capitalist urge have not of course arrested this, but refined its methods. New hardships produce fresh initiative; the food shortage has inspired professional queueing (*Pravda*, Plzen, 4 November 1962)—a butter queue for 5 Kcs, a refrigerator queue for as much as 100. The various forms of open and concealed graft, bribery (few people would dream of going to the dental centre without the equivalent of a pound note in kind or money), and the equivalents of the specific Czech variety of the odd job, *melouch*, are familiar from all communist countries; to the Czechoslovak political climate they contribute, first, by making it possible for quite a large number of people to live above their nominal income, and more especially by draining the citizens' energy away from political issues.

THE regime's increasingly deflationary policy during the past two years, coupled with a great deal more indoctrination and a much shorter food supply, have however helped to reawaken the political spirit. Contempt for Novotny plays a part in this; since the historic words 'There'll be meat again, comrades!', uttered by him on liberation day, 9 May 1962, working-class protests have become much more frequent and have to be taken much more seriously. In his speech to the Central Committee on 12 April 1962, Novotny dealt at length with the 'Dukla case': a resolution passed by the party organisation of the elite Dukla factory in Prague, that contained most of the known deviations, from social democratism to opportunism, Trotskyism and even dogmatism. 'The class enemy's voice' could be discerned behind this and other resolutions, said the President; they 'deny the Party leadership the right to speak on behalf of the whole Party'. Similar charges have been made during the discussion on the Party Programme—one resolution sent in by the Tatra Motor Works, demanded that Comecon trade be 'cleaned up' and charged the government with ensuring that all trade agreements with the people's democracies be checked 'for fairness and equality' (*Nova Svoboda*, Ostrava, 11 November 1962). Commenting on this, the secretary of the Ostrava regional committee, Drahomir Kolder, demanded a more intensive screening of Party members (ibid).

It is doubtful, however, whether this would be effective in the long run. In fact the 'permanent purge' has never ceased to be an integral part of Czechoslovak internal policy. Through the notorious system of cadre certificates, practically all citizens from schoolchildren to old-age pensioners are regularly screened for political reliability and class origin (and admission to school as well as pension awards may be affected by the result). The system has not, however, been found very profitable with regard to workers, in or outside the Party. The true class division in Czechoslovakia runs not between Party members and non-members, nor even between the elite and the masses, but between those who have to worry about their cadre-certificate and those who don't, those whose

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career may depend on their political and ideological image and those who can be indifferent to it. The latter include most of the workers 'in production'—in the farms, factories, and mines, to which those who are 'screened out' of their more or less privileged positions in offices, the professions, etc. are ultimately sent. The system has most of the advantages of the police state with few of the drawbacks: it is invisible, it is civilised, and it corrupts instead of terrorising.[7] This corruption is one of the chief sources of Czech quietism and a mainstay of Novotny's power. Its effect is not to make people communists, but to train them to become morally neutral, to deprive them of the inclination to distinguish between right and wrong, even to shirk these problems as irrelevant. Together with the class-basis of selection for higher education (which Czechoslovakia, in contrast to Hungary, still upholds), it has effectively disposed of the middle class, or that much of it that has not yet been transferred to production, as a potential opposition. Most important at this point in Czechoslovak affairs, it has taught many the art of being timeservers and oppositionists at the same time: the parent who sends his children in secret to a priest for religious instruction, teaching them at the same time to deny the fact at school; or the young non-conformists who attend one of the numerous concealed 'discussion groups' on political questions, but are careful to toe the line at work. This is not action, but a substitute for action, a fallacy to which many are prone: they cultivate western dress, the twist, and Radio Luxembourg (*Laxik* in Czech slang) as gestures of protest, or persecute African students as a condemnation of the government's foreign aid policy.

THE probing of these sore and only half acknowledged regions of the national conscience is what has made the intellectuals' offensive so fascinating to watch. Much of this has been concerned with tracing the sources as well as the consequences of the attitude summed up by one author in the memorable phrase 'cult of unpersonality' (Milan Schulz in *Literarni Noviny*, 5 January 1963)—the phenomenon of hiding behind the 'collective view' so as to avoid having one's own, of 'parasitism posing as activism', of pretension brazenly standing for principle. The search for a way out of passive egoism and conformist indifference has led to a re-examination of the nation's conduct under Nazi occupation,

[7] The cadre-system has rarely been mentioned publicly until recently; the most remarkable recent reference to it is by Ladislav Mnacko (who at the second Writers' congress in 1956 proposed burning all cadre-certificates) in a story 'Night Conversation' (*Kulturny Zivot*, 8 June), which forms part of a series characteristically entitled 'Delayed Reports'. It is the monologue of a war-time RAF officer: 'I am a disease, a cadre-infection, they watch me everywhere and look closely at everyone they see with me. . . .' The monologue describes the advantages enjoyed by those who collaborated or joined fascist organisations during the war, the 'highly developed ownership instinct' of 'what is termed the working class', the corruption the cadre-system entails in practice and its moral effects: 'What such circumstances will do to a man's character, I needn't tell you'. It refers, of course, to the Stalin age, but the author evidently considered it still topical—as evidently do those who condemned him for it subsequently as having 'besmirched the entire socialist order' (*Kulturny Zivot*, 22 June).

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a topic long shrouded by official legend. The taboo was broken a year ago by the literary monthly *Plamen*, which prepared the ground for much of the present ferment. The topical undertones are evident:

'A debate on the national character is in progress . . . at crucial moments in history, nations reveal both their strength and weakness . . .' The 'specific problem of Czech resistance' was that 'the overwhelming majority of the people were anti-fascist, but only a relatively small part fought actively against fascism . . . The chief obstacle was the Czech attitude of "wait-and-see", the passive expectation that "someone" would bring us liberty, the elevation of cowardice into a principle . . .'

In a remarkable reflection on the Good-Soldier-Schweik cult, the Czech critic Karel Kosik drew an unconventional and disquieting picture of the symbol of passive resistance: 'Schweik appears to us at one and the same time as a good simple soul and a clever scoundrel, an officially certified idiot and an officially suspect rebel, a spy and a loyal subject. . . . His mystery stems from the fact that he is part of a perverted and perverting system, based on the universal assumption that everyone pretends to be something he is not. . . . In this system, one who takes things seriously and literally exposes its absurdity and must therefore himself appear ridiculous and absurd. . . .' (*Literarni Noviny*, 19 January 1963).

The authors and liberal intellectuals, especially those closest to the centre of power in Prague, cannot claim immunity from these charges. Indeed, for them, the assertion of their right to speak on national and political (as dictinct from literary and professional) issues has often been a substitute for actually speaking. There has been much discussion on the obstacles to freedom, but few of them have been scaled. On practical issues their struggle with the establishment was compromised when the Writers Union re-elected the arch-Stalinist Ivan Skala (who had been unconstitutionally imposed on it in 1957) at the May congress. There is justice in the apocryphal aphorism with which the Slovak writers' paper greeted the congress in Prague; 'Galileo: Didn't I say, *Et tamen movetur*? Once again we have arrived where we were seven years ago' (*Kulturny Zivot*, 25 May 1963). Czech authors have therefore pointed to the more pertinent and courageous stand taken in Bratislava, as well as to the social and political influence exerted by their Hungarian and Polish colleagues; the critic Jiri Hajek explicitly gave Hungary as an example ('The Hungarian Miracle', *Kulturni Tvorba*, 23 May 1963), as did the Slovak Rudolf Hoffmann in his noteworthy—as well as promptly and officially refuted—articles in *Kulturny Zivot* (6 April and 18 May 1963) on 'The Leninist Struggle on Two Fronts in Hungary' and 'The Struggle for the Return to Leninism in Poland'.

THE isolation of the intellectuals from the wider public is one of the crucial facts in the Czechoslovak crisis. The writers congress made considerably less impression in Prague (due partly to late and piecemeal reporting) than on western observers; *Kulturny Zivot* (25 May), called it

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the ' secret congress '; and it was a Slovak, Vladmir Minac, who in the first speech in the debate attacked the view of literature ' as a mere spectator in a game played by others '.[8] Czechs do not, in fact, take their writers, for all their claims to be keepers of the national conscience, very seriously. Not merely because conscience is an uncomfortable concept to those who have to deny it as a daily exercise, but because the authors, above all the more prominent, are frequently in the ambiguous position of apologists for the system they are trying to reform; as when Jiri Hajek, one of the leading members of the literary establishment, in an article purporting to attack the spirit of ' cautious adaptability ', interprets Novotny's typically zhdanovite pronouncements on the Party's right to direct culture as both justified and ' anti-conservative '.

This spirit of compromise has kept the debate largely away from the really crucial issues of Stalinism in planning and policy, and given the regime the opportunity for an organised, if not graceful, retreat from its untenable position of last December. Direct attacks on that position have been few and isolated. In January, a Slovak academician challenged the doctrine (most categorically put by Siroky to the central committee on 4 January), that only Party cadres can be employed in leading posts, by putting forward the ' Hungarian ' thesis, formally held also by the KSC though abused in practice, that communists and non-communists should have equal access to all leading appointments (*Pravda*, 5 January 1963). He added, rather more heretically, that ' the dictatorship of the proletariat signifies the rule of the working class and not of its party '. *Rude Pravo* surprisingly took the same position (in an editorial on 19 February, given added prominence by being broadcast), stating that hostile classes no longer existed in Czechoslovakia, and that the practice of appointing politically reliable but economically incompetent managers was incorrect. ' Empty babblers ' must no longer receive Party support; ' mastery of complex economic problems ' was the criterion—but one had to reconcile oneself with the consequences of past policy. This view has not been disputed, with the exception of the Slovak *Pravda's* attack on ' Political Directors ' (by Miro Hysko, 18 April 1963). The Party programme has not, in fact, been abandoned or even modified, and there have been few to challenge it directly. The

[8] The greater outspokenness of Slovak intellectuals has been remarked on frequently, among others by the Czech guest delegate to the Slovak Writers' conference, Jiri Hajek, who complained of his countrymen ' cultivating their literary private plots like collective farmers ' (*Kulturny Zivot*, 4 May). The discrepancy has even been interpreted as a ' Slovak revolt ' against Prague, and as a revival of traditional Slovak separatism. There is no doubt that Slovak nationalism poses a serious problem to the regime, which has modelled its attitude towards the Slovaks closely on Stalin's nationalities policy, and progressively deprived Slovak autonomy of most of its practical value if not of its trappings. Slovak popular opposition to ' Prague colonialism ', moreover, dates from pre-war days, and loyalty to the—however fictitious—Slovak state during the war is still strong. All these factors, as well as the much more intense Slovak national (and religious) feeling as against the Czech, have made for an attitude among the intellectuals which is closer to that of the Poles or Hungarians. All of them, however, have spoken as *Czechoslovak* anti-Stalinists; the national issue has been, perhaps surprisingly, almost completely absent from their speeches and writings.

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most noteworthy exception was an attack on the 'Cult of the Plan' by the Leningrad-trained economist Radoslav Selucky ('People and the Plan', *Kulturni Tvorba*, 7 February 1963), a cult which 'existed side by side with the cult of personality'.

> If a socialist Mr Gallup were to carry out a poll in this country, he would probably find that the question most frequently asked these days is this: Why are our economic results out of proportion to the effort invested in them? The question is justified. About 80 per cent of all persons of productive age are employed in the national economy. The annual production increment over the past years has been approximately 10 per cent; our industry is four times as big as before the war. Despite all this . . . we meet all too many obstacles, too many weak spots in our work . . .

The diagnosis is that the 'pursuit of indices' has become the leading idea of society; what should have been a means had become an end; 'the Plan had been raised to a moral code'. 'Scientific planning' has become an empty cliché, the allocation of tasks a game of chance, and this 'formalism', the 'ballast of the third five-year plan', ignores the real possibilities of the economy.

Selucky's has very nearly remained a voice crying in the wilderness. There are few who would subscribe to Ladislav Mnacko's angry words: 'I don't write to be praised or abused in the West. I don't care what Radio Free Europe says . . .' (*Kulturny Zivot*, 22 June 1963). Isolated questionings of the basic principles of policy remain largely unnoticed. Therefore, the Party's political and theoretical organs have been able to execute a remarkable manoeuvre in 'indirection', presenting the Party programme in quasi-Liberman terms and demonstrating that the struggle against conservatism entails 'the need for strengthening central direction' (*Rude Pravo* editorial, 3 May 1963). Only in one detail has the regime granted a concession—the decision to abolish collective farmers' private plots and the free sale of their output, taken before the 12th congress, was rescinded as of 21 June. But as Novotny's *Times* interview showed, there has been no change of mind on basic issues.

Such a change could only result from a concerted opposition movement that would establish contact between the now isolated centres of protest. The social conditions for such a movement undoubtedly exist, above all in the vastly swollen working class, which contains an increasing percentage of 'screened-out' members of the middle class, students, and intellectuals, many of whom owe their misfortune to their mental independence. Equally indubitably, the psychological conditions for such a movement, which would have to bridge the gap between the workers and the intellectual establishment, have not yet been created. It is a depressing thought that Czechoslovakia's democratic traditions and western habits are a hindrance rather than a spur to the emergence of a 'Polish' situation. The Czech man in the street hears little of strikes and protest resolutions. His symbol of resistance—and that most

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frequently seen in the country—is still the tiny emblem bearing the face of the Good Soldier Schweik with its characteristic halfwitted grin, and the legend 'Keep Calm'. There is no doubt that the spirit it expresses has done much to bring the regime to its present plight; nor that it is the greatest obstacle to further progress.

PANORAMAS

REVISTA BIMESTRAL

Número 5 septiembre–octubre de 1963

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TESTIMONIO: Del odio a la comprensión, por el Mayor Oscar Bueno Tovar—ENTRE EL SILENCIO Y LA TRIVIALIDAD, por Francisco Ayala—AGUJA DE MAREAR: Cómo nos ven—Homo sapiens—In memoriam—Fichas Biblioteca—

UN MANUAL DE EDUCACION CIVICA: Las ideologías sociales contemporáneas.

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THE LITERARY PURGE IN RETROSPECT

Max Hayward

IT is useful to remind oneself of the atmosphere in Soviet intellectual life as it was on the eve of Mr Khrushchev's calamitous visit to the exhibition of Moscow artists on the first of December last year. To those writers who came under attack in succeeding months, and to their patrons and supporters, everything seemed to be going very well. The eighteen months or so since the exposure of Stalin at the 22nd CPSU congress, the removal of Stalin's body from the mausoleum, and all the subsequent measures of destalinisation, seemed to have brought total moral discredit on the old guard among the intellectuals and utter confusion to their ranks. They were increasingly uneasy and defensive in their public utterances.

On the other hand, the progressives, particularly the young guard, were clearly encouraged to believe that they could count not only on indulgence but even, to a certain extent, on the support of the party leadership.

In retrospect, therefore, despite occasional rumbles of a rather back-stairs kind, the young rebels seemed to have every reason for confidence. There was no sign at all that the rearguard action of the old guard was receiving or was about to receive any decisive official support. There was certainly no such support in any public announcements. The idea of a controlled coexistence between different trends in art and literature seemed to have been tacitly accepted by the Party. At the meeting of young writers which was scheduled to take place in the middle of December they could hopefully look forward, if not to a complete triumph, then at least to a recognition of their demand for greater creative freedom—the sort of demand which was so clearly expressed last summer in their replies to a questionnaire from *Voprosy Literatury*.[1] Here they all significantly emphasised their debt to Boris Pasternak and their determination to write the truth as they saw it, and to seek new modes of expression which would owe nothing to the older generation except to those who had always refused to comply with the canons of socialist realism. It seems that their main worry until the end of last year was that they might have to buy the new indulgence of the Party at the expense of compromise. They had some reason to feel that the regime had a deliberate policy of winning their confidence in order to exploit them for political purposes, for their value as an advertisement of the new post-Stalin image of the USSR. Some of them were certainly distressed by whispers at home and open allegations abroad that they had sold out to the regime and become a sort of officially licensed *fronde*.

[1] See *Survey*, No. 46.

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Their belief in the comparative security of their position was not shattered by Khrushchev's impromptu remarks at the art exhibition. There was no reason for them to believe that this was necessarily the signal for a complete switch in the Party's policy towards literature and the arts. It was precisely the sort of outburst that might have been expected, on the occasion of an unexpected confrontation with modern art, from almost anybody of Khrushchev's generation. It is significant that in this matter he stressed his likemindedness with the Earl of Avon.

IT is, I think, highly unlikely that this visit to the exhibition was somehow planned, at least on Mr K.'s side, in order to precipitate a show-down in the cultural sphere. By all accounts everybody present, including Adzhubei (who is rumoured to be a collector if not a connoisseur of modern art) was quite taken aback by the violence of Khrushchev's outburst. If it had been in any way planned there would surely have been some preliminary campaign in the press. From everything one knows it is clear that the whole thing was spontaneous and unforeseen. While it is certain that there was some element of deliberate provocation on the part of the conservatives in the Academy of Art, the impromptu, almost accidental character of the incident seems beyond doubt. This is why many people both in Moscow and abroad felt that it might blow over or at least that its consequences might be limited to the visual arts and would not affect the 'new wave' in literature, let alone lead to a general reappraisal of the Party's attitude to culture as a whole. The importance of Mr K.'s visit to the exhibition was that it suddenly made him aware, through the shock of immediate recognition which only the visual impact of art could have, that all was not well on the cultural front for which he is *ex officio* responsible. His genuine anger could be, and was, successfully exploited by the old guard to force him to look more closely into matters to which he had probably given very little attention since his speech to the writers in May 1959. He must now have been made to realise by the sight of these canvasses painted by donkeys' tails that things had got out of hand as a result of a lengthy period of relaxed Party control, and that if he did not exert his personal authority to arbitrate between the two opposed factions of the Soviet cultural intelligentsia, in other words, if he did not stop the rot before it went any further, then the general political consequences could be serious.

For a long time he or his advisers had turned a deaf ear to the frantic warnings of the reactionaries. The right moment had now come—when they were almost on the verge of despair—for them to get a hearing for their arguments. They no doubt presented Khrushchev with a formidable dossier on the serious ideological implications (in terms of a gradual undermining of the Party's authority) of much recent prose and verse. That it was indeed a case of the dangers inherent in the Party's tolerance of the young writers being *suddenly* brought home to him is suggested by

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the following curious passage in a jubilant article by Kochetov in February this year.

> There is a battle of worlds going on—a cruel irreconcilable struggle between two ideologies. And now the Party has begun to notice that on certain sectors of the front, in our battle for the minds of people, something is not quite right. Certain realist artists, instead of taking the offensive, have been forced to go on the defensive, and instead it is the formalists and abstractionists who have gone over to the attack.

The shock wave from Khrushchev's outburst did not hit the writers until the third week of December. In fact, until the end of the year there were reasonable grounds for hoping that the campaign against abstract art would not spread to literature. Despite a resurgence of Zhdanovist jargon (*partiinost*, *narodnost*, *ideinost*, attacks on formalism, constant reminders that art must serve as an instrument of education under Party control, etc.), attacks on individuals were still confined only to the painters and sculptors picked on by Mr K. Concurrently there was a less violent campaign against 'distortions' and 'formalist trickery' in music and cinematography.

As regards literature, on the other hand, as one can see from reading *Literary Gazette* for December, there was no sign of any trouble until about the 20th of the month. On the contrary, there was a number of articles which confidently, almost defiantly, expressed the point of view of the literary avant-garde. On the 11th, for instance, there was a long article by Pavel Antokolsky containing unqualified praise of Evtushenko and Voznesensky, and hotly defending the younger generation as a whole against unfounded charges of 'nihilism'. Of Voznesensky he wrote that he had no reason to apologise for proclaiming himself a disciple of Khlebnikov, Tsvetaeva, and Pasternak. What he said about Okudzhava was particularly noteworthy—that it is scandalous that Okudzhava's songs (which freely circulate on tape in Moscow) are the object of a conspiracy of silence and have still not been published. 'Do we still have enough hypocrites who imagine that only they know what is "progressive"?' he asked.

Even more striking evidence that the progressives still felt reasonably secure, despite the gathering momentum of the attack on art, was an article by Osetrov on the 15th in which the collection *Poetry Day* was given passionate praise for the inclusion of verse by Khlebnikov, Mandelstam, Tsvetaeva, and Pasternak. Their importance as forerunners of all that is best in the work of the young poets of today was emphasised. Osetrov ended his article on a highly optimistic note: 'So we see that poetry is on the march. Long live the poets and their verse.' This same number of *Literary Gazette* featured four poems by Evtushenko.

IN the last week of December, however, the tone of *Literary Gazette* changed abruptly, as also did its editor.[2] The full text of Ilychev's

[2] V. A. Kosolapov was replaced by A. Chakovsky.

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first speech was given on the 22nd, and there were militant leading articles, still however couched in general terms and so far not naming names, under such ominous titles as ' There can be no compromises '.

Ilychev's speech was given at a meeting of Party and Government leaders with representatives of literature and the arts on 17 December. The latter seem to have been a fairly representative group of the intelligentsia of Moscow and Leningrad, including Ehrenburg and Evtushenko. Khrushchev made a speech which was not reported, and after a long speech by Ilychev there was an ' exchange of views ' in which Mr K. himself took part. Judging by foreign news reports, it appears to have been a real debate. In particular Evtushenko defended his friend Neizvestny, and reproached Khrushchev for saying that some people ' could only be straightened out by the grave '. This occasion was also marked by the curious denunciation of Ehrenburg by Serebriakova, who hysterically accused him of unmentionable crimes and quoted Poskrebyshev as her authority. This outburst apparently led to a display of solidarity with Ehrenburg.

Ilychev's speech was still quite restrained compared with what was to come. Basically it was little more than an expansion, in more coherent language, of Mr K.'s words at the Art exhibition, and an attempt to give a more systematic justification in ideological terms for the Party's rejection of abstract art. He also extended the field of the Party's dissatisfaction beyond painting and music to literature, but still only in a general way. There was no abuse of individuals apart from the exceptional case of Esenin-Volpin. However, Ilychev provided a clear ideological framework for the coming campaign. With appropriate quotations from Lenin, Gorki, and Lunacharsky, he tried to show that the Party has always drawn and is obliged to draw a clear distinction between art which serves the bourgeoisie and art which serves the toiling masses, and that only Party guidance and the acceptance of Lenin's sacred principle of *partiinost* can prevent the line between them getting blurred. The lesson was that there could be no question of peaceful ideological coexistence either between varying trends at home or between the Soviet Union and the outside world.

The most interesting part of this first speech of Ilychev was the mention of two letters from ' a group of persons engaged in literature and the arts ' to the central committee and Khrushchev personally. The signatories were not mentioned by name but it appears from agency reports which trickled out of Moscow that they included Ehrenburg, Simonov, Shostakovich, the artists Konenkov and Favorsky, and the film director Romm. The partial text of these letters quoted by Ilychev shows that there was very influential opposition to a change in the Party's policy. The first letter said, among other things: ' If we all appeal to you through this letter, it is only because we wish to say in all sincerity that without the possibility of the existence of *various* trends in art, then art is doomed. We now see how artists of that trend which alone flourished under Stalin, giving others

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no possibility of working or even of living, are beginning to interpret the words you uttered at the Art exhibition. We deeply believe that you did not desire this and that you are against it. We appeal to you to stop the swing in the arts to past methods that are repugnant to the whole spirit of our times.' Shortly after this, said Ilychev, there was a similar letter from another group of comrades which even contained a plea for 'peaceful coexistence of *all* trends in art'. However, the comrades who signed this letter thought better of it and retracted it. It is interesting to note in this connection that in March this year, at a writers' meeting held to discuss Mr Khrushchev's speech of 7 March, Surkov was accused by one speaker of having championed the idea of ideological coexistence 'for nine hours'; it appears that Surkov had been one of the signatories of the second letter mentioned by Ilychev. It seems reasonable to suppose that if such a timeserver as Surkov stuck his neck out in this way, then he must have had good reason to think that as late as the end of December, the Party had still not committed itself finally to a radical change of policy. It would also suggest there was some quite powerful faction in the central committee opposed to it, since Surkov would scarcely have backed a side which he did not think might win.

THE next development was on 22 December, when another meeting of the intelligentsia was addressed a second time by Ilychev. This time, however, neither Mr K. nor any other member of the presidium was present. Ilychev repeated his former arguments ad nauseam, and for the first time mentioned individual writers. However, the tone was not too harsh and his criticism was indeed carefully balanced with praise for Voznesensky and others. He said, for instance: 'All of us take pleasure in the civic patriotic verse by Evtushenko. He is quite sensitive to the times. But he has written other poems which are superficially declaratory and pander to Philistine attitudes. The Soviet public likes the lyrical and civic poetry of Voznesensky, but it cannot tolerate the vulgar motifs of some of his work.' He was harshest about Okudzhava: 'The verse and songs of the gifted poet B. Okudzhava are out of keeping with the entire structure of our life. Their whole intonation—everything about them—does not come from purity of soul but from a kind of hysteria. . . .' It is interesting also that he suggested that most members of the Evtushenko group in their speeches at this meeting had expressed agreement with the Party's criticism. However, nothing more was heard about this.

In the first two months of this year, things were fairly quiet and there was no massive follow-up to Ilychev's two speeches. There was even a continuation of some sort of literary debate; that is, it was still possible for the 'left-wing' to answer their critics. But everything was now weighted and slanted against them. At the end of January *Izvestia* published a long article by Yermilov in which he attacked Ehrenburg for his sponsorship of modern art, his ambiguous understanding of the nature of freedom, and his hypocrisy for having been silent

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about Stalin while claiming not to have been taken in by him. After some delay, *Izvestia* published, on 5 February, a short reply from Ehrenburg with an editorially supported rejoinder from Yermilov. On 31 January *Izvestia* addressed open letters to Boris Polevoy, the editor of *Yunost*, chiding him for having published two 'banal' poems by Voznesensky about his trip to Italy in the January number, and to Tvardovsky for having published *The Vologda Wedding* by Yashin in the January number of *Novy Mir*. *Izvestia* published a reply from Polevoy, in which he defended himself, but again accused him of dereliction of duty in an editorial note. However, despite these slight indications that the battle was still not entirely lost for the left wing, it is clear that this lull of some two months was only a preparation for the final show-down which came at a two day meeting of Government and Party leaders with the intellectuals on 7 and 8 March. This was again addressed by Ilychev, but his speech was only a curtain raiser to Khrushchev's long pronouncement on the second day. Since both speeches have been given wide publicity, there is no need to reproduce the gist of their contents here.

The aftermath of the two speeches followed the familiar pattern of writers' meetings, beginning with a plenum of the board of the Writers Union at the end of March, followed by the long delayed conference of young writers and ending with the ideological plenum of the central committee in June. Every point made by Khrushchev was dutifully recited over and over again, but it was striking that the extremists, who stood to gain most by a harsh interpretation of his speech, not only went far beyond it, but in several points even contradicted him. The most striking example was in the appraisal of Evtushenko's behaviour abroad and of Solzhenitsyn's literary and political qualities.

Evtushenko has been the main object of the concentrated fury of the many obscure and jealous hacks who can never forgive him for having stolen the limelight. There is in particular a pleiade of young poets who write undistinguished poetry in conventional form on the most hackneyed of 'production' themes, who are not deeply concerned with the moral issues raised by the exposure of Stalin, who have never been abroad or read their verse to thousands of cheering youths in the Luzhniki stadium or the Polytechnic museum, and who, as they now bitterly complained, found it difficult to get their stuff published in the metropolitan journals. Their spokesmen are V. Fyodorov, Vas. Zakrutkin and V. Firsov. It is these who, in venting their spleen on Evtushenko, Voznesensky, and the others, have suggested that far from conducting himself in a worthy manner during his visit abroad (as Khrushchev had said on 8 March), Evtushenko was guilty almost of high treason. In *Literaturnaya Rossiya* of 12 April, for instance, Fyodorov said that in selling his autobiography to the Paris *Express* 'for 30 pieces of silver', Evtushenko had behaved like Fadeyev's Stakhovich.[3] It was the same

[3] The character in *Young Guard* who, out of pusillanimity, betrays his comrades to the Germans.

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Fyodorov who also suggested that there should be a virtual travel ban on the ' young geniuses ' as he sarcastically calls them.

The case of Solzhenitsyn was an even more interesting example of how the organisers of the campaign appeared to contradict Khrushchev himself. Solzhenitsyn received unqualified praise from both Mr K. and Ilychev, and should therefore have been held up together with other writers mentioned by them as a positive example. In fact he was for the most part either conspicuously ignored or even attacked, first for the two stories in the January number of *Novy Mir*, and then for *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich*.[4]

At the beginning of the campaign against them at the plenum on 28 March, which seems to have been their last public appearance, some of the young writers were given the opportunity to recant. Voznesensky's statement was ambiguous, while Evtushenko's apology for the publication of his autobiography in Paris was not accepted. In the meantime, V. Nekrasov at a meeting with Party leaders in Kiev, was openly defiant and said that he would always write the truth which he had learnt in the trenches of Stalingrad. Only Aksyonov caved in completely and made a rather abject submission in *Pravda*.

ON the whole, however, there was among the writers an extraordinary display of solidarity. Despite all the techniques of moral blackmail employed against them, they evidently had enough inner strength and a feeling of enough silent moral support not to yield. Any hopes that they might have publicly repented at the conference of young writers did not materialise. This gathering of shabby conformists was anything but a victory parade. It was boycotted by nearly all writers of worth, and apart from a handful of notoriously conservative writers from the capital, most of the speakers were undistinguished provincials.

All the signs at the moment are that the campaign has spent itself, and that the Party leadership has had second thoughts. In abruptly upsetting the balance between the two camps in literature, Mr K. has achieved nothing except the alienation of the liberal intelligentsia and may even have turned a number of loyal oppositionists into opponents. When they make their comeback, as one day they inevitably will, they will constitute a much greater challenge to his authority than hitherto. It may now well appear to some of Khrushchev's advisers that the chain of events started by his outburst at the beginning of last December was a mistake. It is no use employing Stalinist methods of intimidation at a time when people, or at least the younger generation, have lost the conditioned reflexes induced by Stalinist terror. It is notable, too, that, despite the ferocity of much of

[4] See the article by N. Sergovantsev in the April 1963 number of *Oktyabr*.

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the language, actual measures against the literary intelligentsia were few and half-hearted. There were scarcely any purges in the literary organisations and editorial boards, despite calls for them.[5] Evtushenko and Aksyonov remain on *Yunost*. Fedin, the secretary of the Writers Union, who has been responsible for carrying through the 'soft' line of the last few years, has not been removed and his recent speeches at writers' meetings have been noticeably restrained.

But the best evidence that there has been some sort of truce and that the old guard would not be allowed to get out of hand and crush their opponents, was an extraordinary interview given by Tvardovsky to the Moscow U.P. correspondent, Henry Schapiro, and published in *Pravda* on 12 May. This was a remarkable exercise in diplomacy which somehow managed to play down the importance of the recent events, and to suggest that the statements of the Party leaders were not as intolerant as all that, and that hence there was no warrant for the interpretation subsequently put on them by extremists. Of Mr K.'s and Ilychev's criticism of Ehrenburg, for instance, he said: 'Our attitude to this criticism is serious and responsible and we are convinced Ilya Grigorevich will draw the necessary conclusions from it. All the more so in that, while sternly criticising Ehrenburg, the Party leaders characterised him as a remarkable Soviet writer, a gifted journalist, and a prominent public figure.' By this sort of statement Tvardovsky was evidently trying to lower the temperature and remind people of the relatively balanced nature of the original Party pronouncements. Significantly, he alone of the editors of the literary monthlies reproduced the full text of Khrushchev's speech in his April number. There was no self exculpation in his article, and his one mention of Evtushenko and Voznesensky was friendly. In talking of Solzhenitsyn, he pointedly recalled Mr K.'s praise of *One Day*. Yashin's *Vologda Wedding*, which he published in his January number and which was a main target of the old guard, he described as 'an excellent work, full of poetry'. Finally he announced that in the coming year he is going to publish a new work by Solzhenitsyn and also works by V. Nekrasov and Aksyonov.

This interview with Tvardovsky marked the turning point in the licensed campaign of the diehards against the liberals. In succeeding months attacks on the heretics have been intermittent and moderate in tone. The Central Committee plenum on ideology in June was not in the upshot, as had been expected, the occasion for a final settling of accounts with the heretics. Cultural matters were dealt with in the wider framework of a discussion of ideological insubordination and apathy in general. Ilychev castigated various literary and artistic misdemeanours, but attacked nobody by name. Khrushchev spoke with

[5] A. Borshchagovsky, who has played a notable part as a patron of the young writers, lost his place on the editorial board of *Literaturnaya Rossiya*. O. Smirnov, of *Molodaya Gvardiya*, is the only other editor to have been dismissed.

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noticeable indulgence about Ernst Neizvestny whose 'Nude' had so much angered him at the exhibition last December. If he was still wrathful about Victor Nekrasov, it was mainly because he had refused to submit to Party discipline.

Since the plenum, the peccadillos of Soviet intellectuals have been completely overshadowed by the enormities of the comrades in Peking. Not only has the campaign against them been abandoned, but the pendulum, in a way typical of the Khrushchev era, has now begun to swing back again in their favour. This movement has, needless to say, been initiated by those two older champions of the liberal cause, Ilya Ehrenburg and Tvardovsky. On the propitious occasion of a meeting of the European Writers' Community in Leningrad, Ehrenburg reaffirmed his belief in the possibility of the sort of cultural pluralism which has so recently been anathematised at the highest level. Most astonishingly of all, Tvardovsky has published, after reciting it in public to Khrushchev, his poem 'Vasili Tyorkin in the Other World'. With its fantastic mockery of ideological humbug and official cant, it is by far the most outspoken work to appear since Stalin's death. Its publication is bound to raise hopes for the gradual 'rehabilitation' of all those writers who were under attack earlier in the year. On political and ideological grounds their disgrace seems no longer necessary. By sanctioning the publication of Tvardovsky's poem, Khrushchev has once again proved himself the greatest and most devious deviationist of them all.

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THE POETRY OF ANDREI VOZNESENSKY

Pierre Forgues

DURING a public reading which he gave in Paris on 12 January 1963, Voznesensky described the beginnings of his 'poetical career' as follows:

'I was a student at the Architectural Institute, and the month of the examinations was drawing near. Like my class-mates I had prepared an enormous model, two metres by three in size, in the purest pre-Twentieth Congress wedding-cake style. A fortnight before we were due to appear before the examiners with our projects, a fire broke out at the Institute and gutted it from top to bottom. Our designs perished in the fire; the firemen made it their job to pulverise whatever escaped incineration. At first we were dismayed, but then we thought that thanks to this mishap we would have a few extra weeks to submit new designs to new examiners. And what was more, we saw that the piece of furniture in which all our bad reports were locked up had also gone up in flames! It was then that the poet awoke in me and I wrote my first work: "*Fire at the Architectural Institute*".'

Whether or not this story is exactly true in all its details, it has a genuine mythical value, even greater than would appear at first sight if we remember that the famous '*Fire at the Institute*' was to be published only in October 1960, in *Oktyabr*. The new Russia, like the young Voznesensky, awoke during the uproar about Pasternak, and had to wait awhile before she could make herself heard.

The Fire at the Architectural Institute

VOZNESENSKY'S poetical baggage to date consists of three slim volumes: *Mozaika*, published at Vladimir in 1960, *Parabola*, published at Moscow in the same year, and *The Triangular Pear*, published at Moscow in 1962 in 50,000 copies under the auspices of a recent Lenin prizewinner, the Lithuanian poet Mezhelaitis.

The first poem written by Voznesensky, 'Fire at the Architectural Institute', already gives us a forceful sketch of the poet's personality. It is one of the works in which the young writer's revolutionary symbolism reaches its highest power. Indeed, these few verses contain most of the characteristic features which we find scattered about in other works, sometimes exaggerated and transformed into routine tricks, but sometimes, in the best poems, revitalised, intensified.

It seems, therefore, useful to begin by analysing the essential features of the 'Fire', and then to see what has happened to Voznesensky's poetry since. It should be noted that Voznesensky has published at least

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three versions of this poem: (i) the original version in *Oktyabr*, containing eleven stanzas; (ii) the version included in *The Triangular Pear* (pp. 69–71), which contains only ten stanzas—the ninth stanza, which has been suppressed, read as follows:

What spires, what stay-wires
Sprung from the fire
Will rush over the paper
Like the first tracks on a ski-run.

The fifth stanza, which has met the same fate, read:

Cribs and cramming sessions
Are crumbling in hell,
Dark berries on a burning bush
Farewell, farewell.

On the other hand, a new stanza has been interpolated between the third and the fourth:

The drafting paper is wounded,
It's a red fall of leaves;
My drawing boards are burning,
Whole cities are burning.

(iii) In the bilingual (Russian and Italian) collection recently published at Milan by Feltrinelli (*Scrivo come Amo*), and issued as we know with Voznesensky's imprimatur; the 'Fire' now consists only of nine stanzas: the fifth and the ninth are still missing, and the extra fourth stanza has not survived.

What is the reason for these variations? It would, without a doubt, be easy and convenient to explain them by political exigencies: the two stanzas which were suppressed could easily be said to carry a disturbing message, the fourth showing the desire for a general 'purge' of the past, and the ninth the anticipation of a future radically different from the past. But these hypotheses would be rather flimsy, for a variety of reasons. First, it is the poem as a whole which is revolutionary in content and expresses the desire for a complete change. Yet the poem was added by Voznesensky to the group already published in *Znamya* (April 1962) to make up the collection under the title *The Triangular Pear*, although it does not fit in very well with the rest of the collection, which revolves for the most part around American themes. Second, the stanza added to the poem in *The Triangular Pear* is in the same class as the two which have been suppressed:

My drawing boards are burning,
Whole cities are burning.

The changes must then have been made in response to poetical necessities, unless we prefer to see them as a product of Voznesensky's extraordinarily happy-go-lucky nature. But we could see for ourselves, during his stay in Paris, that the author of *Parabola* ceases to be happy-go-lucky the moment he sets to work as a writer.

A brief examination of the 'Fire' may put us on the track of the

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poetic dictates to which Voznesensky tends to adapt his work. At first glance we can distinguish the following characteristics:

The rhythm: At his public reading in Paris, Voznesensky declared that for him rhythm, that is to say music, is of primary importance, and that his poetry obeys in the first place the dictates of rhythm. The 'Fire' is indeed a mad, daemonic dance, an attempt to convey in its very movement the sensation of a gigantic, all-devouring, blinding conflagration. The verse bounces along, with two or three stresses to the line, alternately slowing down and accelerating right up to the final cry:

This is the end!
This is just the beginning!
Let's go to the pictures!

If we keep the poet's intention in mind we can see that the omission of the fifth and ninth stanzas from *The Triangular Pear* and the Feltrinelli versions speeds up the rhythm, and makes it more convulsive, because these two stanzas are intervals of rhythmic stagnation in the development of the poem.

Alliteration: Alliteration, which is as old as poetry itself, is one of the means which Voznesensky uses to make his poem bound along at the fastest possible rhythm. The 'Fire' provides a few examples of this device, but it is still in an undeveloped state. In the fourth stanza of the version published in *The Triangular Pear*:

Goryat moi podramniki	[*My drawing boards are burning*
Goroda goryat . . .	*Whole cities are burning*]

Here the double alliteration of 'g' and 'r' has an imitative effect: the 'gr's are intended to give a palpable sensation of the fire's ferocity.

In the sixth stanza another alliteration—'r's and 'k's—has a different effect:

Proshchai arkhitektura!	[*Goodbye, architecture!*
Pylaite shiroko	*Blaze away merrily*
Korovniki v amurakh	*Cupidaceous cowsheds,*
Raikluby v rokoko!	*Rococo recreation rooms . . .*]

Here the force of the alliteration is humorous and 'destructive': it reduces the object in question to the level of the absurd, the grotesque. It deprives the object of anything which could give it a 'serious' significance. The assonance of the 'o's contributes to the same effect.

Humour: This second function of alliteration introduces into Voznesensky's poetry a quality which is utterly foreign to the official Soviet literary tradition: humour. Since 1930 there has been no genuine humour in Soviet letters, except in the form of such harmless jests as Marshak's whimsical pieces for children. That earnestness which Nietzsche denounced eighty years ago, is one of the essential ingredients of the Soviet literary spirit. The elementary virtues of labour, of family

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life, of devotion to the collective or the plan, of self-effacement for the good of the people as a whole, are too fragile to withstand the least little smile. This is particularly true in poetry. In prose, which is discursive, it is always possible to correct a slip. Humour made its appearance in Soviet prose with Aksyonov; it was Voznesensky who introduced it into Soviet verse. Humour is one of the greatest explosive forces of the 'Fire'. This could be seen in the stanza quoted above, and we might add the following lines.

They're crackling away in a sealed cupboard,
All those bad reports on me!
It's all burnt clean away
And what a lot of sighs are heaved
This is the end!
This is just the beginning!
Let's go to the pictures!

The whole poem could be quoted in this context, for there is 'a certain smile', a lighthearted and mocking tone running right through it that recalls both Diderot and Jean Prévert, Ilf and Petrov and the young Desnos, and marks a break with tradition.

Imagery: 'The Fire' is an allegorical poem, written at a time when an idea not at all in line with the decrees of the Central Committee could be expressed only in symbols. It is therefore surprising how few images 'The Fire' contains. In the first version we find:

A window writhes up like a red-arsed gorilla!
Five summers and five winters have wreathed
Up in flame like a bottle of paraffin
(Your dissertation . . .) wiggling its little red skirt.
Life is a series of burnt-out buildings.
Angrier than a bee . . . a compass-point will sting your finger.

These images do not possess a great evocative or illustrative force. They cannot be called new or particularly powerful, but if we look at them in the context of the historical development of Soviet poetry they represent something of a leap forward. For one thing they are real images, and for another, unlike those of an Isaakovsky, a Tvardovsky, or any other Soviet poet including Yevtushenko—on the rare occasions when the limpid flow of their verse is troubled by images—Voznesensky's images serve a purpose beyond that of simple illustration. In Soviet poetry the image degenerates into purely explanatory comparisons, into 'examples' which break the natural rhythm of the phrase. It could almost be said that because it regularly prefers discursive comparison, Soviet verse is practically devoid of true poetic imagery. A single reading of 'The Fire' gives us the feeling that Voznesensky has raised the image to a higher level although its function is not yet clearly realised: it does not in the least disturb the rhythm of the verse, but is an integral part of it, it is not superimposed on a more or less artificially metrical prose but springs spontaneously from the flow of the verse.

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Word-play: Word-play is one of the traditional elements of poetic humour. It plays an important part in Voznesensky's poetry, but there is very little of it in 'The Fire'. Voznesensky will make up for this later.

From 'The Fire' to 'The Triangular Pear'

IT is a little early to try to trace the evolution of a poet whose literary history begins only four years ago, but it is in fact instructive, for anyone interested in the future possibilities of contemporary Soviet poetry, to see what line of development Voznesensky's work is following.

Content: It is not certain that Voznesensky in fact accepts the traditional distinction between form and content, although he has declared that 'poetry must be revolutionary in its forms and in its subject matter'. Moreover, critical studies of his work in the Soviet Union, as we shall see, make a close connection between the problems of its content and those of its form, and rightly so. Hackneyed subject matter usually implies a hackneyed form, and conversely the disintegration of traditional Soviet poetic forms, in Voznesensky, is bound up with a volatilisation of the traditional content of socialist-realist literature. This double aspect of his work is well brought out by Voznesensky himself in his answer to the *Voprosy Literatury* questionnaire (see *Survey* No. 46): 'The main problem of contemporary literature is that of deeper insight into the soul of man, into the interior of consciousness . . . metaphorism reflects the interconnections between phenomena, the way in which they interpenetrate one another.' Such a dynamic view of the world puts itself at once outside the canons of the law.

Socialist realism is based on the absolute primacy of content: the form is as simple as it can possibly be, negatively determined by the content; it must be unobtrusive, merely the vehicle of the Idea. If the vehicle attracts too much attention the Idea is pushed into the background. Enemy Number One therefore is Formalism. But in Voznesensky's work, more than in that of any other Soviet writer, the vehicle of the Idea appears to be more important than the Idea itself. When the critics are not attacking him they are trying to inject into his poetry qualities which are either missing from it or are of secondary importance in it. This explains the astounding 'summary' of *The Triangular Pear* given by *Novye Knigi* (No. 40, 1962):

> The poet Andrei Voznesensky's new collection is devoted mainly to his impressions of the United States during his travels in that country. The author shows us contemporary America, that great tragic country, a country of contrasts, of moral degradation and disintegration, of technological might and workless social outcasts. The book also includes lyrical poems on love, the Russian countryside, and Soviet youth.

It is no doubt true that the 'description' of certain aspects of American life is one of the themes to be found in *The Triangular Pear*, but the

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rationalist Smelyakov is up in arms because it occupies such a limited space: 'There is surely in all this not the slightest new discovery of America' (*Moskva*, No. 12, 1962). Voznesensky has not done his job properly according to Smelyakov, who concludes that: 'We do not want Voznesensky to lose his individuality and harness himself to the fabrication of clichés . . . Heaven forbid! We simply want his poetry to serve the essential ideas of our people.' Which is as much as to say that it does not serve them as yet. If we remember that Yaroslav Smelyakov, far from being an ultra-Stalinist, is a man who served three sentences, amounting in all to nearly 15 years, in concentration camps under Stalin, we shall have some idea how scandalous Voznesensky's work appears when measured by the traditional canons of Soviet literature.

Some critics try to play down the scandal by reducing Voznesensky's work to the status of a slim volume from a slightly more gifted Gribachev. This, for instance, is the object of a quite skilful article in *Literaturnaya Gazeta* of 2 February 1963 by Stanislav Lesnevsky. What makes the article all the more interesting is that Lesnevsky inadvertently brings out the quite extraordinary aesthetic complexity of the poet's work:

> In Voznesensky's poems about America I see . . . an image of the bourgeois world. Andrei Voznesensky's '40 Digressions' make up a polyphonic poem, in which the apocalyptic features of present-day America are sometimes pictorially, sometimes musically, and sometimes symphonically expressed . . . Voznesensky depicts the feverish and inescapable chaos of a bourgeois society which strives to drag the whole of humanity down into the tomb with it. . . Indeed, this chaos which the poet strives to understand occasionally breaks in on the poem and we are deafened by sonorous incoherence, dazzled by neon-sign metaphors, dizzied by the acrobatics of his strophes which . . . *go beyond the bounds of clarity, which is to say beyond the bounds of poetry.*
>
> But in my view it is realism, the poet's genuine civic conscience, [the qualities which we see in] 'Lenin's Sequoia' that prevail in Voznesensky's poetry. The poet passes on bourgeois society the stern and clear-eyed judgment of Soviet Russia. He looks upon its follies with a penetrating, eager, and impatient gaze.

It is true that Voznesensky's poetry tends more and more to reflect the chaos of the world, but it is the chaos not merely of bourgeois society but of the human condition in the twentieth century. To make this lyrical description of a world out of joint applicable only to the 'other camp' is not merely to emasculate Voznesensky's poetry but to denature it entirely. Moreover, this way of looking at the outside world makes the essential content of Voznesensky's poetry—his exacerbated self-assertion —stand out in bolder relief. It is not the aggressive assertion of a complacent and noisy ego like that of Yevtushenko, but the subjugation of all aspects of existence to the poet's consciousness.

This process can be seen at work, especially in his protests, in his affirmation of the rights of the individual as against the community:

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What are we? Pawns or poets?
The genius in the blood of the planet.
No more physicists, no more lyricists—
Lilliputians or poets! . . .
Amongst the avalanches
I am like the abominable snowman—
Utterly impossible to catch!

This protest runs right through the work of Voznesensky, less eloquent perhaps than that of Yevtushenko but more tragic. Is not the poet brother to the symbolical girl in 'Wedding', of whom he says:

Youth marries not someone but something.

More clearly and more vigorously still, Voznesensky conjures up in 'The Masters' the fate which awaits true poets:

The walls of the prison.
The dawn is dumb.
Where is the poem?
Poem—there's none.
Seven-headed the poem was,
Like a temple with seven domes.
Now it has no voice,
Like a face without eyes.
Out in the night it stands
By the scaffold . . .
And the executioners
Wiped their hands on their smocks.

This demand for creative freedom is not just a rejection of the heavy restrictions which the 'Tsars' impose on the poet; it is the expression of an infinitely subjective vision of the world which asserts itself more and more clearly in Voznesensky's poetry. This is what is conveyed by one of the finest poems in *The Triangular Pear*, called 'Inaugural':

Open up America!
Eureka! . . .
. . . I am discovering
In America—America
In myself—myself.

In the lines that follow he defines his poetical method, linking it with a moral compulsion which might easily turn out to be dangerous if we remember what sort of audience young Soviet poets are addressing:

I tear the rind from the planet,
I sweep away dust and mould,
I descend into the depths of the object
As though into the Metro.
There I find triangular pears,
And I look for naked souls in them
I take a trapezoid fruit, not to swallow it—
But to see its glassy stone shine like an altar.

No sooner has the poet freed himself from external constraints, and

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clearly defined his methods as a poetic adventurer, than he sets off to conquer an *unexpected* world:

Following the prompting of my heart
I blow towards the shore . . .
Set out for the Indies—
And you will find America!

When he reaches this point—which brings to mind the ideas of the surrealists about poetic creation—what resemblance is left between Voznesensky's poetic world and socialist realism? None whatsoever. So the poet tries to make it look as though there were some connection, writing a few poems on officially approved themes ('Lenin's Sequoia', 'Riff-raff'—a poem about Russian emigrés or 'Striptease', a puerile indictment of Western moral degradation), or else interlarding *The Triangular Pear* with digressions in prose like the little piece on the painter Siqueiros who tried to assassinate Trotsky. But this quite superficial connection, which makes possible the interpretations of a Lesnevsky, is seen to be pretty weak if we just look at the remarkable introduction to *The Triangular Pear*. In a few casual lines the poet apologises for his inability to deal with his *subject*—his realistic poem has foundered—and it was then that poetry made its appearance!

> I am working at something big with 'the discovery of America' for my subject. The starting point was my impressions of America. But as I worked other events, other parts of my life, other memories, the landscapes of Russia and the Baltic coast burst in on my narrative and diverted the author from the line which he had intended to follow.
>
> Hence the discovery of quite different things: birch-trees, sunsets and motorcycles got mixed up with the heroes of the book.
>
> The poem foundered like an overladen ship. And simultaneously an autonomous organism, a poem of 'lyrical digressions', was born. The verses ordered themselves as they pleased, irrespective of thematic and geographical considerations, just as ideas pass through our heads.

If the poem leads the poet more or less where it likes (a dangerously surrealistic idea), what use are the friendly admonitions of the Writers Union or the Central Committee? The unconscious is here supreme, and bureaucrats have never liked the unconscious, perhaps because it is seldom 'civic'.

Images: We may distinguish three kinds of poetic image: ascending, horizontal, and descending images. An ascending image is one which broadens the vision of the subject of comparison by illuminating new aspects of it: the second term of the comparison raises the first to a higher level. André Breton's 'Union Libre', for instance, gives us a whole bouquet of ascending images:

Ma femme à la chevelure de feu de bois . . .
Ma femme . . . aux bras d'écume de mer et d'écluse . . .
Ma femme aux yeux de savane . . .

A horizontal image is one which establishes a simple equivalence between

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the terms of the comparison, the second explaining the first without enriching it. All images in everyday language are or have become horizontal: 'strong as a lion', 'pale as a ghost', etc.

A descending image is one which degrades the object of comparison.

Soviet poetry after 1929–30 is timid and sparing in its use of images, and where they occur they are always strictly horizontal, the most banal possible: there is in this a complete break with the legacy of Mayakovsky, Blok, and Khlebnikov. Voznesensky's contemporaries are struck by the novelty of his images. Thus Nikolai Rylenkov writes in *Literaturnaya Gazeta* of 29 February 1962:

'His verse . . . grips us with the boldness of his comparisons and his utterly unexpected metaphors.'

Yet, as we have already seen, the metaphors in 'The Fire' except for the 'red-arsed gorilla' are not particularly 'gripping'. Let us take another of Voznesensky's masterpieces, 'I am Goya' from *Mozaika*. There are two metaphors in this poem:

I am the throat
of a hanging woman whose body swings
like a tolling bell over the naked square.
and
I have driven sturdy stars like nails
into the jubilee sky.

These are pretty banal images! A woman's body swings from the scaffold like a bell—there's not much in that . . . and hundreds of poets have driven the stars into the sky like nails. . . .

Going on from *Mozaika* to *Parabola*, we find in the 'Parabolical Ballad' three images:

Fate like a rocket describes a parabola.
There once was a painter with fiery red hair.
Straight and flexible like the rod of an aerial.

It cannot be said that these, any more than the images of 'I am Goya', are new or unexpected. 'Hair red as fire' is superlatively banal.

Let us turn to the third collection, *The Triangular Pear*, and gather a random harvest of metaphors, which occur more frequently than in the other collections:

Glows like a cigarette in the fog
You go off down the corridor as though you were
taking to the woods.
The window cleaners make you weep
like a midge in your eye.
On the roof I stand like a gnome over a plan of New York.
Gaunt as a bargee.
A shoe as narrow as a smoothing-iron.
You will become translucent like a cocoon.

These images would call for no comment but for the presence, in the same collection, of others which show an effective, though still diffident concern to renew the mechanism of association: pale and feeble still, shoots of genuine metaphor begin to show:

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The plate glass windows have a pale gleam
Like X-rays of the soul.
Five dazzling Caravelles
Descend from the sky!
Five nightbirds wearily lower their under-carriages.
Where is the sixth?
She must have come a cropper
Slut, stork, star.

To avoid excessive quotation let us briefly analyse just two more examples:

I go down
into the depths
of the object
As though into the Metro.

Clearly, we are no longer dealing here with a horizontal image: 'as though into the Metro' really adds something to 'I descend into the depths of the object': to begin with the proud assertion that, for the poet, penetration into the essence, the innermost structure of the object, or if you like, of the world, is as easy as the commonplace action of going down into the Metro is for other people. Further, from the traditional point of view (the Moscow Metro notwithstanding!) the Metro is a modern and unpoetical 'object', so that it is an example of the thematic renewal which Voznesensky's poetry brings into Soviet literature. And finally, the Metro is a 'public transport system', a place accessible to everybody: the poet's search for the essence then brings him into real contact with the people—something which he in fact claims and which his adversaries deny.

One final example:

She lay like a lake,
Her eyes were standing water
She no more belonged to him
Than a forest path or a star.

Here again we have an ascending image: the woman, beaten and stretched on the ground, is raised to the level of nature at large, represented, it is true, by four rather traditional 'poetic objects' the lake, water, the forest path, the star. But after all, the idea of a woman on the ground and in pain does not automatically awaken the idea of a lake, or her eyes the idea of water.

The same mixture of banal images (He went on through the lowering crowd/Like a partisan taking to the woods) and of poetic discoveries (the palaces ablaze with torches like sevens of hearts) can be found in the poems published in the January 1963 issues of *Yunost* and *Znamya*. It appears that Voznesensky is extricating himself, slowly and with difficulty, from the traditions of socialist realism, for which the image must be perfectly horizontal because, like poetry itself, it has an essentially utilitarian function: to help the reader or listener to understand the idea properly. The 'idea', however, is often clear enough

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by itself, and in Simonov or Tvardovsky the image has become no more than a simple rhetorical ornament. Unfortunately the Soviet Government's latest rightwards turn of the helm is bound to hamper Voznesensky's still faltering evolution in this sphere.

Incantation: If Voznesensky's visual imagery, comparisons, and metaphor are in fact often so poor it is because, whatever he himself says about it, he pays little attention to them. In the course of a conversation about French poetry someone quoted Cocteau's anti-poetic line *la guitare, bidet qui chante* to him. He replied, with some slight embarrassment, that this image appealed to him very much and that he would be glad to invent others like it. Whether an image is of this or some other kind matters very little to him in reality, because sound is of much more importance to him than the image: he tries to recapture the incantatory effect of primitive song, he wants his poems to affect his listeners as religious chants affect a gathering of believers. It is the *listener* who counts for Voznesensky, not the reader: he writes his verses for crowds who are ready to listen to him tirelessly. As in the litanies of the church, meaning is of hardly any importance.

The analogy with magical incantations is, however, more illuminating than that with the litany. In most of his poems the image is reduced to its sensual content, at the expense of any intellectual value which would disrupt the auditory communion at which Voznesensky aims. The ideal end of such poetry is to bring the listener into a state of poetic trance, using all the resources of *sound*.

Voznesensky's poetry is primarily oral. The rhythm, and the shifting play of resonances, are more important to it than the content even of an image, let alone of a verse. Hence the importance of what are strictly speaking sound effects: alliteration, the play on vowels or consonants, play on words, convulsive accelerations of rhythm. A Soviet critic recently showed a clear realisation of this. Evgenii Osetrov, in *Literaturnaya Gazeta* of 15 December 1962, in the last blessed days before the dismissal of Kosolapov and his replacement as editor by Chakovsky, wrote:

> This is not verse to be read with the eyes: Voznesensky must be read aloud. The subtle rhythmical drive, the intoxication with sound overwhelm the reader like a violent storm. . . . Rhythm and music in Voznesensky's verse are as important (perhaps more important) than the sense.

We see then that ever since he began writing Voznesensky has been trying to perfect a real oral magic. We have already seen traces of it in ' The Fire '. Another of his early poems, ' I am Goya ', still more vividly illustrates this striving after an incantatory effect. The poem, which is very short, rests on the nagging repetitive echo of the words ' I am Goya ' in a string of words beginning with the same guttural, and conjuring up the universe of suffering and catastrophe which Voznesensky sees in Goya and in the images bound up with Goya in his mind:

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Ya Goya . . .
Ya Gore . . .
Ya Golos Voiny Gorodov Golovni . . .
Ya Golod . . .
Ya Gorlo Poveshennoi Baby . . .
O grozdy vozmezdia . . .
Ya Goya.

Translation cannot convey the essence of the thing: I am Goya . . . I am grief . . . I am the voice of war, the charred remains of towns . . . I am hunger . . . I am the throat of a hanged woman . . . Oh grapes of wrath . . . I am Goya! For the essential point is in the despairing knell of those reiterated 'g's.

Later on, in his poem 'The Masters', he conveys the high spirits of the foundry-masters of Moscow by alliterative 'k's and 'v's. One of his greatest successes in this line is the poem in *The Triangular Pear* called 'Negroes Singing', which is utterly untranslatable because the aching despair of the Negroes is conveyed by the haunting repetition of the 'yery' (y) sound, which is halfway between 'i' and the French 'u', and which reproduces quite well the sound of lamentation. The first five lines end with this rhyme, and the sound is repeated fifteen times in these verses, without any artificiality. No doubt Voznesensky took a malicious pleasure in parading his super-formalism in this poem which, of all those in *The Triangular Pear*, is on the surface least open to objection from the censor's point of view—an 'exposure', or perhaps we should rather say an evocation, of the wretched situation of the Negro in the USA. . . . If this is not civic verse what is! But, as far as I know, Voznesensky has earned nobody's thanks with this poem.

This oral poetry relies very little on gesture. Voznesensky recites his verses with just one endlessly repeated movement of the right hand, and does not overload them with affected diction. In this he is just the opposite of Yevtushenko, who tries to compensate for the facile, feeble, and flat passages with which his work is strewn by a lyrical orgy of frenzied histrionics.

Even a superficial examination of *The Triangular Pear* reveals at once that Voznesensky has intensified and diversified the oral elements in his poetry, while trying at the same time, as we have seen, to enrich the imagery. If we refer back to the analysis of 'The Fire' given earlier, we can see from the three quotations which follow how far alliteration, assonance, and word-play have developed:

Avtoportret moi, retorta neona, apostol nebesnykh vorot, Aeroport. . . .
Zhdut kavalerov, sudeb, chemodanov, chud. . . .
Pyat 'Karavel' . . . syadut s nebes. . . .
My
tamtamy gomerichnye s glazami goremichnymi, klubimsa kak dymy my. . . .

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Vy
belye, kak kholodilniki, kak marlya karantinnaya,
bezzhiznenno mertvye . . . vy . . .
O chom my poyom vam, uvazhaemye dzhentlmeny . . .

The diversification of the incantatory technique is seen also in its use for humorous effect, which is a development of the tendency already observed in 'The Fire'. The most striking instance is the marvellous poem 'Anti-worlds', where the method fits the content perfectly:

Yest sol zemli, yest sor zemli.
No sokhnet sokol bez zmei . . . etc.

The incantation then is at once lyrical, dramatic, humorous, and critical. In this vein Voznesensky is not inferior to the most brilliant surrealists, Prévert and the young Aragon included.

Voznesensky and Soviet Criticism

WHAT most strikes Soviet journalists and critics is the difference between Voznesensky and his fellows

> He does not write like the others. . . . The young are pleased to think that Voznesensky is a poet unlike other poets (Y. Smelyakov, *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, 9 December 1961).
>
> The most controversial poet of the younger generation is Andrei Voznesensky (Aleksandr Kviatkovsky, *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, 23 June 1962).
>
> Andrei Voznesensky is the 'extreme left' of young contemporary poetry (Menshutin and Siniavsky, *Novy Mir*, No. 1, 1961).
>
> Andrei Voznesensky eagerly seeks new means of expression which have never been tried before . . . we can still feel the influence of certain models on his poetic technique, but he is drawing steadily farther and farther away from them (A. Mikhailov, *Znamya*, No. 2, 1963).

Voznesensky is not just different, but radically new, as the older poet Aseyev recognises, with a modesty which is rather unusual:

> Voznesensky's first poems left me unmoved to begin with. It was not his fault. It was simply that I did not yet know how to read this new way of writing. . . . But in the end *The Triangular Pear* forced me to look for the key to his work (*Literaturnaya Gazeta*, 4 August 1962).

Kviatkovsky, in the article quoted above, underlines the value of this novelty: 'His poetry seems to have torn itself away from the traditional, dogmatically schematised thematics in search of freedom. . . . The poet's artistic boldness is extraordinary. . . . How fresh and unusual it all is!'

The modest Aseyev, the enthusiastic Kviatkovsky, the compliments of the poet's friends, of Bokov and Evtushenko for instance, reflect the enthusiasm which Voznesensky arouses in Soviet youth. But for most of the critics, for the conservatives who hold four-fifths of the literary

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journals and periodicals in their hands, Voznesensky is a crazy urchin, the incarnation of loathsome formalism, whom some of them would like to send to Siberia to till the soil:

> Andrei Voznesensky has been criticised several times for bad taste and the vulgarity of some of his poems. A little while ago he committed a fresh offence by publishing his 'Ton-and-a-half Lorry', which, in the general opinion, is a sample of unsurpassable vulgarity. I should like to advise Voznesensky, a good poet who is still maturing, to go to the Dzerzhinsky sovkhoz in the virgin lands (Vladimir Chibilikhin, *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, 8 January 1963).

There is an attempt to make him into a poet for intellectuals, remote from the masses:

> His verses enjoy some success, and will continue to do so, amongst a limited section of our youth, but they cannot reach the great mass of the people (Smelyakov, *Moskva*, No. 12, 1962).

The accusation of vulgarity may not look very serious, but it can be carried to great lengths, as in a short anonymous piece published by *Literaturnaya Gazeta* (22 January 1963) under the heading 'Worthy of Regret'. The author attacks one of the Voznesensky poems which appeared in the January number of *Znamya*:

> The far-fetched vulgarity of expression and the light-hearted slovenliness of the versification can appeal only to petits bourgeois and philistines. . . . The rudeness and disrespect with which Andrei Voznesensky speaks of his fellow writers are astonishing. We can only regret that the traditional good taste of the magazine *Znamya* has failed it on this occasion, and that a poem unworthy of a good poet has appeared in its pages.

The tactics are obvious. Some writers, like the unfortunate Valentin Ovechkin of *Novy Mir*, are shut up in lunatic asylums. In the case of certain other writers hints are dropped that they are irresponsible and badly brought-up, that all they need is to complete their education. This is Khrushchev's attitude to Yevtushenko, for example. The rebel writer is degraded to the status of an urchin whom experienced people must teach how to behave . . . and this is what they are now doing.

* * * *

The present phase in the history of Soviet literature is bound to arrest momentarily the development of Soviet poetry at large and that of Voznesensky in particular. In one of the two Italian melodies published by *Yunost* in January 1963 Voznesensky wrote: 'I am socialist realism's erring child.'

The badly-behaved child made a self critical speech before the Board of the Soviet Writers Union on 28 March, but what he said was so vague and hollow that it could not satisfy even the most benevolent of bureaucrats. He contented himself with saying that he had been criticised, that he would not forget it, and that he intended to work, work, work . . .

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They want to make him recapture an innocence which he surely never had. Like all true poets everywhere, Voznesensky is an 'erring child'. Plato, long ago, wanted to expel poets for ever from his ideal state. Khrushchev, as we see, has a glorious tradition behind him . . . but there are some differences, because Khrushchev needs poets and does not want to banish them but to tame them.

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PARTY CONTROLS REORGANISED

Herbert Ritvo

I

THE November 1962 Plenum of the Central Committee, the third of the year and thirty-third since the death of Stalin, adopted important decisions in four related sectors:

(1) reorganisation of the leading Party organs from the primary bodies to the top of the apparatus;
(2) centralisation of the administrative bureaucracy responsible for new technology and construction;
(3) modification of the planning committees;
(4) establishment of a unified system of Party-State control.

Only the first and last will be discussed here.

The November Plenum approved without debate one of the most radical revisions of the organisational structure of the Party in its history. This fundamental reform of the lower and middle echelons, summarised in fewer than 500 words in the resolution (*Pravda*, 24 November 1962), changed the organisational principle of the Party, with some exceptions, from 'production-territorial' (Article 20) to 'production' at the raikom, gorkom, and obkom (district, city and regional committee) levels.

The alterations, which necessitate amendments to nearly all the articles of the Statutes from 39–52 inclusive, also added another regional bureau of the CC (Central Committee), the Central Asian, which now appears alongside the RSFSR Bureau. The Secretariat of the CC, CPSU has been regrouped according to the 'functional' principle by creating three bureaus for industry, agriculture, and chemicals/light industry, and two separate commissions for ideology and Party organs. Party and State control organs are now unified in a new joint Party-State Control Committee under CC secretary A. Shelepin, and the Party Control Commission (formerly Committee), retains only the function of an appeal board (Article 40-B). Presidia are henceforward to be formed in all the Central Committees of the union-republics, similar to those which formerly existed only in the CC, CPSU and the Ukrainian Central Committee; these will direct the work of the bureaus for agriculture and industry as well as the Party-State control committees of the union-republics. At the next level of the Party apparatus, under the respective bureaus of the Central Committees, there are now

> . . . within the boundaries of existing krais and oblasts, as a rule, two independent Party organisations, a krai or oblast Party organisation embracing all communists working in industry, construction,

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> and transport . . . and a krai or oblast Party organisation embracing communists working at collective and state farms . . . and [all] other establishments connected with agricultural production.

Continuity with the past is sought by regulating the activities of the new Party bodies at this level according to the 'appropriate clauses of the CPSU Statutes on krai and oblast Party organisations' (Articles 43–47). At the lowest level of the Party bureaucracy, the rural raikoms, subjected to continuous reorganisation since 1953, have finally been abolished and replaced by the Party committees at the territorial production administrations set up in March 1962. These committees are to operate under the rules for the abolished raikoms (Articles 48–52), which will also apply to the zonal group industrial committees to be formed in rural areas 'for the guidance of primary Party organisations at industrial enterprises and building enterprises where there are no town committees'.

Unlike the other highly publicised measures sponsored by the First Secretary in the past, from the reorganisation of industrial management in 1957 to the 1961 draft of the Party programme, his proposals to revoke the territorial-production principle, in force since the late twenties, had been submitted only to functionaries, not to the rank and file membership. Khrushchev's speech and all commentaries to date refer only to closed discussions among the Party elite [1]:

> . . . the Presidium of the CC has frequently and repeatedly discussed from every angle with members of the CC and leaders of the local organisations the question of how to improve the organisational structure of Party leadership of the national economy at the present time (*Pravda*, 20 November 1962).

Except for similar references by a few other speakers to 'preliminary studies by lower Party organs which made recommendations to the CC', there was no suggestion that the contemplated division of the CPSU for the first time into industrial and agricultural components had been widely discussed. Certainly no indication of the nature of the new design [2] had been detected by outside observers until publication of Khrushchev's memorandum on agriculture to the Presidium on the eve of the November Plenum (*Pravda*, 13 November 1962), despite considerable evidence of the inevitable demise of the rural raikoms after the March 1962 Plenum.

IT is difficult to find an adequate explanation for the postponement of measures which could have been fitted so appropriately into the

[1] This is probably a reference to conferences held in the CPSU Central Committee and in the RSFSR Bureau in July (*Pravda*, 29, 31 July 1962).

[2] In his speech at the Bulgarian Party Congress, Presidium member A. Kirilenko revealed that 'in cities with developed industry . . . where city committees formerly also dealt with agriculture, the direction of collective and state farms has now been turned over to the rural raikoms' (*Rabotnichesko Delo*, 14 September 1962). In retrospect this can be seen as a preliminary to the November reforms, particularly since Kirilenko also mentioned that 'in many oblast, city and urban raikoms, the industrial departments have been strengthened . . . and established where none existed previously'.

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scheduled proceedings of the twenty-second CPSU congress—the adoption of the Programme and Statutes. The delay is all the more puzzling since Khrushchev had clearly stated in connection with the 1957 industrial reorganisation that structural changes in the Party from top to bottom were necessary:

> It was said here quite correctly that there are too many people in the Party raikoms. The Central Committee is studying this problem. We will reorganise industrial management and we will tackle this question as well. . . . Evidently the structure of the Party organs in raions, oblasts, and republics must be revised and we should also revise the structure in the Central Committee of the CPSU and release a considerable number of people. Comrades, it is not good to start on all lines at once. Let us first complete one job, rebuild the organisation of management in industry and construction (Speech in Leningrad, Radio Moscow, 24 May 1957).

In view of the challenge to his position to be made shortly thereafter by Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich, and others at the June 1957 Plenum, Khrushchev no doubt wisely refrained at that time from simultaneously subjecting both the managerial functionaries and Party apparatchiki to severe administrative shocks. Instead of reorganising the Party immediately to conform to the changed industrial structure, Khrushchev shifted his attack to agriculture, beginning with the abolition of the MTS in January 1958 and completing this operation with the March 1962 reform.

The latest Party reorganisation is hardly likely to confirm Podgorny's statement that it 'is the logical and appropriate continuation—or rather conclusion—of the enormous and purposeful work carried out by the Party and CC (on Comrade Khrushchev's initiative) during the last ten years in perfecting the system of economic leadership of the country's economy' (*Pravda*, 22 November 1962).

The purpose of the reform, simply stated and strongly stressed by Khrushchev and all others at the Plenum, is the improvement of 'Party leadership of industry, construction and agriculture'. This is, of course, not an unfamiliar theme; nor does the long list of shortcomings, now attributed to the old system, bring any sudden revelations. Judging from the results of past efforts to find remedies for the multiple maladies of the Party-State bureaucracy, the new structure given to the 'ruling Party' is not likely to produce any remarkable cure, either in the short or long run. The results of this prescription for increased production through intensified Party control will show themselves only gradually; but it is possible to predict some of the effects on the Party apparatchiki. Let us begin with the personalities immediately affected by Khrushchev's institutional changes.

The 1962 reorganisation of the Party apparatus invites comparison with the 1957 changes. At the top the contrast could hardly be greater. In 1962 the single change in the Presidium was the election of L.

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Yefremov as a candidate member.[3] Of the eleven full members of the Presidium in June 1957, five were immediately ousted, and only three—Khrushchev, Mikoyan, Suslov—still held their seats in November 1961. In November 1962 Khrushchev's proposals to rebuild the Party apparatus were accepted so docilely that the reassignments involving Presidium members were limited to the transfer of G. Voronov from the RSFSR Bureau to succeed D. Polyansky as Chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers, and the latter's appointment as Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. Both kept their positions in the Presidium.

The momentary stability in the Presidium provides a timely opportunity to analyse the personal changes in the top policy body since July 1955, when the first post-Stalin additions were made. Between that date and the present the Presidium has had seventeen new members, drawn as shown below from the various sections of the bureaucratic machines:

	Regional Party			
	Regional Party Secretaries (8)	Secretaries after Service in Secretariat (4)	Central Party Apparatus (3)	Military-State (2)
1955	Kirichenko [2]		Suslov	
1957	Kozlov	Aristov [3]	Kuusinen	Zhukov [1]
	Ignatov [3]	Belyaev [2]	Shvernik	
	Mukhitdinov [3]	Brezhnev		
		Furtseva [3]		
1960	Podgorny			Kosygin
	Polyansky			
1961	Voronov			
1962	Kirilenko			

[1] Removed, 1957. [2] Removed, 1960. [3] Removed, 1961.

The almost complete monopoly of the regional Party apparatchiki demonstrates that under Khrushchev, until recently, only one road led to the Presidium. There have been some brief detours through the Secretariat, but these are more likely to bring a loss of position and prestige than lasting increase in power and status. Thus at the end of 1957 Kirichenko and the last two of the 1957 group promoted to the Presidium (Ignatov and Mukhitdinov) were also brought into the Secretariat to join their six colleagues already in that body (Aristov, Belyaev, Brezhnev, Furtseva, Suslov, and Kuusinen) to create the dual Presidium-Secretariat relationship which characterised the next two years, during which Khrushchev's major reforms were implemented. All except Suslov and Kuusinen, whose responsibilities have been in the

[3] Already a member of the RSFSR Bureau as first secretary of Gorky Oblast, he has been named First Deputy Chairman of that body, to succeed G. Voronov.

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field of ideology and international communism, and Brezhnev (Voroshilov's successor as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet), were gone from the centre of power and authority by mid-1960. Support for Khrushchev in his 'time of troubles' in June 1957, then, was obviously no guarantee of security at the peak of the Party pyramid, even for those who came up through the regional machines in the Ukraine and Moscow.

After the twenty-second congress and the November Plenum the functionaries from Khrushchev's apparatus who have been promoted to the Secretariat represent an overwhelming majority in the executive organ of the Central Committee:

	Access to Secretariat (1955–1962)		
	Regional Secretaries		Central
	Directly from Regional Organisations	From Presidium	Party apparatus
1955	Aristov [2] Belyaev [2]		Shepilov [1]
1956	Brezhnev [2] Furtseva [2]		Kuusinen
1957		Ignatov [2] Kirichenko [2] Mukhitdinov [2]	
1960		Kozlov	
1961	Demichev Spiridonov [3]		Ilyichev Ponomarev Shelepin [4]
1962			Andropov Polyakov Rudakov Titov

[1] Ousted in 1957. [2] Ousted in 1960. [3] Ousted in 1962. [4] Actually transferred from the KGB.

In 1957, after Khrushchev's victory over the managerial bureaucracy in June and over the military (Zhukov) in November, the First Secretary had created a temporary amalgamation of the Presidium-Secretariat to supervise the implementation of the domestic programmes obstructed for years by the opposition of the 'anti-Party group'. Five years later an entirely new batch of functionaries, selected almost exclusively from the apparatus of the Secretariat, had been given the assignments in which their former superiors had been found wanting. As in 1957, Khrushchev's subordinates are to carry out Party guidance of industry and agriculture as members of the Secretariat which he has controlled since 1955; in 1961–62, however, none of those *promoted* to succeed the fallen favourites of 1957 hold membership in the policy-making

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Presidium, now no less subject to the domination of the First Secretary than the Secretariat.

The expansion of that organ in 1960–62, quantitatively equal to that in 1956–57, is therefore qualitatively different. It is not a 'packing' of the Secretariat with the Presidium members who were to be entrusted with supervision of Party work in various sectors of the economy; it is, in effect, a manoeuvre which apparently reduces the role of Presidium members in the execution of the 1962 reform to a minimum. Apart from Khrushchev, the only full members of the Presidium to address the Plenum were N. Podgorny [4] and G. Voronov.

Three of the four new secretaries promoted from the apparatus of the Central Committee, i.e., the departments directly under the First Secretary, have thus been given operational assignments as heads of the newly created CC Bureaus: V. Polyakov, moved from the Ukrainian Central Committee Department for Agriculture to the CC Bureau for Agriculture; A. Rudakov, from the CC Department for Heavy Industry to the CC Bureau for Industry; and V. Titov, from the Ukrainian CC Department for Party Organs to the CC Commission for Party Organs. At the same time three of the secretaries elected at the twenty-second congress have also been made chairmen of new organs: L. Ilyichev, Chairman, Commission for Ideology; A. Shelepin, Chairman, Committee for Party-State Control; P. Demichev, Chairman, CC Bureau for Chemical-Light Industry. The functions of Andropov, appointed in 1962, and Ponomarev, appointed in 1961, have not been defined, but they are clearly the secretaries responsible for relations with bloc parties, and parties outside the bloc, respectively.

ON the basis of the above it is possible to approximate the degree of change in the Secretariat. Until November this body of eight included four Presidium members (Khrushchev, Kozlov, Kuusinen, and Suslov) whose responsibilities in the administration of the economy were unclear. After the reorganisation the functional assignments for the eight 'junior' members promoted in November 1961–November 1962 were sharply demarcated. Thus the promotion of the octet of apparatchiki from the CC apparatus (Demichev is the only exception) created a new hierarchical level on the organisational chart; immediately below these secretaries, and still directly responsible to them, the CC departments no doubt continue to exist on the former industrial-branch system. In the perspective of the past, the structural reorganisation of the Secretariat at this stage, therefore, seemed quite similar to Zhdanov's 1939 reform, which was then changed under Malenkov in 1949 to the system only now being revised.[5] Without the extreme innovations at

[4] Podgorny and Brezhnev became secretaries of the Central Committee at the June 1963 Plenum.

[5] The appointment of two other Presidium members (Brezhnev and Podgorny) to the Secretariat in June 1963 does not seriously modify the relationship between Presidium and Secretariat. Brezhnev probably takes over the functions of the ailing Kozlov.

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the lower levels of the Party apparatus, however, the modification of the leading bodies of the central apparatus could easily have been considered just another experiment in the continuous process of reshuffling the upper reaches of the Party bureaucracy.

A scarcely more meaningful revision is the creation of the Central Asian Bureau of the Central Committee, thereby setting up another regional bureau similar to that for the RSFSR, in existence since March 1956. Its chairman, V. G. Lomonosov, previously a minor functionary, became nominally superior to a candidate member of the Presidium of the CC, CPSU (R. Rashidov, first secretary, Uzbek CC) and three other full members of the CC, CPSU. A more convincing demonstration of the total subordination of this part of the regional apparatus to the CC Secretariat could scarcely be imagined, and suggests very strongly that this Bureau, even if formed by the Presidium, will soon come as completely under the domination of the First Secretary as its prototype, the RSFSR Bureau, has been from its inception. In any event the formation of this new regional body at the top demonstrates that the principle of centralisation which determines the structure of the CPSU is not to be weakened in any way by vertical functional divisions at lower levels.

The truly novel elements in the reform first begin to emerge in the Central Committees at the republic level. In each of these organisations, which it must be remembered have only 'the rights of an oblast committee', there is to be a Presidium 'to guide and coordinate the activities' of the new bureaus for agriculture and industry. The initial details of the reorganisation have already brought stronger recollections of a familiar past than harbingers of a different future. Thus, in Latvia, the first republic to form a Presidium, A. Pelshe, first secretary of the CC, was elected Chairman of the Presidium (*Izvestia*, 9 December 1962). Two of his subordinates in the Secretariat of the Latvian CC were simultaneously appointed Chairmen of the Bureaus for Agriculture and Industry, so that the new system has evidently been implemented in the Central Committees of the union-republics exactly as in the CC, CPSU.[6]

In the Ukraine, the second largest republic, there was only a slight variation of the pattern set by the tiny Baltic CC. The secretariat of the Ukrainian CC was expanded by two members, both former oblast secretaries, who were immediately named Chairmen of the Bureau for

[6] Five secretaries were elected to the nine-member Presidium; previously the eleven-member Bureau had included four of the five secretaries (Riga Home Service, 8 December 1962). In Azerbaidzhan the new Presidium (seven members) includes the first secretary and four other secretaries. The Bureaux for Agriculture and Industry are both headed by secretaries, the former newly appointed. The other two members of the Presidium, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers and the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, had also served in the secretariat in recent years (Radio Baku, 7 December 1962). In Georgia, six of the nine members of the Presidium are CC secretaries; three were appointed for the first time (Radio Tbilisi, 20 December 1962). In Kazakhstan, six of the nine members of the Presidium are CC secretaries, another is secretary of the Virgin Lands Territory; the others are, as in Azerbaidzhan, the Chairmen of the Council of Ministers and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet (Radio Alma Ata, 27 December 1962).

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Agriculture and Committee for Party-State Control respectively; the CC Bureau for Industry was to be headed by another former obkom secretary who had been a CC secretary since August 1962. In institutional terms, the key to the reform at the republic level also lies exclusively in the hands of the secretariat, hardly a new element in the complex of Party construction.[7] Unless this constant limiting factor is recognised, the effect of structural alterations at the base of the Party pyramid may be exaggerated.

Below the Central Committees of the union-republics the radical nature of the structural reform is most salient. Through a division of the Party apparatus vertically as well as regionally, a dual system of Party committees has been formed in a manner which would require constant intervention by the Central Committees to settle disputes between two 'equally' ranked Party committees in the same territory, except that, in practice, one of the two is often arbitrarily given sole competence in a particular field of activity. Although the table of organisation is new, the personalities who are now being selected for the 'functional' obkoms are quite familiar. The results of elections in the first nineteen RSFSR obkoms to be divided (including Moscow and Leningrad) give the following breakdown for the chairmen of the organising committees who, with a single exception, were confirmed at subsequent regional conferences:

	Industrial oblast Party organisations	Agricultural oblast Party organisations
Former 1st or 2nd Secretaries	14	13
Former Chairmen, Obispolkom	1	4
Unidentified	4	2

In none of these cases, despite Khrushchev's complaints concerning the inefficiency of the former obkom leadership, has a first secretary failed to be elected to head one or other of the new obkoms. The first phase of the organisational reform, at least, will therefore be carried out largely by those who have moved up to obkom posts since 1959.[8] For these harried functionaries the chance to concentrate on the problems of a single branch of the regional economy, instead of the entire range, may represent a lightening of their onerous burdens; for some of them it also means a loss in status because of a considerable inflation in the number of obkom secretaries.

For the First Secretary of the CPSU, of course, the reorganisation provides another opportunity to move a new generation of Party leaders up the ladder to replace those who prove unable to adapt to

[7] Note, in particular, the infrequency of representatives of the military and police, previously members of the bureaux in several republics, and the total exclusion of all managerial (i.e. Sovnarkhoz) functionaries.

[8] According to F. Kozlov, writing in *Kommunist*, No. 8, 1962, 70·5 per cent of the first secretaries of obkoms, kraikoms, and Central Committees of the union-republics had held these posts less than three years; only 12·8 per cent more than five years. In the gorkoms and raikoms 78·8 per cent of the secretaries had held their positions three years or less in early 1962.

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'new conditions'. Since a mere 20 per cent of the obkom secretaries who were elected to the CC at the nineteenth Party congress are still active at the obkom level or above, Khrushchev, aided by the normal attrition of age, has practically completed the renovation of the Stalinist-trained apparatchiki within a decade. The renewal rate of their successors seems certain to be no less in the next few years, as the complement of Party functionaries with full higher educational and production training [9] moves into vacant and newly created posts.

IT is difficult to see any of the alleged possibilities for a significant reduction in personnel or for increased efficiency at the obkom level, but this may not be the case at the next lower level of gorkoms and raikoms, where the reorganisation should have its greatest impact. The creation of 1,500 Party committees in the territorial production administrations to replace 3,200 rural raikoms, each formerly staffed with twelve to eighteen full-time functionaries (*Partiinaya Zhizn*, No. 23, 1957), marks the final stage in the elimination of the raikom apparatus, which for years had been primarily responsible for agriculture. Having somehow survived all challenges, at times with considerably damaged status, from the establishment of the political departments of the MTS to the 1962 reorganisation of agricultural management, the raikoms as Party organs and the raions as governmental administrative units have now passed permanently from the scene. In the tremendous reshuffle of cadres the number of apparatchiki immediately affected by the dissolution of the raikoms runs into tens of thousands.[10] For most the transfers from the raikoms 'closer to production' in the committees of the territorial production administrations, however, will still mean their subordination in the primary Party organisation to functionaries selected by the obkom secretariat from among the outstanding first secretaries of the raikoms.

At the time of the twenty-second Party congress, the CPSU had 296,444 primary organisations with 3·3 million members at industrial, transportation, and construction enterprises; the collective and state farms had nearly 52,000 organisations with 1·6 million members (Ye. Bugayev, B. Leibzon, *Besedy ob Ustave KPSS*, Moscow, 1962, p. 162). The division of the Party according to the production principle will, therefore, affect exactly one-half of the Party membership in a 2:1 ratio in favour of industry. Although there is no breakdown available for the other half, it is safe to assume that an even larger majority will fall under the jurisdiction of the industrial obkoms. Despite the predominance of agriculture in perhaps two-thirds of the largest administrative regions and the continued

[9] In the RSFSR forty chairmen of the organising committees for industrial oblasts had higher engineering training, one middle technical schooling, and only one an incomplete higher technical education; all have long experience in industry and Party work (*Kommunist*, No. 18, 1962, p. 28).

[10] The consolidation of four raions into a single territorial production administration in Kursk Oblast made 200 former Party and Soviet functionaries superfluous (*Selskaya Zhizn*, 12 December 1962).

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growth of Party membership in the countryside, the political power of the Party apparatus will, no doubt, continue to be concentrated in the industrialised urban centres rather than in the rural areas.

The confusion caused by competing Party bureaucracies will be compounded by the creation of duplicate state bodies, the Soviets, corresponding to the Agricultural and Industrial Committees at the regional levels. In the reorganisation of the 'Soviet organs which will be carried out somewhat later, the administrative subdivision of the territory of the republic will be within the limits of the collective-state farm territorial production administrations created'.[11] The importance given to these governmental administrative organs, however, can be measured by the relative lack of attention paid to them in the early stages of the reorganisation. From Khrushchev to the final speaker at the November Plenum, no one made more than a passing reference to the problem of 'urban-industrial' and 'rural-agricultural' Soviets; three weeks after the Plenum the December session of the Supreme Soviet concluded without the slightest trace of debate on the contemplated reform.

FAR more significant than the apparent neglect of the traditional Soviet of Workers Deputies was the formation of the new Party-State Control Committee of the CPSU and the USSR Council of Ministers. For the first time in Soviet history a single agency will have full and sole authority to investigate all phases of Party-State work. Ostensibly modelled on the joint (Party) Central Control Commission and (State) Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate (1921–34), the new body is headed, as noted earlier, by CC secretary and Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, A. Shelepin; it provides a unique example of the fusion of Party-State functions and personal union which may well set the pattern for apparatchiki at other levels of the Party during the construction of communism. In every republic for which listings are available, either an incumbent or newly elected secretary has been appointed to head the joint Party-State Committee; all have been named Deputy Chairmen as well. The sole exception is the RSFSR Bureau, which received as chairman G. Yenutin, the last head of the now defunct Commission of Soviet Control. Although the Committee's powers and structure have not yet been clearly defined, its subordination to the secretariat rather than to the Council of Ministers is unmistakable. There can be little doubt that under the former KGB chief it is destined to play a key role in the inevitable purge which will become inextricably interwoven with the shakeup of the entire apparatus. First proposed publicly in September 1961 during the discussion of the Party Programme and Statutes, and advocated by Khrushchev and Mikoyan a month later at the twenty-second congress, the belated formation of the committee may represent the resolution of a high level controversy in accordance with Khrushchev's desires.

[11] L. I. Bodyul (first secretary, Moldavian CC), Radio Kishinev, 8 December 1962.

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There has been a recent precedent for the amalgamation of Party-State roles in the (State) Agricultural Committees formed in all the oblasts and republics after the March 1962 Plenum, headed by the first secretaries of the republican Central Committees and the first secretaries of the regional committees:

> The official employment of responsible functionaries of the corresponding Party organs in certain bodies of the state administration represents something entirely new and therefore a concrete form of the increased influence of the Party on the activities of the State. . . . The leading organs of the Party, which bear the chief responsibility in every section of communist construction, send their most active . . . representatives into the state organs so that, first through their Party influence, and secondly with the authority of official governmental functionaries, they can do everything in their power to strengthen the . . . state organs. . . . Thus the Party guarantees the strict implementation of the previously determined political line. This form of the strengthened leadership role of the Communist Party can thus be regarded as a new type of direction of the state organs by our Party (I. V. Pavlov, *Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i pravo*, No. 7, 1962).

It is important to note that this kind of intervention has now gained 'legal' approval because the Party Statutes, adopted at the twenty-second congress, firmly ruled that 'Party organisations must not act in place of government organisations . . . they must not allow either the merging of the functions of the Party and other bodies or undue parallelism in work' (Article 43-C).[12] Yet implementation of the planned reform of the Party apparatus will be impossible without the violation of this provision. Indeed, the reforms have little meaning unless the Party functionaries at all levels intervene more directly in production to a greater degree than ever before.

On the eve of the November 1962 Plenum, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union had nearly eleven million members (*Sovetskaya Rossiya*, 4 November 1962). This represented an increase of more than a million since the twenty-second congress, a net growth twice as great as the increment for any of the past six years and the largest rise in membership for a comparable period in history. Although the Party had grown by exactly 50 per cent in the decade between the nineteenth congress (October 1952) and November 1962, the full-time Party apparatus of the Central Committees of the union-republics, the territorial and regional committees had been reduced by one-third (Bugayev, Leibzon, *op. cit.*, p. 163); the apparatus of the district and city committees had also 'decreased significantly', certainly more than in the higher bodies. There are now only one-third as many full-time

[12] 'The reorganisation . . . does not mean that [the Party organs] are being transformed into administrative-managerial organs, directly running the economy. . . . They were and remain organs of political and organisational leadership. . . . Their main task is the correct selection and assignment of cadres' (Ye. Bugayev, *Pravda*, 26 December 1962).

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apparatchiki per 1,000 members as in 1940. This steady decline in the numerical strength of the apparatus in the face of a great increase in Party membership is one of the most striking manifestations of Khrushchev's domination of the Party machine which he had manipulated as his major instrument in subordinating the competing institutional forces to the leader of the Party-State. In a very real sense the significance of the November reforms lies in the seemingly contradictory demands for intensification of the Party's role in the guidance of the economy concurrently with a further submission of the apparatchiki to Khrushchev's personal rule. Ten years after the death of Stalin, the organisation which Khrushchev had revived as 'the ruling Party' and restored to its position of unchallenged primacy in Soviet society has, in the wake of the other bureaucracies—police, ministerial, and military—been completely redesigned to meet the First Secretary's specifications, drawn up by him more than twenty years ago:

> The Party is responsible for everything. Whether it is Army work, Chekist work, economic work, Soviet work—all is subordinate to the Party leadership, and if anyone thinks otherwise he is no Bolshevik. (Speech at the fifteenth congress of the CP of the Ukraine, quoted from J. Armstrong, *The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite*, New York, 1959, p. 151.)

(When Herbert Ritvo submitted the manuscript of this article he was intending to make some additions, and possibly some changes too. Three days later he died. Even so, it shows what a meticulous analyst of Soviet affairs has been lost by his untimely death.)

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POLITICS AND MANAGEMENT

*Jeremy R. Azrael**

THE reorganisation decreed by the November 1962 Central Committee plenum and the December 1962 session of the Supreme Soviet will provide students of Soviet affairs with material for analysis for some time to come. These pages offer only some initial reflections on the reorganisation, with special stress on its implications for the position of the managerial elite and technical intelligentsia in Soviet society.

The main features of the reorganisation are by now clear.[1] First, the party *apparat* has been divided along 'production' lines. Separate party committees for industry and construction and for agriculture have been formed in the majority of *oblasts*, while at the republic and all-union levels analogous party bureaus have been established.[2] Second, a parallel division has taken place or is imminent in most governmental bodies (soviets) and public organisations (trade union, Komsomol, etc.). Third, central committee presidia have been elected in all republics, and a number of new CPSU Central Committee bureaus, commissions, and committees have been formed: a so-called 'Party Commission' (replacing the old Committee of Party Control), a joint Committee of Party-State Control, a Commission for Party-Organisational Questions, an Ideological Commission, and a Central Asian Bureau. Fourth, the *raions* in the countryside have been liquidated in favour of the recently created *kolkhoz-sovkhoz* production administrations. Fifth, so-called zonal party committees (with the rights of *gorkoms*) have been formed to supervise industry in predominantly agricultural areas. Sixth, elective 'production committees' have been experimentally introduced in some industrial enterprises. Seventh, a number of new state committees for branches of industry have been formed, particularly in the realm of light industry. Eighth, policy-making and resource-allocation in the fields of construction and of scientific and technical research and development have been further centralised. Ninth, the organisation of planning has been revised: an All-Union Council of the National Economy has been created to handle current planning, and the task of long-range planning has been transferred from the State Economic Council to USSR Gosplan. Tenth, a very large number of economic-administrative regions have been merged, thus greatly reducing the number of *sovnarkhozy*.[3]

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1 See *Pravda*, 20–24 November 1962, for the Central Committee Plenum, and 10–14 December 1962 for the Supreme Soviet.

2 At the all-union level three party bureaus have been established: for (heavy) industry and construction, for light and chemical industries, and for agriculture.

3 In the Ukraine seven new *sovnarkhozy* have been formed instead of the former fourteen (*Pravda*, 28 December 1962). In the RSFSR, 24 *sovnarkhozy* have been

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The reasons for this unprecedentedly far-reaching series of changes—and here only the most important have been noted—are not easy to fathom. With few exceptions the official explanations are either so general as to be almost meaningless, or so specific as to be obviously insufficient in view of the radical measures involved. The information that the reorganisation was designed to 'strengthen party leadership of the economy' sheds little light, and it is difficult to believe that the decisive change, the specialisation of the party *apparat*, was occasioned solely by the desire to simplify the task of selecting *obkom* secretaries and to prevent them from dispersing their energy wastefully between industry and agriculture, although these considerations, particularly the latter, undoubtedly played some part. Indeed, the reasoning behind the reorganisation is so opaque that one is tempted to view the changes as an expression of the belief of the regime in the value of change as such within the totalitarian system, and to see it as part of the continuing effort to maintain the 'permanent revolution' and guard against the ever-recurrent threat of 'routinisation'. However, even if this explanation is partly valid, the specific pattern of change must still be examined. Here the problems are manifold, for the new arrangements clearly run counter to the official ideology by accentuating rather than diminishing the differences between town and country, and clearly create unusually serious problems of administrative and policy coordination, even granting the possibility that in the USSR the agricultural and industrial sectors of the economy are less closely integrated than in most countries at a similar level of economic development.

THE leadership has been particularly reluctant to air the political implications of the reorganisation, although these are by no means inconsequential.[4] It is possible that the reorganisation is directly related to a power struggle in the Kremlin, but, even if it it not, it is likely to have great power-political significance. It provides an opportunity for a reshuffling of top personnel and seems likely to bring forth new cliques and alliances within the leadership and to facilitate efforts to settle old scores. In addition, it provides an opportunity for a general 'renewal' of cadres at all levels, thus furthering Khrushchev's policy of accelerating circulation within the elite, and, in particular, of promoting younger, better-trained cadres who are relatively unencumbered by the heritage of Stalinism and better attuned to the new, Khrushchevian, political

formed in place of the former 67 (*Pravda*, 10 January 1963). In Central Asia a single *sovnarkhoz* has been formed instead of a separate *sovnarkhoz* for each of the four republics.

4 It is noteworthy that the reorganisation was not preceded by one of Khrushchev's beloved 'public discussions'. While this does not suggest top-level disagreement (the 1957 reorganisation of industrial management, about which there was great disagreement, *was* preceded by a 'public discussion'), it does suggest a desire to maintain relative secrecy until the last possible moment in order to prevent powerful groups whose interests would be adversely affected from rallying in opposition. One such group, as we shall see, might have been the mass of middle and lower level *apparatchiki*.

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style. Finally, the reorganisation provides an opportunity for the further concentration of power within the political system. It has the effect of considerably reducing the power of the middle and lower levels of the party *apparat* relative to that of the top leadership. The number of *obkom* secretaries has been nearly doubled and the jurisdiction of each secretary has been reduced through the specialisation of the *apparat*. General policy coordination cannot now take place below the republic level, for it is only at this level that the various channels of party activity merge. Moreover, in Central Asia, the power of even the republic authorities has been restricted by the formation of the new Central Asian Bureau of the Central Committee. The effects which will flow from this further concentration of power are bound to be substantial. At a minimum it seems certain that the middle and lower ranges of the *apparat* will play a much lesser role in political decision-making, and will, at the same time, provide a less stable and monolithic power base for any individual within the leadership who might be inclined to challenge the prevailing balance of power at the top.

In the economic realm as well, the reorganisation signifies a further concentration of power. It thus continues a trend which set in soon after the economic 'decentralisation' of 1957. The establishment of new state committees, the centralisation of construction activities and of scientific research and development, and the consolidation of economic-administrative regions, should be appraised in conjunction with such earlier measures as the withdrawal of the right of *sovnarkhozy* to distribute 'funded commodities' without central sanction (1959), the organisation of 17 'major economic regions' (1961), the centralisation of investment policy (1961), the transfer of control of local industry from the local soviets to the appropriate *sovnarkhozy*, etc. The hopes placed in 'decentralisation' have clearly been disappointed in important respects, although those who originally opposed it are no longer in a position to reap political benefits from their foresight.

The 'recentralising' measure which is of greatest significance in the present context is the consolidation of the economic-administrative regions. This measure should contribute to greater economic efficiency by eliminating 'dwarf' *sovnarkhozy* and permitting a regionalisation of management that accords better with the territorial distribution of resources and production facilities. By putting an end to the present situation in which, in the great majority of cases, the jurisdiction of *obkom* and *sovnarkhoz* coincide, it should reduce the marked 'localism' which has developed since 1957. Now, at a minimum, the 'localist' propensities of *sovnarkhoz* officials and *obkom* secretaries will no longer tend to reinforce each other. By the same token, the consolidation gives the *sovnarkhoz* officials greater scope for independent action where *oblast* party officialdom is concerned. Their domain will now encompass more than one or part of more than one *oblast*, and they will hence be in a

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position to play off one (industrial) *obkom* against another. To a significantly lesser extent than before will they be the *de facto* subordinates of the *obkom* secretaries.

HOWEVER, the reorganisation as a whole is anything but a victory for the Soviet managerial elite in its perpetual struggle for greater autonomy. If recentralisation in general and the consolidation of the *sovnarkhozy* in particular promise more operational independence vis-à-vis the party, this promise is more than counterbalanced by other facets of the reorganisation. In fact, if one thing about the reorganisation is certain, it is that the latter was designed to strengthen party control over and increase party involvement in economic management, and that, in this sense, it expresses *continuity* with the 1957 industrial reorganisation and reflects the temper of the entire Khrushchev era. A strengthening of party control is implied in both the merger of the state and party control organs, and the formation of 'production committees'.[5] It is more than implied in the key measure of the reorganisation, the specialisation of the party *apparat*, which, as official commentaries have made abundantly clear, is specifically designed to ensure more extensive, uninterrupted, systematic, and penetrating party guidance of economic operations.

While the decision to intensify operational control over management was probably influenced by the desire to forestall any attempt on the part of the managerial elite to 'abuse' the trend towards economic recentralisation by using it as a wedge with which to try to regain the *political* authority which it possessed before 1957, this consideration was probably far from paramount. Despite recentralisation, the danger of a resurgence of a politically powerful managerial faction, such as may have existed earlier, is slight. The current recentralisation stops well short of a re-establishment of the old ministerial system, and does not provide the sort of institutional basis for a challenge to the central party leadership that the latter system provided. The structure of management is still basically regional in character, and the managerial elite is still dispersed.

The decisive considerations behind the intensification of party control were economic rather than political. In the first place, the regime is anxious to reinforce its struggle against the various well-known techniques utilised by economic officials to evade or simulate the fulfilment of centrally-determined plan targets. Recourse to these techniques has long been a constant of Soviet management, and (judging, for example, by the increasingly harsh penalties which the regime has felt compelled to impose for 'economic crimes') does not appear to have become less widespread in recent years. In the second place, the regime is obviously

[5] These measures should be seen in conjunction with the establishment of permanent 'production conferences', the formation of party commissions for implementing the right of control over the activities of management, and other similar measures recently adopted to symbolise a 'return to Leninism' and 'advance to communism' *at the expense of* managerial independence.

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greatly concerned about what might be called, in its most general form, the absence of the entrepreneurial approach. More concretely, it is concerned at the failure of economic officials actively to search out and exploit 'hidden reserves' in the economy, and to encourage and support technological innovation. In fact, according to Soviet sources, 'hidden reserves' are regularly concealed and technological innovation is frequently discouraged and frustrated.

Again, these are not new phenomena. Nor should their prevalance be exaggerated, seeing the record of performance of the Soviet economy. However, they may have become more widespread as the disappearance of terror diminished the risks involved in seeking a 'quiet life'; and they may also have become more serious as the demands on Soviet resources expand, as the production facilities of the early plan period become more obsolete, as the labour shortage places a higher premium on labour-saving technology, and as the potential benefits for productivity of the 'automation revolution' become increasingly clear.

The entrepreneurial problem has been at the heart of much of the extensive discussion in which Soviet economists have recently been engaged, including the highly publicised debate on Professor Liberman's proposals.[6] Here it is not necessary to analyse this discussion in any detail; for the present purposes it is only necessary to note that a large number of economists urged solutions to the entrepreneurial problem which pointed towards a marked increase in the operational autonomy of Soviet managers.[7] Khrushchev has authorised a continuation of the economic discussion and, in particular, has ordered that the Liberman proposals be intensively studied and practically tested on a limited scale. However, the main thrust of the November reorganisation, pointing as it does towards a restriction of the operational autonomy of economic officials, runs directly counter to the spirit of much of the economic discussion. The regime has decided to intensify party pressure on the managers; it hopes that by specialising the *apparat* it can augment the latter's role as an energising entrepreneurial force in the economy.[8]

THE attempt to solve the entrepreneurial problem by these means may not be quite so 'irrational' as it undoubtedly appears to many people both in the Soviet Union and outside. In the first place, it does not completely preclude such 'rational' solutions as revision of the incentive system, reduction in the detail of central planning, etc. In the second

[6] See *Survey*, No. 47.

[7] What was urged was greater operational autonomy for lower level economic officials as against higher, and by implication, for all economic officials as against the *apparat*.

[8] The role of the *apparat* as an entrepreneurial force is not a new one. Barrington Moore, Jr. (*Terror and Progress USSR*, pp. 63–64, 71, 192), has argued that the *apparat* has been *the* centre of entrepreneurialism in the Soviet economy, and the author's own research would tend to support this judgment, with reference to the period since the Great Purge, although not to the earlier period. It is clear that Khrushchev has given much thought to the entrepreneurial role of the *apparat*, and, since his rise to dominance, has sought to buttress it.

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place, there may be considerable validity in the regime's implicit assumption that unless such measures are accompanied by heightened external pressure, albeit pressure which contradicts their basic spirit, they might not evoke the desired entrepreneurial response on the part of the economic cadres.

The Soviet managerial elite still consists primarily of men of the Stalin generation, the generation which rose prematurely to positions of authority in the wake of the Great Purge.[9] Although this generation, and even the managerial stratum within it, is far from homogeneous, it shares certain things in common. Above all, it has been taught by almost everything in its experience that the exercise of independent initiative is fraught with danger. To be sure, under Stalin no manager long survived who was not able to meet most of the unrelenting demands which were made upon him. In the circumstances, however, these demands could be met better by the skilful use of coercion than by supporting or initiating technological innovation. Now the framework of sanctions upon which the managers often relied—the infamous laws on lateness, work transfers, etc., as well as the general terror—has been largely dismantled.[10] A new managerial style is needed and is being called for. However, adaptation to the post-Stalin atmosphere is not easy for those whose attitudes and habits have been shaped by Stalinism, as has recently been publicly and succinctly acknowledged by Frol Kozlov (*Kommunist*, 1962, No. 8, p. 15):

> The cult of personality made workers forget about independence and initiative and led to intellectual atrophy. And, despite the fact that all of this has been struck a decisive blow, the habits which were formed in the course of decades cannot completely disappear in a moment.

Moreover, apart from its conditioning, the Stalin generation is now a tired generation. No matter how great its gratitude, it is more likely to respond to the liberalisation of the atmosphere of Soviet life with a massive relaxation than with an upsurge of zeal and enthusiasm. Such a response is the more likely because many of the most conscientious members of the Stalin generation are not merely tired but also disoriented. They have been compelled to call their entire past into question, and the accompanying uncertainty and confusion serve further to inhibit bold action and encourage adherence to routine. This goes far towards

[9] The reference here is to a sociological rather than chronological generation, although in this case the two tend to coincide. The bulk of those who rose to top managerial positions in the 1936–38 period were in their thirties, and many have since been replaced. However, many still survive and the replacements of those who have not have usually been men only slightly younger whose basic experiences have been similar. Being young, it might be somewhat easier for them to adjust to the post-Stalin atmosphere; as against this, being somewhat younger, their early conditioning was more decisively influenced by Stalinism. Among the directors of the largest plants and factories in Leningrad, as represented at a recent meeting, the majority were aged 50 or over (*Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta*, 5 January 1963).

[10] It is noteworthy, however, that in his speech to the November plenum Khrushchev expressed grave concern about the high rate of labour turnover and suggested that legal changes—i.e. more coercion—might be necessary to reduce it (*Pravda*, 20 November 1962).

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explaining the existence of a situation which Khrushchev described some time ago in the following terms—terms which, even if exaggerated, are indicative of the regime's concern:

> We still have many officials . . . who fear everything that is new and advanced. An old fossil of an official argues: 'Why should I become mixed up in all this? There will be a lot of bother and it might even lead to unpleasantness. They talk about improving production! Is it worthwhile knocking your brains out over it? Let the higher-ups worry! Let the top men do the thinking. When a directive comes we'll see about it.' Another official, after he has received instructions, directs his energies largely to evading a vital job or merely going through the motions of tackling it.[11]

In sum, in many of the respects which are now critical, many (though by no means all) of the managers of the Stalin generation are basically non-entrepreneurial. It is not 'irrational' to believe that they might not respond positively to 'rational' entrepreneurial stimuli of the sort proposed by many economists without external pressure of the kind which it is now hoped that the party *apparat* will be able to supply.[12]

To suggest that greater party involvement in economic operations is not necessarily 'irrational' is not, of course, to suggest that the hopes placed in it will be fulfilled. One ill omen for the prospects of the effort to accentuate the entrepreneurial role of the *apparat* is the fact that many *apparatchiki* are themselves members of the Stalin generation and hence apt to be more than ordinarily cautious, tired, and disoriented. It may be true that, having operated under Khrushchev's direct supervision, they have been more thoroughly 'screened' than the managers. Likewise, it is probably easier to effect a changeover of generations in the *apparat* than in the economic organs, since the experience of lower-level management is probably more analogous and hence readily transferable to high-level management in party work than in economic work, where the transition from specialist to general administrator is more abrupt. However, so long as the Stalin generation dominates in Soviet life, the entrepreneurial problem is at best only partly soluble, and, even in the *apparat*, a changeover of generations can be accomplished only gradually so long as the regime forswears mass terror and strives to maintain basic political and administrative continuity.

Moreover, even though the problem of the Stalin generation may be less acute in the *apparat* than in the economy, other difficulties remain. Greater party pressure may reinforce the non-entrepreneurial attitudes and propensities of the managers, making them even more wary of exercising initiative and tempting them to adhere even more rigidly to standard

[11] *Current Soviet Policies*, II, p. 39.

[12] It is indicative of the hopes Khrushchev places in the role of the *apparat* as an entrepreneurial agency that he followed the description of the attitudes and behaviour of 'many officials' which has been quoted above by remarking that 'it has been necessary to *mobilise the party* to overcome defects in the work of industry and to bring about better use of our enormous unutilised potentials in the battle for technical progress' (italics added). These remarks were made at the twentieth Party congress, and the party has stayed 'mobilised' ever since.

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operating procedures. Finally, it is doubtful whether even specialisation will enable the *apparat* to achieve the sort of intimate familiarity with economic operations that is today essential to the successful exercise of the entrepreneurial function. The *apparat* retains other, non-economic, functions which will continue to draw on its energy and attention. It remains a separate, and, perforce, external institution in the world of production, and hence is bound to meet and generate barriers which will absorb much of the force of its intervention before that force can become effective. These things are less true now than ever before, but they are still true. What remains to be noted is that, to the extent that they are no longer true or cease more and more to be true, the reorganisation confronts the regime with other problems—problems so serious as to make it doubtful whether the expected economic improvements, even if achieved, are worth the risks involved.

THE most obvious risk inherent in the reorganisation is that the *apparat* will become so oriented towards production that party leadership of and control over other areas of Soviet life—e.g., education, culture, etc.—will suffer. The party has run this risk before; indeed 'over-reaction' is a constant danger in the campaign atmosphere of Soviet life, particularly where the party's role in economic affairs is concerned. Rarely has it seemed more serious. In the first place, in many respects, education (youth) and culture are precisely the areas of Soviet life in which tension is greatest and forces challenging the totalitarian aspirations of the regime are strongest. In the second place, the present stress on production is institutionalised to an unprecedented degree. Institutional arrangements have a dynamism of their own, and future attempts to 'restore the balance' in party activities will encounter powerful obstacles. Given the broader, general tendency of industrial maturation to foster a 'production orientation', these obstacles may prove insurmountable.

The self-generating dynamism of institutional arrangements also points to another risk inherent in the reorganisation. The division of the *apparat* into autonomous agricultural and industrial branches, with coordination only at the highest levels, is certain to make it more difficult for the regime to pursue its traditional policy of treating agriculture as a stepchild. No doubt the November plenum was intended to signalise a partial moderation of this policy, but the reorganisation is likely to produce demands for a much more fundamental modification than the regime wishes to sanction. The division of the *apparat* may make it possible, as the regime hopes, to utilise available agricultural resources more effectively, but the chronic weakness of Soviet agriculture is not primarily a function of the poor utilisation of available resources. Acute consciousness that this is the case will now penetrate much more deeply into the *apparat* and will find expression at a higher level. To a much greater degree than heretofore, the fate of a large number of *leading* cadres will depend almost exclusively on their ability to raise agricultural

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productivity. Their vital self-interest, if nothing else, will compel them to demand a *major* reallocation of resources in favour of agriculture, if not more fundamental changes, and they will be speaking now as representatives and leaders of a powerful organisational machine *within* the *apparat*. Such a development, if unchecked, could have profound economic and political consequences.

In addition to these risks, two others of a more general character must be noted. First, the greatly increased involvement of the *apparat* in economic operations threatens gradually to erode the party's legitimacy as the universal ' leading core ' of Soviet society by further blurring the distinction between its functions and the more prosaic functions of other agencies and organisations, particularly those dealing with economic management. Second, there is a related risk that the *apparatchiki* themselves will lose their distinctive elan and become so involved in economic affairs that they develop a pragmatic ' problem-solving ' approach which is basically secular and tends to undermine ideological commitment. This too is not a new danger. The party has always had to guard against the growth of *delyachestvo* among its cadres, and, so far at least, it has shown an impressive ability to preserve its purity as *the* party despite the ' contamination ' of some of its cadres. The complete ' managerialisation ' of the party which so many have predicted for so long has not occurred, and this should serve as a warning against exaggerating the present danger. However, pressures in this direction are present, and the danger that they will prevail has been increased by the specialisation of the *apparat* and consequent elimination of some of the institutional barriers which tended, under the old arrangements, to restrain the growth of a managerial approach among party cadres. Moreover, recent measures in the realm of personnel policy seem likely to foster such a growth.

EVER since the Great Purge there has been a trend towards staffing the party *apparat* with technical specialists. Recently, however, this trend has been dramatically accelerated and there has been a new stress on recruiting specialists with considerable production experience. The consequences have been marked. At present, over two-thirds of the *raikom* secretaries in Moscow have higher *technical* education.[18] In the Soviet Union at large over nine-tenths of the secretaries of *obkoms*, *kraikoms*, and republic central committees, and almost three-quarters of the secretaries of *gorkoms* and *raikoms* have higher education, and it is reported that the number of specialists among them is constantly growing. In many of the party committees of Vladimir *oblast*, ' comrades who are well-trained and have no little work experience in various branches of the national economy have taken over leadership ', while in Stalingrad (Volgograd) *oblast*, ' it is a source of satisfaction that the

[18] *Partiinaya Zhizn*, 1962, 8, p. 18. It is worth noting that in Moscow the *raikom* secretaries are considerably better educated than plant directors, of whom only 45 per cent have *any* form of higher education (*Pravda*, December 8, 1962, p. 2).

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majority of party workers . . . were involved in the past in leading economic work'. Indeed, things have apparently gone so far that there can be objections to the appointment of graduates of the Higher Party School to the editorships of local newspapers simply because they are not technical specialists.[14]

The intensified recruitment of specialists for party work has been, of course, a logical concomitant of the 'decisive turn towards concrete party leadership of the economy' decreed by the twentieth Party congress and of all the measures which flowed therefrom. Now the recruitment of specialists will probably be pushed even more rapidly.[15] The regime clearly recognises that only informed leadership can be effective in modern conditions. However, as we have noted, the logic involved here is not without danger, particularly at present. Informed leaders are precisely the ones most likely to succumb to, if not actively to exploit, the institutional bias towards *delyachestvo* which exists in consequence of the specialisation of the *apparat*.

While the specialists who transfer to party work are probably not fully representative, they are likely to share many attitudes and values with their fellow specialists.[16] And, judging from personal observations and from a not inconsiderable amount of evidence found in Soviet sources, the modal attitudes and values of the Soviet technical intelligentsia as a group are relatively non-ideological if not apolitical, relatively pragmatic if not technocratic. The Soviet press gives the impression that the plant director who was recently vilified in an editorial article in *Kommunist* (1962, 10, p. 66) because he 'spoke out openly against political work . . . characterising it as a purposeless and unnecessary waste of time', is more atypical in his forthrightness than in his views. At a minimum, the frequent references to similar cases suggest that such views are widespread enough to cause the regime concern.[17] L. F. Ilychev has recently gone so far as to suggest that advocates of outright technocracy are to be found among the Soviet intelligentsia, after having asserted even earlier that,

> Among some part of our intelligentsia an incorrect attitude towards the social sciences has grown up. Some people reason approximately

[14] *Partiinaya Zhizn*, 1962, 3, p. 4; 1959, 11, p. 15; 1958, 13, p. 9; 1961, 18, p. 66.

[15] On the eve of the reorganisation, *Partiinaya Zhizn* (1962, 15, p. 7) editorialised as follows: 'It is essential that engineers and technicians, people who know and love industrial production, enter the party committees. The proper selection of the secretaries of party committees and the strengthening of cadres in the branch departments are necessary conditions for the improvement of the leadership of industry'.

[16] There is some evidence that the most competent specialists are reluctant to assume party posts. No less an organ than *Kommunist* (1960, 7, pp. 64–65), after citing the case of a young engineer who refuses to become a party worker because he loves his speciality, wants to work only in it, and fears that even a short interval in party work would mean to lag as a specialist, and after observing that 'such a view is not rare', complains that 'some comrades who are detached from the activity of party committees do not take into account that the labour of a party worker is no less creative than the labour of an engineer, constructor, or pedagogue—in a word, of any specialist'. Among other things, the defensive tone is noteworthy.

[17] See, e.g., *Kommunist*, 1962, 10, p. 75; 1960, 7, p. 65; 1962, 18, pp. 92–93

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> as follows: Now, technical science—that's important, but social science [read ideology]—what has it to offer? Only theories, nothing concrete.[18]

Ilychev, as the party's leading *agitprop* official, has a vested interest in stating the problem of ideological agnosticism among the technical intelligentsia as starkly as possible, but that he refers to it periodically, and that his references have tended to grow more vehement suggest that its scope is increasing. Thanks to current personnel policy it is likely to spread more and more into the party *apparat* itself, thereby changing increasingly from a problem of control to a fundamental problem of political dynamism. Already, Ilychev has acknowledged, the tendency to denigrate the role of ideology has appeared among party workers as well as 'economic' workers.[19]

THE combined effects of the institutional changes embodied in the November reorganisation and the accelerated influx of technical specialists into the *apparat* make the threat of an erosion of the ideological basis of Soviet politics more real than ever before. However, it would be wrong to exaggerate the immediacy of the threat. As has been noted, although the specialists-become-*apparatchiki* share many of the attitudes and values of their fellow specialists, they are probably more ideologically committed and politically zealous than the average specialist. In addition, although the reorganised *apparat* has an institutional bias towards *delyachestvo*, it remains the party *apparat* and continues to derive its legitimacy from Marxist-Leninist ideology. Men have an irrepressible need to justify themselves, and this need prompts all *apparatchiki*, irrespective of their backgrounds, to develop an ideological orientation. In a sense, this prompting is likely to be stronger now than ever before precisely because the functions of the *apparat* are less distinct from those of the economic apparatus than ever before. Finally, as we have seen, the power of the *apparat* as such has been reduced relative to that of the top party leadership. Within the top leadership one does not now find and is unlikely to find in the near future men who can meaningfully be identified as 'technocrats'. The screening process is too fine and appreciation of the dangers of *delyachestvo* too great. All of these countervailing factors might prove to no avail over the long run. However, the November arrangements are unlikely to survive into the long run.

Continuous reorganisation seems to be a constant principle of Soviet politics, serving, as it does, as a partial safeguard against 'routinisation', a partial guarantee of continued political dynamism. The November arrangements, like all other arrangements, will generate vested interests and give rise to incipiently autonomous centres of power, and the regime is likely to respond by decreeing another radical reorganisation in order

[18] Ibid. 1962, 16, pp. 16–17; 1959, 14, p. 56.
[19] Ibid, 1962, 16, p. 16.

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to preserve its control and maintain Soviet society in a state of total mobilisation. This is the more likely in the case of the present reorganisation because of the many risks we have discussed. Above all, it is likely that a sharp institutional separation between the industrial and agricultural sectors of the economy will become increasingly untenable as economic development proceeds, and that, when all is said and done, the problem of production will prove less politically critical for the regime than the problems of youth, culture, and social organisation which the new system relegates to the background.

In the short run, the reorganisation may facilitate a wide ranging renewal of cadres and thus accelerate the phasing out of the Stalin generation, in the *apparat* above all and also in the economic organs. Simultaneously, it may moderate the urgency of the entrepreneural problem. If so, it will have accomplished what may well be its primary goals. In the long run, it will probably give way to yet another reorganisation. Even so, however, it will have contributed to the further 'managerialisation' of Soviet politics and will have complicated the task of preventing the erosion of communist ideology.

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MARX AND THE INTELLECTUALS

Lewis S. Feuer

IT is a remarkable fact that Marx and Engels provided no theory of the intellectual class. Why do intellectuals join the socialist movement? To this question, Marx and Engels gave a brief parenthetical reply in the *Communist Manifesto*: 'a portion of the bourgeoisie goes over to the proletariat, and in particular a portion of the bourgeois ideologists, who have raised themselves to the level of comprehending theoretically the historical movement as a whole'. This is as near as the two came to providing a theory of the intellectual class, especially its revolutionary group. As a theory, it carries little psychological conviction, for it asserts a purely intellectual causation; it says that, quite apart from any personal involvement of emotion, economic interest, or desire for power, the mere understanding of the laws of social development suffices to bring a section of the intellectuals to the proletarian side. As far as intellectuals are concerned, in other words, it affirms that existence does not determine consciousness, but rather that a purely theoretical consciousness determines existence. The revolutionary intellectual evidently then stands with Promethean exceptionalism against the whole materialist conception of history.

The motivations of revolutionary intellectuals would scarcely, however, fit into a pattern of determination by theoretical consciousness. Can one say that all the personal sacrifices which intellectuals have made have been motivated by a desire to conform to a theoretical comprehension of the laws of social evolution? A profound dilemma would have confronted Marx and Engels if they had tried to develop a theory of the intellectual class. In the first place, to have granted that revolutionary intellectuals were basically moved by ethical feelings, by principles of justice and equality, would have constituted a decisive departure from historical materialism. Marx and Engels, however, could never formally affirm that the ethical consciousness in history can transcend its material base. On the other hand, to have said instead that revolutionary intellectuals were moved by the desire for power or by economic self-interest would have meant raising a new spectre to confront the proletariat—a new ruling class of intellectuals which availed itself of the workers' unrest to place itself in power. This was the dilemma which the intellectual class posed for Marx's sociology: either historical materialism was false or the advent of a new class society was likely. The problem was far more deep-seated in its significance than technical disputes concerning the law of the falling rate of profit. Marx and Engels met this dilemma by choosing not to discuss it.

The question of the intellectuals' hegemony, it must be remembered, was raised sharply in Marx's time. Marx's adversary, Bakunin, argued

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that the latent content of the Marxist programme was 'government by scientists (the most distressing, odious, and despicable type of government in the world)', which would constitute 'notwithstanding its democratic form, a veritable dictatorship'. Marx could only write the marginal note alongside Bakunin's words, '*quelle rêverie*', and repeat his general view that class domination must last as long as the economic basis for classes is not destroyed.[1] But what if it were not a reverie? What if the workings of modern technology were compatible with the hegemony of a techno-managerial class?

Curiously, throughout their lives, Marx and Engels were sensitive to the authoritarian motivation of socialist intellectuals, whom they characterised in probing and sardonic terms. Lassalle, the intellectuals of 1848, the German socialist students in 1879, the English Fabian intellectuals, were all, according to Marx and Engels, trying to establish themselves as dictators and managers over the workers. Lassalle's goal, said Marx, was 'that of the future workers' dictator'; the people were to elect those 'like himself armed with the shining sword of science into Parliament'. Lassalle had indeed boasted of his dictatorial powers as president of the General Association of German Workers as an example of the leadership of the learned. Sixteen years later, in 1879, Marx and Engels wrote gloomily that the 'educative elements', the university graduates, all believed that the working class 'of itself is incapable of its own emancipation' and 'must be freed from above'. The later socialist student movement in Germany in 1890 similarly aroused little enthusiasm in Engels; these men were arrogant young declassed bourgeois, he said, 'arriving just in time to occupy most of the editorial positions on the new journals which pullulate and, as usual, they regard the bourgeois universities as a Socialist Staff College which gives them the right to enter the ranks of the Party with an officer's, if not a general's, brevet. . .'. They were akin to the students, 'those "representatives of intellect", as they liked to call themselves', who in 1848, according to Engels, 'were the first to quit their standards, unless they were retained by the bestowal of officer's rank'. He regarded the English Fabians with foreboding: they were socialists who planned to establish the rule of the intellectuals over the proletariat; the Fabians, wrote Engels, 'have understanding enough to realise the inevitability of the social revolution', but they are above all concerned with 'making *their own* leadership secure, the leadership exercised by the "eddicated".'[2]

THERE were two components of historical inevitability as Marx and Engels conceived it; first, the economic inevitability of a planned economy, and second, the sociological inevitability that the workers in

1 Henry Mayer, 'Marx on Bakunin: A neglected text', *Etudes de Marxologie*, Série S, n. 2 (1959), p. 114.

2 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Selected Correspondence* (Moscow, 1953), pp. 388–394, 530, 537. Frederick Engels, *Germany: Revolution and Counter-Revolution* (New York, 1933), p. 103. Frederick Engels, Paul and Laura Lafargue, *Correspondence*, vol. 2 (London, 1960), p. 386.

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emancipating themselves would achieve a social democracy. What theoretical ground could Marx and Engels provide, short of their own ethical aims and hopes, for asserting a sociological inevitability which would exclude the possible hegemony of the intellectual class? Intellectuals themselves, they believed they had identified themselves wholly with 'the proletarian outlook'; the intellectual authoritarians whom they criticised had, however, achieved no identification with the working class.

Where intellectuals have predominated in the Marxist movement, there authoritarianism has been most pronounced. (By authoritarianism, in this context, we mean the pretension of intellectuals to decide political questions and make political decisions for society at large on the presumed basis of their scientific knowledge without the conscious participation and approval of the majority of the people.) The Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, in which Lenin's authoritarian politics found its most fertile soil, was pre-eminently a party of intellectuals. 'The intellectuals in our Party', wrote Lenin in 1904, in a polemic with Rosa Luxemburg, 'made up a much larger percentage than in the West European parties'.[3] On the face of it Lenin seemed to accept unreservedly Kautsky's theory that the intellectuals were not a class but a privileged social stratum. Kautsky, like Marx, had continued to doubt the intellectuals, and had advised the German Social-Democrats to keep them in a subordinate position. Lenin, on the other hand, departing radically from classical Marxism, took on the character of spokesman for the hegemony of the intellectual class.

Karl Kautsky was indeed the first to use the formulation, later adopted by Stalin as well, that the intellectuals are not a class but a stratum: 'the intellectual workers have this peculiarity of not having any common class interest, and of having only professional interests; moreover, they are a privileged social stratum in opposition to the proletariat, which wishes to put an end to all privilege'. There was no hope, he said, of winning the 'aristocracy of the "intelligentsia"' to the workers' movement, although many were being driven by declining economic circumstances into a situation which united them with the proletariat'. Among the students, Kautsky agreed, there was an enthusiasm for socialism, but he placed little confidence in them. The student, he wrote, usually abandons his socialist convictions as 'childish ideas' when he enters 'serious life'. During his socialist phase, the student's superior education enables him to impose on the workers. A socialist student movement might therefore become a danger to the movement as a whole: 'where the proletarian movement is feeble and confused and where there exists alongside it a strong student socialist movement, the latter may come to dominate the former'. The unreliable young intellectuals might then lead the movement into insane experiments. Fortunately, he added, such an outcome was not likely in Germany or

[3] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, vol. 7 (Moscow, 1961), p. 479.

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in the greater part of the civilised world, where the student movement would remain only an 'annex' to the workers.[4] With unconscious prescience, Kautsky had stated the condition which in backward countries would assist the intellectual class to assume the hegemony of the socialist movement.

Lenin, by contrast, explicitly called upon the intellectuals to become the bearers of bureaucracy. The word 'bureaucracy' had no terrors for him; he welcomed bureaucracy, and espoused it. He was the first, said the youthful Lenin, to have analysed the concept of bureaucracy. 'Bureaucracy *versus* democracy,' he wrote, 'is the same thing as centralism *versus* autonomism; it is the organisational principle of the revolutionary social-democrats as opposed to the organisational principle of the opportunist social-democrats.' He ridiculed the 'outcry against bureaucracy and autocracy' raised by the Girondist-like Martov and his associates. He extolled the alleged virtues of the factory-disciplined proletariat as compared to the 'flabbiness and instability' of the intellectuals. The factory, said Lenin, was not only a means of exploitation; it was also a 'means of organisation' which inculcated discipline. He did not join in the intellectual's wail against the alienation of man under modern technology: 'Division of labour under the direction of a centre evokes from him a tragi-comical outcry against people being transformed into "wheels and cogs".'[5] He defended outright the authoritarian procedures of 'excommunication', a 'dreadful word', only to the democrats. Thus, Lenin invoked a myth of proletarian discipline to impose a sense of guilt on those intellectuals who had imbibed the liberal tradition. During the nineteenth century men like John Stuart Mill had painfully built a counterweight to authoritarian tendencies. Now Lenin, working to unleash the repressed will to authoritarianism, sanctified it by an appeal to the alleged psychology of the proletariat. The party of the intellectuals was thus to rationalise its authoritarianism.

The authoritarianism of the intellectual class is a recurrent historical theme, yet its traits, characteristics, and sources have been little studied. When Lenin portrayed the authoritarianism of the working class, he was in large part projecting upon the workers traits peculiar to himself. The contemporary emphasis on working-class authoritarianism is perhaps similarly in large part a projection of the latent authoritarianism of intellectuals. What, then, is the evidence for the authoritarianism of the intellectuals, and what are its social sources?

THERE is an impressive tradition of philosophical Utopias beginning with Plato's *Republic*, going on through Campanella's *City of the Sun*, to the social diagrams in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries of Edward Bellamy's *Looking Backward* and H. G. Wells' *The Open*

[4] Karl Kautsky, 'Die Intelligenz und die Sozialdemokratie', *Die Neue Zeit*, 1895, pp. 10–16, 43–49, 74–80.

[5] V. I. Lenin, *One Step Forward, Two Steps Back* (Moscow, 1947), pp. 52, 53, 81, 91, 94, 96, 103.

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Conspiracy. These Utopias, a mixture of fantasy and blueprint, illumine the unconscious strivings and direction of the intellectuals. The Athenian philosopher, the Renaissance man, the American nationalist, and the English social evolutionist all shared the same vision of the rule of the scientific intellectuals. It diffused into the most distant regions to awaken intellectuals from social torpor. José Vasconcelos, ideologist of the Mexican Revolution of 1911, for instance, pondered Plato's *Republic*, and aspired to be the philosopher-king of Mexico. The rule of the scientist-philosophers was always to be authoritarian rule.

We must distinguish, however, between the universal source of authoritarianism common to the intellectuals of all societies, and those more specific roots of authoritarianism which are found in the frustrations peculiar to intellectuals in modern times. The intellectuals in Marx's term the 'ideological class', have in all societies, from the time of the Pythagorean governors, felt themselves an aristocracy, an elite. Ancient Greek analogies of the state as an organism told how the head directed the hand. The intellectuals regarded their status as godlike; thought was, for instance, the unending joy and prerogative of Aristotle's God, and thought was likewise the distinctive attribute of the intellectual, the philosopher. Immortality itself was made proportionate to intellectual acquirements by medieval Aristotelians; it was the lower classes who claimed eternity for the illiterate who were kind in heart.

The intellectuals conceived of themselves as meant to rule men. That was the purport of their philosophical knowledge. They were not warriors; they could not claim the right to rule by force. Yet in every age they have claimed that 'the pen is mightier than the sword'. They were often not men of property, yet they would claim, as Keynes did, that the power of ideas far exceeded that of vested interests. They were neither merchants nor artisans nor tillers of the soil, but stood outside all conventional class systems. Without the labourer's skill or the rich man's wealth, they had only their intelligence and culture; but theirs was the calling to rule. The touchstone of the rational and just society from Socrates' time on was the rule of the intellectuals.

In China, where the intellectual class ruled for two thousand years, their self-awareness as the elite most fit to govern was incorporated in the wisdom of proverbs:

> Without leaving his study, a Bachelor of Arts may understand the affairs of the empire.
> As a student—under one man; in office—over ten thousand. All scholars are brethren.[6]

Such was the intellectual's vocation to rule over all classes—his universal authoritarian propensity. The circumstances of his situation in modern times, however, ranging from deprivation of power and employment, have bred in intellectuals a more acute authoritarianism, and its

[6] Rev. W. Scarborough, *A Collection of Chinese Proverbs*, Revised by Rev. C. Wilfred Allan (Shanghai, 1926), pp. 74–75.

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frustrations have reinforced the role of ideas as the aggressive vehicle of dominance over others.

THE intellectual as a man of words has often suffered from a prolonged divorce from action. There is a normal biological pattern in the confrontation of problems; the problem provokes ideas, plans of action, which in the normal process find fulfilment in action. The rise of an intellectual class often means, however, a proliferation of thinkers who do not become doers. Thinking which does not culminate in action is, from the biological standpoint, a psychological anomaly. The very situation of the intellectual, then, carries with it a high degree of frustration, the outcome of a life in which important initiating stimuli to action are presented without any of the termini and consummations. The frustration of the intellectual breeds its counterpart of heightened aggressive energy. When social circumstances are most unfavourable and the hope of social action has dwindled, this aggression may be turned against one's self; the self-aggression of intellectuals is manifested in movements as diverse as monasticism and beatnikism. But where the desire for action is not subdued, it becomes imbued with the characteristics of behaviour which has long been frustration-contained. The intellectual then tends to dictatorial, impatient, and ruthless modes of action. Pent-up aggressive energies tend to drive ideas to an extreme which they would not have reached if those energies had been expended in action. Tocqueville said that the French intellectuals of the eighteenth century were led to the most extreme ideas because ' their very way of living . . . quite out of touch with practical politics ', deprived them of the experience which would have tempered their ardour.[7] What is important, however, is not that experience confutes the schematic simplicities of a few general ideas. What is central is that the frustration of inaction tends to make ideas into a displaced means of aggression. An extreme ideology is an idea suffused with displaced aggressive energy. The situation of the intellectual tends to make him into an ideologue.

The most eminent Fabian intellectuals thus became increasingly authoritarian as in the course of their long lives they saw the transition of their ideas into action disrupted. Bernard Shaw, in his play *On the Rocks*, expressed the intellectual's self-disillusionment: 'I am not a man of action, only a talker. Until the men of action clear out the talkers, we who have social consciences are at the mercy of those who have none.' Shaw developed an admiration for strong men, including Mussolini and Hitler, and gave way to an inner violence in which he justified the extermination of a social and political opposition. Sidney and Beatrice Webb, towards the end of their lives, had an unashamed reverence for Stalin's methods. The breaking of the thinking-action sequence reinforced the authoritarian propensity of the most distinguished socialist intellectuals in democratic, industrial England.

[7] Alexis de Tocqueville, *The Old Regime and the French Revolution* (Anchor Ed., New York), 1955, pp. 140–141.

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MOVEMENTS whose membership has consisted primarily of intellectuals have tended to acquire an authoritarian pattern, to exhibit traits of intolerance and adopt procedures of excommunication. This has been true in science as in politics. One would have expected the psychoanalytical movement, for instance, born of the desire to liberate men from irrationalities, to have been characterised by a friendly exploration of differences and an overriding sense of common purpose. An intellectual movement, however, invariably centres on a strong father-figure; a scientific or philosophical school is usually defined methodologically by its adherence to a common method and basic hypotheses, but in a deeper psychological sense it is constituted by the dominance of a particular kind of super-ego personality. Freudian psychoanalysis was (in Erich Fromm's words) a '"movement", with an international organisation on strictly hierarchical lines, strict rules for belonging, and for many years guided by a secret committee consisting of Freud and six other members'. Its representatives showed on occasion 'a fanaticism usually to be found only in religious and political bureaucracies'.[8]

From a psychological standpoint, moreover, the intellectual can be said to have about him something of the feminine. The bookish boy growing up invariably finds himself at odds with his less intellectual companions, who regard him as 'sissy' in his tastes. The young thinker later on finds that the battle of ideas has a terrible reality, and in the struggle of ideas he finds his manhood as others did in physical conflict. Always, however, as compared to 'practical' men, the man of ideas is under a kind of onus to demonstrate his manhood. To do so he makes of his ideas weapons; he tries to be tough, and this indeed lends to his thought a strain of authoritarian compensational strength.[9]

POLITICAL sects arise because intellectuals cannot stand differences in politics. The history of political sects is a history of intellectuals' intolerance and authoritarianism. By contrast, the large non-ideological American political parties, which embrace a variety of sections, classes, interests, and ethnic groups, and which are not run by intellectuals, have not shown a tendency to sectarian fission. In the American non-ideological parties intellectuals have been relatively uninfluential.

Engels in 1847 noted that the socialist sects were primarily composed of men outside the working classes, and that they looked to the 'educated classes' for support.[10] During the Second Empire, when two socialist schools, the Blanquist and the Proudhonist, competed for the allegiance of Frenchmen, it was noticeable that the Blanquists, organised as an authoritarian secret society, were drawn primarily from students, while the loosely organised Proudhonists were chiefly composed of

8 Erich Fromm, 'Freud, Friends, and Feuds: 1, Scientism or Fanaticism', *The Saturday Review*, 1958, June 14, p. 11.
9 Max Lerner, *Ideas for the Ice Age* (New York, 1941), pp. viii, 15, 98–99.
10 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy*, ed. Lewis S. Feuer (New York, 1959), pp. 4–5.

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working men active in mutual aid, credit, and cooperative societies.[11] The law of the extremism of the revolutionary intellectual in authoritarian sects was cogently formulated by James P. Cannon, the leader of the American Trotskyist sect, who wrote on the basis of a lifetime's experience: 'It seems to be a peculiar law that the greater a party's isolation from the living labour movement . . . the more radical it becomes in its formulations, its programme, etc. . . . You see it in the split-offs from the Trotskyist movement—our own "lunatic fringe". The less people listen to them, the less effect their words have on the course of human events, the more extreme and unreasonable and hysterical they become in their formulations.'[12]

The revolutionary intellectual, in other words, is especially prone to sectarian behaviour because he has been deprived of the continuous consummation of the transition from thought to action. An intolerant purity of principle enables him to make a virtue of his action-inhibited asceticism. The intellectual's authoritarianism is the eruptive obverse of his impotence.

THE intellectual in the so-called backward areas tends to develop an authoritarianism which is proportionate to the gap between his ideas and the social environment; social reality for him is an ever-present obstacle, stubborn and recalcitrant to his ideas. The more existence frustrates him, the more aggressive in idea becomes his consciousness. Both Mill and Marx observed that the intellectuals of materially backward countries adopted the most advanced ideas. A doctrine such as Saint-Simonianism, with its programme of rule by the intellectuals, could only have arisen, wrote Mill, in a relatively under-developed country like France.[13] Marx remarked that the young Russian intellectuals in Germany and Paris 'always run after the most extreme that the West can offer'[14]; his books, he observed, 'had a greater sale in Russia than anywhere else. And the first foreign nation to translate *Kapital* is the Russian'.

Ideas and practices which are found only among the most extreme sectarian, isolated intellectuals in the West have found a fertile milieu among governing intellectuals in Africa and Asia. Kwame Nkrumah, Prime Minister of Ghana, tells how, while associated in America with the Trotskyite movement, especially 'one of its leading members, Mr C. L. R. James', he learned 'how an underground movement worked'. A mode of organisation out of place in America became the model for The Circle, a revolutionary African student group which Nkrumah helped to found; its members added a touch of tribal blood ritual to their dedication to an

[11] Samuel Bernstein, *The Beginnings of Marxian Socialism in France* (New York, 1933), pp. 17, 28. Lucien de la Hodde, *History of Secret Societies and of the Republican Party of France from 1830 to 1848* (trans., Philadelphia, 1856), p. 110.
[12] James P. Cannon, *The History of American Trotskyism* (New York, 1944), pp. 10, 12.
[13] Richard K. P. Pankhurst, *The Saint-Simonians: Mill and Carlyle* (London, 1957), p. 15.
[14] Karl Marx, *Letters to Dr Kugelmann* (New York, 1934), pp. 77–78.

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emancipated Africa. Later, when they were ministers of government, they synthesised Marxism with tribalism, and frankly expressed 'the tribal impulse to destroy those who are out of step'. The African intellectual elite quickly became, as K. A. Busia wrote, a ruling class.[15] In Ceylon, young intellectuals who had imbibed their doctrine from Trotskyite circles in London and from the eccentric authoritarian Scott Nearing in America, emerged similarly from their underground Trotskyite movement to become members of a coalition government.[16] The most influential Cabinet Minister in 1957, Philip Gunawardena, disciple of Scott Nearing, had a simple question and answer: 'Where do you find democratic socialism? On the moon.'[17] It is often said nowadays that authoritarianism is a necessary political means for the industrialisation of a backward country. The facts, however, suggest that the authoritarian traits of intellectual chiefs may lead them to choose that mode and speed of industrialisation which is most expressive of their own authoritarian psychology.

FURTHERMORE, the intellectual class in modern times, in both advanced and backward societies, is most vulnerably situated with respect to the economy. England in the eighteen-eighties was already producing a surplus of intellectuals which the economy could not absorb. The 'intellectual reserve army' was more articulate, resentful, and less resigned than the 'industrial reserve army'. William Clarke described the new 'intellectual proletariat' in the first *Fabian Essays*:

> Fifty years ago you could have gathered all the press writers of London into a single moderate sized room. Today all told they number ten thousand. Everybody with a pen, ink and paper and any capacity for turning out 'copy' is a journalist; and you see at once that it is impossible for all these men to earn a living. They don't, and can't. . . . Now, while a working man who has never known comfort, whose father has never known it before him, can often stand a frightful amount of poverty without getting desperate, the well-bred young man cannot; and the result is that the keenest and most dangerous discontent comes from the educated classes, who are leading the Socialist masses all over Europe.[18]

Where the intellectual experienced an economic system whose very workings deprived him of livelihood or status, he tended to respond with a critique which was not only socialist but, in proportion to his frustration, authoritarian. Whether it was students in New York's city colleges or

[15] Kwame Nkrumah, *Ghana: The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah* (New York, 1957), p. 45. K. A. Busia, 'The Present Situation and Aspirations of Elites in the Gold Coast', *International Social Science Bulletin*, vol. VIII (1956), p. 429. Peter Abrahams, 'The Blacks', *African Treasury*, ed. Langston Hughes (New York, 1961), pp. 55–56.

[16] Calvin A. Woodward, 'The Trotskyite Movement in Ceylon', *World Politics*, vol. XIV (1962), pp. 310–311, 315, 317.

[17] *The New York Times*, 23 and 25 November 1957.

[18] William Clarke, 'The Fabian Society', in *Fabian Essays in Socialism*, ed. G. Bernard Shaw (reprinted, Boston, 1911). Also Ernest Belfort Bax, *The Ethics of Socialism* (London, 1902), p. xi.

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Kerala, India, facing the dismal prospect of a superfluous existence, or young teachers faced with insecurity, an authoritarian socialism emerged as a response.[19] The intellectual proletariat is probably the most authoritarian of all.

It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that economic resentment alone has propelled intellectuals in the direction of authoritarian socialism. The few thousands of the intelligentsia in Russia during the middle of the nineteenth century 'could easily have been absorbed by the constantly expanding bureaucratic apparatus of the state or the growing range of the liberal professions'. There were strong altruistic impulses, mixed with guilt-feelings at the people's lot, a desire to give themselves to the people almost sacrificially, combined with the longing for a free expression of their individuality and talents. 'It was a "class" of expelled students and censored journalists, who in desperation were driven to conspiratorial extremes.'[20] A psychology of 'revolutionary asceticism' came to characterise the young Russian intellectuals.[21] Interwoven, however, with ascetic self-denial was the conception of the intellectual as the historically creative individual, the one who bore the historical mission to redeem and rule.[22]

Authoritarian traits, however, showed themselves among the Russian revolutionary intellectuals in a variety of ways. The anti-Jewish feeling, for instance, of the Narodnaya Volya in the eighteen-eighties went as far as a positive endorsement of pogroms. French socialist sects were similarly involved in anti-Semitism. Curiously, the more proletarian German Social-Democratic Party, much less intellectual in its composition and leadership, was relatively free from anti-Semitism. Although the academic *Kathedersozialisten* were decidedly tinged with anti-Jewish prejudice, 'there were occasions when the social-democratic workers made it a point of honour to demonstrate the feelings of devotion and solidarity with leaders who were attacked twice, for being socialists and being Jews'.[23]

Lenin insisted in *What is to be Done?* that it was the intellectuals who brought socialist consciousness to the workers, who otherwise would not advance beyond trade union consciousness. Was the conception of a socialist society so difficult that it demanded much scientific training? In many places and many times, in Germany, for instance, in the early

19 Robert W. Iversen, *The Communists and the Schools* (New York, 1959), pp. 150–152. On the Indian student, cf. *The New York Times*, 15 July 1959, 8 February 1960.

20 Martin Malia, 'What is the Intelligentsia?', in *The Russian Intelligentsia*, ed. David Pipes, pp. 14–15. For the later period, cf. Vera Figner, *Memoirs of a Revolutionist* (New York, 1927), pp. 36–37, 76–77; I. Steinberg, *Spiridonova: Revolutionary Terrorist* (London, 1935), pp. 32–33.

21 Nicolas Berdyaev, *Dream and Reality, an essay in autobiography* (New York, 1951), p. 113.

22 Vera Figner, op. cit. p. 63.

23 Edmund Silberner, 'Two Studies on Modern Anti-Semitism', *Historia Judaica*, vol. XIV (1952), pp. 104–106. Paul W. Massing, *Rehearsal for Destruction: A Study of Political Anti-Semitism in Imperial Germany* (New York, 1949), pp. 202–203. Avrahm Yarmolinsky, *Road to Revolution* (New York, 1959), pp. 308–309.

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eighteen-thirties, small groups of working men had from their own ethical and intellectual resources sought to fashion for themselves communistic societies.[24] What the intellectuals brought to the socialist movement was not socialist consciousness but the notion of their own elite authoritarianism. The socialist consciousness itself does not require any elaborate theoretical analysis but springs spontaneously from the ethical aspirations of all exploited people. What Lenin was doing was rather to provide an ideological basis for the hegemony of the intellectual elite.

Two impulses have always warred within the socialist tradition, an authoritarian and a democratic, for socialism indeed has emanated from two basically different psychological sources; one, the desire of the intellectuals to be the ruling class; the other, the desire of the working class for a society of equals. Engels called Saint-Simon a Utopian Socialist, but Saint-Simon, a child of the *philosophes*, plainly advocated the authoritarian rule of the intellectuals, and won numerous adherents among the engineering graduates of the Ecole Polytechnique, the new 'industrial priests'. Can it be that Marxism, with its faith in a democratic liberal working class achieving its own emancipation, was daring to be far more Utopian? The authoritarian and liberal components were both present in the socialism of Marx and of Engels from their earliest writings in an unstable equilibrium. Engels indeed first claimed in 1843 that German socialism was superior to the French because of its freedom from democratic prejudices, and he envisaged the socialist society not as a workers' democracy but as one ruled by a technical intelligentsia chosen 'not by a majority of the community at large' but by an examination system.[25] Two years later, impressed by the reports of the American socialist communities, his socialism became more communitarian, less elitist. And Marx's socialism evolved in a more democratic spirit from the time when he wrote in 1844, in typical elitist fashion: 'The head of the emancipation is philosophy, its heart is the proletariat.'

But this is the eternal strife in the heart of socialism itself, the problem of the future, the strife between the authoritarian and liberal elements; it sets for the intellectual class the question how it will define its own character.

(This paper was read at the session on Marxism at the Fifth World Congress of Sociology held in Washington in September 1962.)

[24] Boris Nicolaievsky and Otto Maencken-Helfen, *Karl Marx: Man and Fighter* (New York, 1936), p. 78.

[25] Friedrich Engels, 'The State of Germany', in Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, *Historisch-Kritische Gesamtausgabe*, Erste Abteilung, Band 4 (Berlin, 1932), p. 494.

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STRANGE INTERLUDE

A footnote to the Soblen Case

Arthur Spencer

After leaving Russia in December 1935, Anton Ciliga, a Yugoslav communist, wrote to Leon Trotsky that during his imprisonment in Siberia in 1933–35 he had met an agent provocateur *who was known under the name of Adolf Senin. Senin's real name was A. Sobolevicius, and he and his brother Robert Soblen (later known as Roman Well) played a significant part in the history of the Trotskyist movement in Germany.*[1]

Outside the Soviet Union, the two centres of the opposition which came under Stalin's immediate attention were Trotsky, his family and secretariat, and the German Trotskyist groups up to Hitler's seizure of power in 1933.

Trotsky arrived in Turkey on 12 February, 1929. Early in May he began his political work with the help of a secretary, a certain Jacob Graef who was an agent of the GPU. Graef stayed in Prinkipo until October of that year and then went to Germany, where he joined the opposition group and remained in regular correspondence with Trotsky. In the meantime, the two brothers Sobolevicius had also joined the Trotskyist group in Leipzig.

The Trotskyist movement in Germany was composed mainly of young, inexperienced intellectuals. For the two Lithuanian students, then nearing thirty, it was not very difficult to rise quickly to play a leading role, at first in Leipzig and later in the German Trotskyist organisation as a whole. They were greatly assisted by Graef who, in December 1929, wrote to Trotsky recommending Roman Well as a trustworthy, devoted and intelligent comrade. Barely one month later, Well suggested to Trotsky that he might take on the responsibility of distributing the Bulletin Oppozitsii *in Germany and Eastern Europe. At the time this was one of the most important activities of the Trotskyist movement. The* Bulletin, *in which Trotsky attacked Stalinist policies in the Soviet Union and the policies of the Communist International, particularly with respect to Germany, was at that time read by numerous Soviet officials who travelled abroad; it even reached the camps in Siberia.*

A nucleus of an international secretariat of the Opposition was then being formed in Paris. It was to this small group that Roman Well made his proposal for the distribution of the Bulletin. *He had arrived in Paris, claiming that the German police made his life in Leipzig difficult, but in*

i The activities of the Soblens seem to have been no secret in Moscow in the late nineteen-thirties. A NKVD lieutenant, Shigunov, who fell into German hands in 1941, reported to his captors the existence of one ' Sobolevich ', a member of the CPSU who had been one of the most important agents among the Trotskyites. ' Trotsky welcomed him like a son ', Shigunov reports, adding, ' he was also involved in the murder of Trotsky's son ' [sic]. (German Foreign Ministry files, serial 270.)

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August 1930 he returned to Germany, and as a member of the National Committee of the German Trotskyist group he proposed the inclusion of Jacob Graef in the leadership. Well and his brother, Senin, who belonged to the few Russian-speaking Trotskyists, helped to produce the Bulletin, *then being printed in Berlin. In August 1931, Senin and Well visited Trotsky in Prinkipo. Trotsky describes this visit as follows*[11]*: 'They did not come in any official capacity but as rich men taking a holiday, men who could afford the trip. As far as I was concerned, I could only welcome this visit. At that time friends, half-friends, and sometimes persons unknown to us, who stayed either in Constantinople or in Prinkipo, came to visit us, (the closer friends staying in our house), often for weeks during the summer season. Senin and Well lived in a nearby house but took their meals with us and spent the major part of their time with us in discussions, always in the presence of Jan Frankel [one of Trotsky's secretaries] and other visitors.'*

In 1931, Trotsky's pamphlets analysing the rise of fascism became best sellers. They could be bought at railway stations, at newspaper kiosks, in all bookshops. Never since the revolutionary years were Trotsky's political writings distributed so widely or discussed with such interest. But the Trotskyist group was incapable of following up the influence of Trotsky's political writing. This, to some extent, was due to the activities of Senin and Well, who deliberately exacerbated the discussions within the Trotskyist group, thus paralysing any practical activity. Trotsky became rather suspicious. He repeatedly asked Roman Well for explanations, urging him to put a stop to the endless discussions which he and his brother stimulated. By 1932, relations between Trotsky and the two brothers were rather strained. In November 1932, Trotsky delivered a lecture in Copenhagen. On this occasion a number of followers and friends visited him there. Among them was Senin. In his testimony before the Dewey Commission, Trotsky recalled this visit: 'There were two brothers in Germany, Senin and Well. . . . Their genuine name is Sobolevicius. I had the suspicion, as did other friends who worked in the German organisation, that (Senin) the so-called Trotskyist, was more or less an agent of the Stalinists. He came to assure me that it was not true—that is, Senin came, and we had a conversation for one hour or a bit more.'[111]

Senin's visit to Copenhagen and his conversation with Trotsky apparently convinced the GPU that the time for action had come. Under the pretext of a disagreement with Trotsky, the two brothers attempted what he then called 'a small coup d'état'.[iv] *They left the organisation.*

In December 1932 and until the middle of January 1933, Trotsky still

ii Draft declaration by Trotsky: 'Erklärung zum Fall Senin-Well', in the Trotsky archives, Harvard College Library. It is dated 27 February 1937, and was prepared for the Dewey Commission, but was not presented, as the Senin-Well case was not examined in detail.

iii *The Case of Leon Trotsky*, Report of hearings on the charges made against him in the Moscow trials (New York, 1937), p. 138.

iv Draft declaration, loc. cit.

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treated Senin's and Well's disagreement as genuine, stating that they were misguided comrades who, as he wrote in an article (dated 29 December, 1932) 'had not understood the ABC of Marxism'.

Senin's and Well's role as agents provocateurs *became apparent when early in January 1933 they published an issue of* Permanente Revolution, *the organ of the Trotskyist group in Germany. The Communist daily,* Die Rote Fahne, *reprinted its first page in full. It carried a declaration by Well and Senin denouncing Trotsky as a saboteur of the working class movement. On 15 January, Well was seen by a German Trotskyist in a Berlin café in company with Jacob Graef, who by then had already been identified as a GPU agent. On 22 January, in one of the last workers' demonstrations in the Alexanderplatz in Berlin, a young Trotskyist saw Well leading a communist group.*

On 2 February 1933, Trotsky and his collaborators issued a statement asserting that the forged issue of the Permanente Revolution *had been published 'by Stalin's agents'.*

It is likely that until his death, Trotsky believed that Senin and Well had joined the GPU only after they left the Trotskyist movement. It was only in the middle fifties when Jack Soble (Senin) was arrested in New York, that the truth became known: he admitted that the brothers Sobolevicius had been active agents of the GPU since the middle twenties and had been given the task of penetrating the opposition groups in Europe and Trotsky's secretariat in exile.

THE case of Dr Robert Soblen, which stirred up so much controversy last year, was considered in the main from the point of view of the right of asylum and the position of the alien in a democratic country. While this aspect was paramount in the discussion of the case at the time, other facts deserve to be recalled from the past which might give a deeper understanding of the motives underlying the activities of the man whom fate thrust on to English soil in the last phase of his life. One of his last statements began with the words, 'When the history of our time comes to be written', at first sight a rather portentous phrase, seeming to claim too much importance for the part Soblen played in contemporary affairs. Yet a closer investigation of the facts will show that Soblen did indeed play a role, admittedly a minor one, in the history of the world communist movement.

More than thirty years ago Soblen was closely connected with the last great attempt that Trotsky made after his fall from power to influence the history of Europe by the printed word, when living far from the centre of things on an island off Istanbul. But the real part played by Soblen in this attempt was not understood by the chief actor. It provides a fascinating, though generally unknown, footnote to contemporary history.

German communism at the beginning of 1928, after Stalin had brought off his final victory over Trotsky, had already been through a series of splits and had shed a good many of those who had been its leaders in

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the years since the foundation of the party. The last crisis in the KPD had been caused by a swing to the right in 1925, and as at the time the battle between Trotsky and Stalin was going on in Russia, the deposed opponents of the swing to the right, the so-called 'ultra-lefts', had drifted into a position of support for Trotsky against Stalin. These deposed leaders had only minute splinter groups as their following, and in the years after Stalin's victory so many quarrels broke out between Trotsky and the German oppositionists that by 1929 there was nothing left of any organised Trotskyite group in Germany associated in any way with any of the former KPD leaders, who had by now all been forced into the political wilderness. This proved to be a blessing to Trotsky's serious political work on German affairs.

IN the Russian debates up to 1927 Trotsky had been the champion of the left against the moderate course pursued by Stalin and Bukharin; he had denounced their policy of '*enrichissez vous*' addressed to the kulaks, he had attacked their pessimism about the prospects of the European revolution and the resultant theory of 'socialism in one country', he had tried to apply his theory of the permanent revolution to the great surge of the national movement in China, in opposition to the alliance with Chiang's Kuo Min Tang effected by Stalin, and he had been a critic of the agreement between the Soviet and the British trade unions.

When the great crisis of German democracy broke out at the end of 1929, Trotsky was an exile in Turkey. There was no proper Trotskyite group in Germany at the time. When he wrote, he wrote as an individual, not as a member of a team or a faction. This complete isolation proved to be a source of strength to Trotsky. Since 1923 Russian factional infighting had been closely paralleled by factional infighting in the parties of the Comintern. When the kulak was appeased in Russia, the social democrats in Germany and the British trade unions were appeased in their countries. The opponents of appeasement of the kulaks in Russia had also opposed the moderate policies of the German and British communists. Trotsky's group in Russia had called itself—with perfect justification—the 'left' opposition, and kept to this title in the years to come. While there were a number of ultra-left leaders in Germany who, since the Comintern's intervention of autumn 1925 which marked the swing to the right, had by 1927 strayed into the political wilderness, opposing the new moderation in German politics and echoing Stalin's critics in Russia, by 1929 all these German ultra-left splinter groups, with their expelled leaders trying in vain to make some sort of political impact, had fallen out with Trotsky. Trotsky's writings on these internal discussions between the various factions of Stalin's opponents in Germany are now deservedly dead. Once parted from these professionals, he was no longer burdened by the weight of old loyalties to any German leaders and to their political past. The past he could draw on in the writings on the German crisis which came from his pen after 1930 was his immense

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knowledge of the international labour movement and his experience as a leading actor in two great revolutions.

The form German Trotskyism took in 1930, the year of its real birth, was a loose grouping of young students, among whom Roman Well and Adolf Senin were already seniors, with some groups of workers who for one reason or another had collided with the KPD and felt at a loose political end, or who followed some obscure local leading political personality whom the same fate had befallen. Numerically speaking, it was an absurdly tiny group, without a single person of eminence. While they managed to establish a journal, *Der Kommunist*, in 1930, which was to last for one year (the only set known to exist is in a library in East Germany, where its perusal is restricted to officials of the Communist party), the only significance the group could claim was that it acted as a purveyor of Trotsky's articles.

There can hardly ever have been such a divergence between the international renown, even in eclipse, of the leader, and the complete obscurity of his handful of followers. Critics maintained that it was fraudulent to speak of a Trotskyite organisation in Germany, there were only a few individuals who were prepared to sell his pamphlets! Indeed, while there were advantages in beginning from scratch, the distance in intellectual calibre and political experience between Trotsky and his tiny band of followers in Germany was so great that all Trotsky's inherent dictatorial tendencies were bound to be awakened. Prophet of party democracy and the rights of the rank and file against the bureaucracy in the Russian party and the Comintern—where his criticisms were only too well founded—in his own dwarf organisation Trotsky wielded absolute authority and expected complete obedience. The parallel with Rosa Luxemburg is obvious. Champion of the almost divine 'masses' as opposed to bureaucratic leaders—the hated '*Instanzen*'—in German social-democracy, she ran her own small Polish party as autocratically as the best, with the inevitable result of factional battles and splits in the years before 1914.

WHAT was not clear at the time but emerged later was that Stalin in 1928 began his battle against Bukharin in the international field, at first concealing the issues which were really of vital concern to him; only after a purge in the Comintern did he turn against Bukharin and his associates in Russia. A sudden sharp turn to the ultra-left in the communist parties was made at his behest early in 1928; the new policy bore no relation whatever to the social realities of the countries in which these parties had to operate, and the more independent and intelligent among the leaders and a small elite of the more experienced party members did indeed protest. When the new line, a violent relapse into 'utopian ultra-leftism', was forced on the German Communist party—for reasons completely unconnected with the German situation, but very relevant to the Russian factional battle—the majority of the German central committee rose in open rebellion and defiance.

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The symbol of their rebellion against the new course was drastic action; the leader of the party, Stalin's obedient follower Thaelmann, was deposed by a majority of the central committee! Stalin hit back with ferocity, his henchmen managed to have the verdict reversed, and from then until Hitler's victory Thaelmann was unchallenged. Stalin's victory in Germany meant the end of any discussion within the German party. In his speech to the plenary session of the central committee of the Russian party in April 1929 (published in full only in 1953 after his death), Stalin charged Bukharin with having supported the opponents of Thaelmann, the mutineers of September 1928. Many of the old Communist party leaders, the comrades in arms of Rosa Luxemburg, were expelled, and in their opposition to the new ultra-left course formed the Right Opposition (Thalheimer, Brandler, Frölich). In this period of bitter party discussion—till the lid of unanimity was clamped down—some rank and file members of the German Communist party began tentatively to form a group, at first within the ranks of the official party, of sympathisers with Trotsky.

The beginnings of the rank and file movement of German Trotskyites led by the Austrian Kurt Landau and the Sobolev brothers, with a few students and sympathising workers, were by no means auspicious. Few experiences could be more melancholy than that of a member of this group standing at a factory gate trying to sell a pamphlet in which Trotsky discussed in great detail what attitude an anti-stalinist communist should take in the question of the possible transfer by Russia of the Chinese Eastern Railway to Chiang Kia-shek's China. Some of the anti-Stalin splinter groups, according to Trotsky, had taken an incorrect attitude on this problem. Small wonder that not a single worker leaving his factory was prepared to spend sixpence on these fantastically subtle discussions which were as relevant to the German political situation as the composition of the moon.

This divergence between West European mass movement and Russian emigré mentality was not new. In the Bernstein discussion of 1898, Plekhanov had written reams of stuff against Neo-Kantianism for German workingmen's papers, and Kautsky had warned him that the German mass movement was not a Russian emigré intelligentsia group. Plekhanov had replied: 'You say that your readers are not interested in philosophy —I think they should be forced to be interested in it'.

If matters had gone on in this way, Trotsky's name would have been forgotten in Germany. By sheer chance—certainly not by superhuman powers of foresight—the new ultra-left policy forced on the Comintern in 1928 by Stalin in preparation for his showdown with Bukharin came to coincide, about a year after its inauguration, with the most severe economic crisis the world had ever seen. In Germany the entire political structure was shaken to its foundations. It was at this moment that Trotsky rose to the challenge. By now he had some sort of a basis in Germany—minute in numbers, but resourceful and devoted; perhaps

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not so much an organisation as a group of people able to publish in German whatever Trotsky wrote on current affairs and to distribute it by zealous and untiring effort. As the historian of German Trotskyism says, 'The significance of all Trotskyite groups consisted in supplying a basis for his frequently remarkable analyses and ideas'.[1]

The official German Communist party carried on its ultra-left policy, introduced at a time of economic prosperity, without at first even taking notice of the truly frightening surge of the Nazi wave, which seemed almost to come out of the blue, a terrifying phenomenon exploding on the scene of Weimar democracy. With their eyes glued on the social-democrats, the official communists declared every six months that fascism had now been finally established in Germany with the active support of the social-democratic leaders. No attempt was at first made to evaluate the Nazi wave. Having written off the social-democrats as hopeless from the point of view of revolution, the communists now turned their attention to the Nazis as people with the right revolutionary temperament whose rank and file could be treated as explosive material to blow high the existing structure of capitalist democracy. Four weeks before the fateful elections of September 1930, the communists came out with a programme impregnated through and through with the spirit of nationalism.

IT was at this historic moment, pregnant with the decisions that were to affect the lives of the whole of mankind in the years to follow, that Trotsky rose above the hairsplitting squabbles of the splinter group to his real height. He remained, it should be stated quite clearly, with his eyes fixed on the German Communist party, just as Rosa Luxemburg had kept her eyes all her life on German social-democracy. This certainly imposed limitations to his thoughts, for he undoubtedly exaggerated greatly the relative importance of the KPD as a political force in Germany. There were many other factors besides this party, which did not 'hold the key to the situation', as he imagined. Whatever policy the KPD pursued, Hitler might have won, carried to power on the crest of a wave more powerful than any the world had seen before. But though it is impossible to discuss historical 'ifs', the undoubted fact remains that, whatever share a party can take in bringing its deadly enemy to power, that was done by the German Communist party on a stupendous scale, obediently taking the line dictated by Stalin, who had the uncanny capacity of growing more powerful with each fresh defeat brought about by the policies he had imposed.

It was not easy for Trotsky, for years the leader of the left, to swing round to a policy which, at least in the German context, was identical with the policy advocated by the victims of Stalin's German purge in 1928, the traditional right-wingers such as Brandler and Thalheimer. From the end of 1929 and up to Hitler's seizure of power, Trotsky

[1] S. Bahne, *Der Trotzkismus in Deutschland 1931–1933* (Heidelberg, Phil. Dissertation, 1958) (typescript), p. 195.

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criticised Stalin's ultra-left German policy from the right. The line Trotsky urged—a defensive alliance between KPD and SPD against the Nazis—was identical with that taken by Bukharin soon after the sixth congress of the Comintern in September 1928. 'To the Swiss Comintern secretary Jules Humbert-Droz, then under attack as a rightist deviator, Bukharin wrote to express sympathy with the idea that the communists' best interest lay in alliances with the social-democrats against fascism. He apologised for not being able to support this position in public because of the critical situation which he faced within the CP in Russia'.[2]

Logically, an alliance between Trotsky's German group and Brandler's group was the obvious next step. While the right opposition in Germany was squeezed out by Stalin as a result of the Stalin-Bukharin showdown, Brandler and Thalheimer were close enough to the realities of German working-class politics to realise that to combine criticism of Stalin's ultra-left policy in Germany with a detailed criticism of Stalin's line at home would deprive any communist group of the all-important asset of Soviet mystique and condemn it to the fate of a tiny sectarian group. They did not openly criticise Russia. And although the situation cried out for an alliance between Trotsky and Brandler on the German question, the factional hatreds of the past were far too deep for them to come together on this issue. Even if the German policy of the Brandler group was identical with his—which it certainly was—for Trotsky it was all or nothing. Germany had been the key country in his theory of the permanent revolution. With revolutionary determination and good leadership 1923 should have achieved what 1918 had failed to win—the spread of communism to Germany and the end of Soviet Russia's isolation.

Trotsky remained convinced that it was only because of Brandler's failure as a leader that this had not come off; this German communist defeat of 1923, breaking the all-important link in his theory of the permanent revolution, had led to everything else—to the theory of socialism in one country and the defeat of Trotsky by Stalin, culminating in his expulsion in 1927. He was not going to forgive Brandler for this. That the communist revolution in 1923 was really a ripe fruit ready to drop into the lap of Germany, and the outcome entirely due to the failure of Brandler's nerve at the critical moment, seems extremely doubtful today. However, this conviction had become a dogma in the Trotskyite catechism, and proved extremely harmful as an obstacle preventing any sensible cooperation between the Brandlerites and the Trotskyites. Had they worked in alliance as a pressure group to influence the two big parties, the picture would have been less faction-ridden than it was. Trotsky had by far the greater literary talent and was altogether a man of greater stature than the right opposition leaders, able men though they were; but in their refusal to worry about events in China and Russia the right-wing oppositionists were closer to the realities of the German

[2] R. V. Daniels, *The conscience of the revolution* (Harvard, 1960), p. 335.

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situation than was Trotsky. The dreadful heritage of the emigré squabbles of the pre-war period had by no means been shaken off.

IN 1929, in a pamphlet devoted to the constitutional crisis in Austria where, under the pressure of the *Heimwehr*, an authoritarian revision of the constitution was being discussed, Trotsky formulated the basic conception which he was going to apply in the years to come. The Comintern had announced the advent of the 'third period' of the post-war revolutionary crisis. Contemptuously dismissing the millions of social-democrats as the 'labour aristocracy', and their leaders as social-fascists, it asserted that only the minority following the communist leaders represented the 'workers'. In July 1929, when the Nazi wave in Germany was already beginning to make its way, Martynov, at an official Comintern session, defined the situation in the following terms: 'In the highly industrialised countries such as Germany and Britain, we are faced with civil war between proletariat and labour aristocracy in the immediate future. . . . On the other hand, the counter-revolutionary role of the purely fascist organisations will doubtless be of minor importance in these advanced countries'. And Bela Kun added: 'We have to reckon on armed collisions with the social-fascist organisations much more than before'.[3]

In his pamphlet on the Austrian situation, which at the time had no effect at all and is not even mentioned in Bahne's otherwise very complete bibliography of his writings in German, Trotsky sketched out the premises on which he was to judge the German situation one year later. He emphasised over and over again that the essence of the situation was not, as stated in the nonsensical utterances of the Comintern leaders, a collision between 'proletariat' and 'labour aristocracy', but the collision between fascism and social-democracy. That was the situation in Austria in 1929 and that would be the situation in Germany from 1930 onwards. In 1929 he was more sanguine about revolutionary possibilities than in the years to follow, and this explains his lordly dismissal of the importance of democracy at this stage. 'By defending democracy, which has outlived its purpose, social-democracy forces historical development into the impasse of fascism'. And he repeated again and again that 'democracy has lost all meaning', 'democracy stands and falls with capitalism'.[4] Whatever sound counsel Trotsky was to give to the Germans in the years to follow, the slogan of 'defence of democracy' *sans arrière pensée* was not to be found in it. For this the impact of his long association with bolshevism had been too deep. At the end of 1932, in an open letter to Vandervelde, Trotsky declared with pride that in the October revolution 'We smashed democracy in order to finish with capitalism!'[5]

[3] *Protokoll des X Plenums des EKKI* (Hamburg, 1929), pp. 192, 230.
[4] L. Trotsky, *Die Österreichische Krisis, die Sozialdemokratie und der Kommunismus* (Vienna, 1929), pp. 3, 6.
[5] Bahne, loc. cit. p. 175.

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After the Comintern's sharp turn to the left in 1928 which, as Trotsky said perfectly correctly, was the precise reverse of the turn of historical reality, a slight modification took place at the beginning of 1930. Stalin put a brake on the excessive speed of collectivisation in Russia, and at the same time the German communists suddenly discovered that it was not sound policy to advise the youngest members of the communist children's organisation 'to drive the young social-fascists from the playgrounds'. After the fateful elections of September 1930, in which the Nazi party shot up to a mass party, Trotsky still thought in terms of turns to the left and turns to the right in the Comintern, his eyes remaining fixed on the decisions of the Stalinist leaders. An essay written soon after the September elections significantly bore the title: 'The turn of the Comintern and the situation in Germany', and optimistically stated that 'The most important objective conditions for a proletarian revolution now exist in Germany'.[6] However, when it came to proposals for action, for recommending the German communists to follow an offensive or a defensive policy, Trotsky came out with the right answer—communist policy must be defensive in character. A united front with the social-democrats against the Nazis was at this moment the only sensible line. The question of the united front was to be the great dividing line between the Trotskyists and Brandlerists on the one hand, and the Stalinists on the other.

In these years the basic antagonism between Trotsky and Stalin was played out in this specific German setting of the collapse of Weimar democracy. Trotsky stubbornly maintained his belief in the revolutionary potentialities of the German working class, the typical proletariat of an advanced country. Communist policy should aim at an alliance with the social-democratic leaders in the defence against the Nazi menace; out of this alliance, which would generate a great deal of pressure from below, effects would follow favourable to communism. At least a victory of the Nazis would be prevented. A Nazi victory would be a catastrophe for the working-class movement as a whole, regardless of political party. Official KPD policy, on the other hand, was inspired by profound pessimism in the revolutionary potentialities of the German working class, because of their adherence to social-democracy; genuine anti-capitalist revolutionary emotion appeared to be more widespread in the ranks of the Nazi followers, and it was hoped that, by launching an appeal to nationalist emotions, part of the Nazi rank and file would come over to communism. Any class dissatisfied with the status quo, the urban middle classes as well as the farmers, should be used to support communist policy. The effect on the social-democratic workers could be written off, as these were anyhow hopeless from the point of view of the communist revolution. The old Russian controversies regarding world revolution versus socialism in one country were thus repeated in the

[6] L. Trotsky, *Die Wendung der Komintern und die Lage in Deutschland* (Berlin, 1930), p. 9.

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divergences between the Trotsky line of reliance on the traditional standard-bearer of socialism, the urban working classes, and the Stalin idea of a multi-class party held together by a common detestation of capitalism and reformist social-democracy. With his emphasis on the potentially revolutionary role of the working class of an advanced country —even if the majority of the organised workers followed reformist socialism—and on the important part played by the pressure from below of the rank and file, Trotsky reaffirmed the position he had held prior to 1914. Stalin, after the sixth Comintern congress, had said, on the other hand, that the communists should concentrate on those strata of the working class that were completely unorganised—i.e., immune from infection by the reformist bacillus.[7] This meant deliberately turning their backs on the traditional core of the socialist movement and relying on the most unstable and least intelligent sections of the working class. From concentrating on the most backward proletarians in an advanced country, it was only a short step to concentrating on other classes altogether.

Communist efforts in Germany were soon to be directed to the conquest of the Nazi rank and file and to winning over the peasants—all by manifestos and propaganda slogans! This idea of the multi-class totalitarian mass party has become so established in people's minds as communist orthodoxy that serious scholars now regard Marxist commonplaces as Luxemburgist eccentricities. In his book on *The Communist Party of Poland* (Harvard, 1959, p. 76), M. K. Dziewanowski writes of the 'traditional Luxemburgist stress on the primary importance of the urban proletariat'. Stalin's concept meant the mechanical transference of the Russian model to Germany, and indeed in recent East German historiography the Spartakus group—a tiny minority group within social-democracy—is blamed for not paying attention to the peasants and for not trying to ally Spartakus with peasant discontent in Germany! The fact that Rosa Luxemburg and her group concentrated on the social democrats is now held against her. The developments after 1928 marked the beginning of this attempt to rewrite the history of the socialist movement of an advanced country from the point of view of a backward one.

Stalin held that since the beginning of the 'third period', about the beginning of 1928, democracy was gradually changing into fascism, and as it did so, social-democracy was changing into social-fascism. There was no clash between fascism and social-democracy, but collaboration. In all this Stalin held diametrically opposed views to Bukharin, whose private opinion in these matters has only recently come to light (in the Humbert-Droz Archives in Switzerland). Some rhetorical nonsense uttered by Stalin in September 1924, when this sort of absurdity could harm no one except the KPD, was suddenly inflated into a dogma guiding the policy of the KPD in a situation when a huge Nazi mass movement

[7] Stalin, Speech of 19 December 1928. *Sochineniya*, vol. 11 (Moscow, 1949), pp. 299–301.

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was raising its head. Stalin had said in 1924: 'Social-democracy is objectively the moderate wing of fascism. . . . These mass movements do not mutually exclude each other; on the contrary, they supplement each other. They are not antagonists, but twins.'[8] This inanity was made into holy writ, presented as the last word on the subject by an inspired leader of genius, and repeated again and again as the theoretical basis of KPD policy in the last years of Weimar democracy.

IN those years Trotsky was not in a position to pick and choose his allies. The circle of his adherents in Russia had disintegrated under Stalin's blows. In July 1929, Radek, Preobrazhensky, and Smilga had capitulated; his own exile from Russia at the beginning of 1929 was another obstacle to effective political activity. He was glad that some obscure young men in Germany came to him as a modest group of followers.

By 1930, some sort of Trotskyite organisation had come into being. A Trotskyite journal, *Der Kommunist*, had been founded, but so far the resonance of Trotsky's ideas had been limited to a few specialists in Russian affairs, such as the circle round Otto Hoetzsch's *Osteuropa*, where at least Trotsky's views on Stalin's economic policy were discussed. In the middle of 1931 there was a schism. The leader of the group, the Austrian Kurt Landau, quarrelled with his colleagues concerning the Marxist definition of the fascist state and left, taking *Der Kommunist* with him. Trotsky's followers then founded the *Permanente Revolution* as their new journal. However insignificant the quarrel may sound today, at its roots lay the genuine difficulties facing the interpretation of fascism in Marxist terms. As the relationship between property and political power is conceived by Marxism in terms which do not render justice to the complexities of the question, the problem of a theory of the Nazi dictatorship was not one which any Marxist could solve satisfactorily. Trotsky's writings on the subject were far superior to the Stalinists' theorising, but even so fall short of the demands of a genuine interpretation, as his mind worked, however brilliantly and originally, within a strictly Marxist framework.

Yet, instead of heralding the complete disintegration of the tiny Trotskyite sect in Germany, the quarrel of June 1931 was followed, in quick succession, by four pamphlets which made a tremendous impact in Germany, reaching far beyond the circles touched by the narrow groups of the communist opposition. In these four pamphlets Trotsky sketched in brilliant fashion his reaction to the quickly changing German situation. They were widely quoted in the press and in public speeches. Trotsky had succeeded in making a break-through.

In August 1931 the communists had supported the Nazis in a referendum directed against the Prussian coalition government led by

[8] Ibid. vol. 6 (Moscow, 1947), p. 282.

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the SPD, by now the strongest remaining bulwark of the Weimar democratic system. In a brilliant manifesto Trotsky castigated this action and condemned the entire policy by which the German communists had sought, in chauvinist competition with the Nazis, to stem the Nazi tide.[9] He formulated his charge with such force and style that Trotsky quotations suddenly appeared in the speeches of social-democratic and trade union leaders. He had expressed their criticisms of KPD policy better than they could ever hope to do. That these criticisms came from a man with tremendous revolutionary achievements to his credit reinforced their strength. At the same time the titles of Trotsky's pamphlets showed that he was no longer obsessed by the vagaries of the Comintern, or by differences with an obscure splinter group on such issues as the Chinese Eastern Railway; the titles of his pamphlets appealed to every German. *Shall fascism really conquer? Germany, the key to the international situation,*[10] or *How can the Nazis be defeated?* [11] Written with great force and wit, they made a considerable impact.[12]

While urging a defensive united front between KPD and social-democracy against the Nazis, Trotsky was at the same time convinced that the real dilemma facing Germany was the 'Russian way' or the 'Italian way'. 'If you put a solid ball on the point of a pyramid, the slightest push will make it roll down, either towards right or towards left. . . . To try to keep the solid ball balancing on the point is utopian.' [13] But, while concentrating as an orthodox Marxist on the importance of the working class within the structure of Germany, Trotsky clearly underestimated the havoc mass unemployment had wrought in the ranks of the workers, and to what extent it had created difficulties for mass action of the kind which he envisaged. When Kapp in 1920 had attempted a coup d'etat against the Weimar Republic, the working class was militant, there was no unemployment, and there was a country-wide response to the call for a general strike issued by the legal government fighting for its life against the putschists. In the years since 1930, unemployment had sapped the strength of the working class and pushed them into a defensive position, a fact which Trotsky clearly realised; on the other hand, the offensive was in the hands of the Nazis, who had built up a large paramilitary force, had powerful contacts with the ruling classes, and altogether constituted a political force whose strength Trotsky failed to appreciate when he called them 'human dust'.

IN November 1931 Breitscheid, a leading social-democrat, had made proposals to the communists for a joint SPD-KPD united front policy, only to be rejected in the usual insulting terms by the Stalinist leaders.

[9] Trotsky, *Gegen den Nationalkommunismus* (Berlin, 1931).
[10] Trotsky, *Soll der Faschismus wirklich siegen?* (Berlin, 1931).
[11] Trotsky, *Wie wird der Nationalsozialismus geschlagen?* (Berlin, 1932, written December 1931).
[12] Cf. O. K. Flechtheim, *Die KPD in der Weimarer Republik* (Offenbach, 1948), p. 177; and Carl von Ossietzky in *Die Weltbühne*, 22 December 1931.
[13] Trotsky, *Wie Wird . . .*, p. 1.

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Trotsky said that this offer should have been eagerly accepted; he emphasised that the very existence of the KPD was based on the decades of work since 1870 in organising and training German social-democracy and the trade unions, that both parties were drawn from the same social class and were rooted in the same social soil. Like Rosa Luxemburg, Trotsky considered that the great hope for German revolutionary socialism was the pressure of the organised masses from below, against the reformist leaders. To him the communist leaders were still errant brothers, while the SPD leaders were enemies. His optimism about the chances of the transition to socialism in the Leninist style in Germany proved to be unfounded, and he blamed Comintern policies after 1928 for the failure of the German communists to take power. 'Without the lunatic theory of the "third period" the German proletariat would be in power today. If after the last elections [i.e. September 1930] the KPD had accepted the programme of action suggested by the Left Opposition, victory would have been ensured', he wrote at the beginning of 1932.[14] In his conception of the permanent revolution Germany occupied such a crucial position that he was unwilling to admit, even in 1932, that it might be unwise to overestimate the revolutionary potential of the German working class and that the right policy would be to set his sights lower and to advocate an alliance limited to the defence of democracy.

Within the framework of the theory of the permanent revolution the fate of the Russian and the German revolutions were inseparably intertwined. 'The conquest of political power by the German and the European proletariat is an immeasurably more realistic task and much nearer at hand than the creation of an autarkical and self-sufficient socialist society within the boundaries of the USSR'.[15] Despite the parliamentary success of the Nazis, he thought in terms of mass action outside parliament as the motive force of history, and from this point of view 'a thousand workers in a large enterprise weighed a hundred times heavier than a thousand civil servants, clerks, and their wives and mothers-in-law'. True, provided the workers were in a militant and self-confident mood, as they had been in 1920, but not valid as an abstract law of history. On the strength of these assumptions, he hoped for the spontaneous creation of German soviets on a non-party basis, within which the differences between KPD and SPD would be overcome in the common struggle against the Nazis, very much as had happened in Russia in 1905; in this common struggle the KPD would ultimately take the lead over the SPD, as the Bolsheviks had wrested the majority in the Petrograd Soviet from the Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries after their common struggle against Kornilov. As the future was to show, Hitler's movement was to prove a more formidable opponent than Kornilov, the KPD a much less effective instrument than the Bolsheviks, and the SPD much more deeply rooted in the working class than the Mensheviks.

[14] Trotsky, *Was nun?* (Berlin, 1932), p. 111.
[15] Ibid. p. 113.

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THE only serious attempt to defend the official Stalinist line against Trotsky was made by Münzenberg, whose article was headed 'Trotsky's fascist proposal for a KPD-SPD bloc'.[16] Münzenberg described the great stir Trotsky's pamphlets had made among the social-democratic, liberal, and young conservative circles represented by the journal *Die Tat*. Trotsky's argument that under certain conditions an alliance with even the most right-wing reformist leaders was a vital necessity evoked the following response from Müzenberg: 'That is the theory of a completely abandoned and counter-revolutionary fascist. It is the most dangerous and criminal idea which Trotsky has put forward in the recent years of his counter-revolutionary propaganda'.

After the shattering electoral defeats suffered by the KPD in the spring of 1932, which resulted in a thorough shake-up of the leadership, the worst excesses of national-bolshevism were gradually abandoned, especially as these slogans had obviously pushed many potential communist voters into the Nazi camp. But there was nothing like an honest attempt to start afresh, to work seriously for a united front with the social-democrats. The KPD was satisfied to repeat the same slogans and to spend its time on criticising the deposed leaders for speaking of the Brüning government as a 'fascist dictatorship' when it was only 'the government for the carrying out of the fascist dictatorship'! On such contemptible rubbish Trotsky spent his considerable polemical talents. How, with such leaders of the Communist party and with the defeatist passivity of the social-democratic leadership he could seriously consider the possibility of the transition to a proletarian dictatorship in Germany, can only be explained on the assumption that he was unwilling to spread despondency in a situation which he did not yet regard as hopeless. When Papen deposed the Prussian government by a coup d'etat in July 1932, the complete impotence of both parties was starkly revealed. The communists were unable to bring a single soul out in protest—after all, in August 1931 they had marched arm in arm with the Nazis to the polls in order to bring the same 'social-fascist' government down—and the social-democrats lacked the elementary courage to defend democracy against this flagrant breach of the constitution. The communists, by their insane policy of the last four years, had eliminated themselves as a potential pressure group on the social-democratic leadership. It was not difficult for Trotsky to show up the utter bankruptcy of Stalinist policy in his pamphlet written immediately after these events,[17] which included, at the beginning of November 1932, one of the most macabre episodes in the history of the German working class, symptomatic of the disintegration of the whole movement. In the undertakings run by the Berlin Transport Board a strike was called to oppose a threatened wage cut. A large majority was in favour of the strike, but as the statutory 75 per cent majority had not been reached—only 68 per cent voting

[16] *Rote Aufbau*, 15 February 1932, pp. 147–166.
[17] Trotsky, *Der einzige Weg* (Berlin, 1932).

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in favour—the trade union leadership rejected the strike. The communist trade union group then called the men out, scoring its first great success; then the Nazis joined in, and a combined KPD-Nazi strike committee directed the strike in defiance of the official trade union leadership. The situation was utterly confused, and the communists should obviously have made the utmost efforts not to be manoeuvred into an alliance with the Nazis against the SPD, whatever the concern about wages.

The strike of the Berlin transport workers of 1932 seems in retrospect a macabre finale to the history of the working class movement in the Weimar Republic, with its nihilistic alliance of communists and Nazis against social-democrats.

It was in connection with the question of united action by socialist and communist trade unionists that Roman Well, the GPU *agent provocateur* inside the German Trotskyist movement, performed his last feat in that country by publishing an issue of *Permanente Revolution* containing a denunciation of Trotsky and his call for unity of action. A decade later the same Roman Well-Sobolevicius, this time under the name of Robert Soblen, was operating in the United States. His activities led to charges of military espionage; he escaped to Israel while on bail, and ultimately committed suicide in London.

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MOSCOW AND THE NAZIS

This is the first instalment of a translation of a series of documents, hitherto unpublished, found in the German archives which fell into Allied hands in 1945. *They have been selected either for their intrinsic interest or because they throw some fresh light on Russian-German relations in the thirties, or on Soviet foreign policy, or on international relations in general at that period.*

I

(THESE TWO DOCUMENTS REPORT meetings in 1935 and 1936 between a representative of Rosenberg's foreign political office (of the Nazi party—APA in German) and a member of the Soviet embassy in Berlin. In autumn 1935 the Nazi and anti-Soviet propaganda campaign reached its climax with violent speeches by Hitler and Rosenberg at the Nuremberg party congress; it lasted almost without interruption until early 1938. The Soviet Union retaliated in kind; at the same time, as we know now, attempts were made to improve, or at least normalise, relations with Berlin. One of these initiatives was the Kandelaki mission. In conversation with various leading German figures, the head of the Soviet trade mission in Berlin, who enjoyed Stalin's personal confidence, hinted strongly at the need to improve relations. Another such approach was made at about the same time at a meeting between a Soviet general and General von Blomberg. The source of the present documents is EAP 250-d-18-15, Aussenpolitisches Amt, Amt Osten, available in microfilm T 81/14 (Washington). Duercksen (not to be confused with von Dircksen, former German ambassador to Moscow) worked for Rosenberg's APA. Yevgeni Gnedin, press attaché in Berlin, later became head of the Press Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, was removed in spring 1939, was subsequently arrested, but survived the camps and returned to Moscow some years after Stalin's death; see Ehrenburg, 'Liudi, Godi, Zhizn', *Novy Mir*, 2, 1963.)

Department East — Berlin, 13 December 1935

Dü/He

File Memo

Re: *Secretary of the Soviet Embassy Berlin, Gnedin*

At the diplomatic reception on 11 December 1935, I had the opportunity of an extended conversation with the secretary of the Soviet Embassy, Gnedin.

Gnedin makes an intelligent impression and in the discussion used the same methods as his Jewish press colleagues. He told me the following about his career: he had studied history and philosophy but had not finished his studies. Subsequently he worked as a teacher in the German colony in Odessa. Later Gnedin worked chiefly as a journalist, as a

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member of the editorial staff of *Izvestia*. Some years ago he went into the NKID where he worked in the German department (as Referat). He wants to return to journalism.

Gnedin was interested in the functions of the APA; up to now he had not had a clear idea of the work of this office.

One topic to which Gnedin kept coming back was the activity of the German journalists in Moscow. Just and Mehnert, for instance, were very reasonable people, and, knowing the conditions, reported in a sensible way. However, the recent manner of reporting defied description, and he, G., could only explain this by instructions from Berlin to write in a negative vein. It was bound to be a central authority which gave such instructions; the only thing he was not sure of was which authority it was. I said that we could reply with substantial counter-charges with regard to the Soviet journalists in Berlin and quoted relevant examples; G. of course denied this.

The most important part of the conversation concerned German-Soviet relations, which was broached by G. He felt obliged to say 'frankly' that he had been sent to Berlin with direct instructions to work energetically for an improvement of German-Soviet relations. But now he felt bound to say, without diplomatic circumlocution, that while here he had gradually come to the conclusion that there was no desire on the German side to improve Soviet-German relations, but that on the contrary everything was being done to make them worse. People here did not bother about what was actually happening in the Soviet Union, but were chiefly engaged in famine propaganda, which in the final analysis was from the national-socialist point of view as well a gross tactical mistake. German businessmen today did not know what the Soviet Union was like, nor did the German military have a true picture of the Red Army. People in Moscow took the view that one had to know both friend and foe well, and that therefore the leadership at any rate had to inform itself about the real state of affairs in other countries. Thus, for instance, there were cinemas in Moscow, not open to the public, which showed foreign films characteristic of the film production of the country concerned.

Gnedin repeatedly expressed his regret that the two countries which depended so much on each other were not able to arrive at a better relationship. He completely understood, and thought it a matter of course that the Germans should take strong measures against the communists in their own country. But precisely from this point of view, i.e. that each of the two countries had to develop in its own way, the possibility of close collaboration offered itself.

The Soviet side was under the impression, G. continued, that Germany was preparing for war against the Soviet Union. In this connection the latest interview given by the Reich Chancellor to the head of the United Press agency was particularly characteristic. Here it was said that Germany was separated from the Bolshevist danger by no more than a few miles. If the impression is given here that Germany and

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the Soviet Union border on each other, that there are no barriers at all between the two, then the Soviet Union has all the more reason to prepare against the danger of a German attack.

In reply I referred to the close links between the Comintern and the USSR, and to the coordination of the policy of the Comintern (the seventh Congress propagated the slogan of the 'destruction of national-socialist Germany') and the 'peace' policy of the Soviet Union: we were bound to regard all this as systematic encirclement of Germany. Gnedin replied to this merely by saying that, though the ideologies of the Comintern and of the Soviet Union were the same, the *Realpolitik* of the USSR had nothing to do with the Comintern. After this pointless argument the talk was broken off, though with repeated references by G. to the need for discussion of these difficult problems in greater detail. At the end Gnedin declared himself a 'sincere supporter of the Rapallo policy'.

Department East 12 October 1936
Dü/He

File Memo

Re: *Secretary of the Soviet Embassy Gnedin*

Having been given permission by Reichsleiter Rosenberg personally, I agreed to the request of the Secretary of the Soviet Embassy G. for a private talk, which took place today between 4 and 5 o'clock at a neutral place.

G. came immediately to the point. He had accepted our invitation of October . . . because he took the sober view that as press chief of the embassy he had to keep himself informed about events in the Third Reich regardless of differences of opinion. But he requested advance information about the contents of the speech by Herr Reichsleiter Rosenberg, because it would of course be intolerable and impossible for him to listen to a speech which took the same line as the Nuremberg ones. In such a case he would be forced to leave the hall demonstratively in the middle of the speech. On the other hand, he of course saw no reason not to listen to a speech on general foreign policy merely because his and our opinions on foreign policy differed widely.

In accordance with my instructions I replied that I believed myself authorised to inform him that Herr Reichsleiter Rosenberg's speech would be chiefly concerned with recent world political events from the German point of view; and within this framework it would of course also touch on Moscow's attitude, especially with regard to the Nuremberg Party Congress.

G. took up the phrase 'from the German point of view' and asked what, in fact, that point of view was—the speeches of the German leaders at Nuremberg, which were studied much more thoroughly in Moscow than anything the German press wrote, or what appeared as German foreign policy in practice.

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I remarked that Nuremberg was the place of the Party Congress of the NSDAP, where it professed its political philosophy. But even if foreign policy was conducted with different means and on a different basis, it was nevertheless nonsensical to distinguish different German points of view if they were interpreted as differences of opinion.

G. now tried to convince me that Germany had done much harm to herself by the Nuremberg speeches, and that her position had become much more unfavourable. After Nuremberg many foreigners, who could in no way be suspected of sympathies with Bolshevism in the Soviet Union, had told him that they disapproved of the Nuremberg methods. Here G. stressed again that it was an impossible method to refer publicly, in offensive terms, as had been done at Nuremberg, to the Jews among Soviet government personnel (!). He could of course not tolerate such insults and defamations. He repeated that during such a speech he would demonstratively leave the hall.

I again expressed my astonishment that G. was so anxious to save us from a demonstration and, furthermore, to wish the German Reich success in her foreign policy. G. tried to convince me that he had come to Berlin eighteen months ago with specific instructions to study the possibility of an improvement in our relations. At the time he had believed it possible to achieve a good relationship between our two countries. Today, however, as the result of the Nuremberg speeches and of other things, the Soviet Union took a very negative view of such a possibility. But he only wanted to say that there was no reason why the former attitude should not return. I merely again expressed my astonishment and said that probably the Soviet Union's desire for good relations with Germany was strongest at the time the communist party in Germany had reached its highest peak.

II

(THE FOLLOWING DOCUMENTS throw some revealing sidelights on the uneasy relationship between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union in the critical months of 1940–41. Oreste Berlings, a Latvian journalist representing *Briva Zeme* and *Sevodnya* in Berlin, was contacted in 1940 by a Soviet representative and enlisted as a source of information (German Foreign Ministry Documents, File 40, 27852, 27855–57). However, Berlings, whose political sympathies were Nazi rather than Communist, reported at once to the German authorities, who advised him to pretend to cooperate with the Russians but to submit reports to Rudolf Likus, Ribbentrop's liaison officer for intelligence matters. A large number of reports submitted by Likus to Ribbentrop are in the Nazi files; they consist mostly of reports about foreign journalists and diplomats and are of limited interest only. The reports sent by Oreste Berlings were by contrast considered of such importance that they were submitted to Hitler himself in a special file on which he occasionally made comments in his own handwriting. Of the several dozen reports submitted by Berlings only a few excerpts have been chosen for publication here. The

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source of the documents is German Foreign Ministry Documents, File 36. About the *dramatis personae* the following is known: Berlings was said by his Nazi supervisors to have sympathised for years with fascist ideas; he had a very unstable character, his marriage was said to be harmonious and his private circumstances orderly (File 40, document 27852). A few days before the German invasion of Russia, Hitler reached the conclusion that Berlings was a swindler and gave instructions to have him watched and if necessary arrested. Berlings' fate after 21 June 1941 is not known. As for his contacts in the Soviet embassy, Filipoff (Filipov), the Tass representative, rose to be assistant head of the press department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry (in 1956) and has been in various diplomatic missions abroad since. Kobulow (Kobulov) seems to have been one of Beria's representatives in the Berlin embassy: so was Dekanozov, the ambassador (both, incidentally, Georgians by origin). His subsequent fate is unknown; there is some reason to believe that he may have come to grief. Both his brother Bogdan Kobulov, a former deputy minister of state security, and his former chief, Dekanozov, were executed in 1953 in the wake of the anti-Beria purges.)

File No. 36/25996 Berlin, 18 March 1941
State Secretary

Confidential Report
Likus

The agent who is active in the Soviet Embassy reports about the last meeting with his contact on Monday evening as follows:

Mr Filipoff conveyed to me the following instructions from Councillor Kobulow. 'It would be worth a fortune if as the result of slow, cautious, but reliable work you could let us know in which direction the Germans are going to move.' When Filipoff told me that my face fell and I groaned. I told him that I could not possibly infiltrate the Army High Command, or read the thoughts of Marshals Brauchitsch and Keitel, nor was I telepathic. If I tried to interrogate a soldier or an officer about what military measures were being planned I would be arrested like the American, Hottelet.* Filipoff said that President Roosevelt had already intervened on behalf of Hottelet and had demanded an official investigation.

I replied that there was no Roosevelt behind me. What would happen if I fell into German hands? Filipoff said, 'You need not worry—behind you there is a bigger power than Roosevelt.' He then said encouragingly, 'If you go to prison you can be sure that we will get you out.' I stopped the car and stared at him: 'Could you give me your Bolshevik word of honour that you will really do something for me?' 'Of course', said Filipoff, and gave me his hand. 'You must find ways and means of

* Richard Hottelet, well-known American journalist.

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learning about German military intentions. Kobulow will support you with all the means at his command.'

I asked him to give me one week to think over how this could best be managed. We fixed a meeting for next Wednesday.

(Signed) L.

(Widespread rumours started in March 1941 about an impending German attack on Russia. By April thousands of Germans, and some others, knew about 'Operation Barbarossa'. As the following documents show, at least some Russians also knew about it, though Stalin chose not to believe them.)

26003 Berlin, 28 March 1941

(Stamped: *This document has been submitted to the Führer.*)
Mr Filipoff received me with the following words: 'German-Russian relations are so tense and the situation is so serious that you must make every effort to find out about the German preparations for a possible military attack.' When I intentionally changed the subject and began to talk about Yugoslavia, Filipoff cut me short and said, 'You know, all this is of no importance now. Why don't you bring us some news about German-Russian relations? There are so many rumours just now! Even the Swiss newspapers reported on the 3rd March (he mentioned the *Basler Neueste Nachrichten* and a Zürich newspaper) that Germany was preparing a campaign against the Soviet Union for this summer.'

26016 Berlin, 11 April 1941

. . . then Kobulow came back to my chief assignment, namely, German-Russian relations, and said in a reproachful manner that my reports were too optimistic and my views incorrect. Kobulow said, 'On the basis of information which we recently received ninety per cent of all reports say that Germany is preparing an invasion of the Ukraine in about six weeks from now. The German Eastern wall is manned by innumerable new divisions. Railway transports from the Reich, loaded with guns and war material and particularly anti-tank guns, are continually rolling towards the East. You realise the seriousness of the situation.'

(By the middle of May, the Russians felt that the danger had passed. About his next meeting Berlings reported:)

26036 Berlin, 17 May 1941

Filipoff said: 'I have the impression that German-Russian relations have considerably improved during the last few weeks.'

(Yet a few days later rumours spread that the Russians were willing to make territorial concessions to the Germans.)

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26040 Berlin, 28 May 1941

When I told Filipoff about the rumours of a German-Russian understanding and asked him to give me some guidance on this interesting matter, he clenched his fist, held it under my nose and said, 'They will get a punch on the nose, but not the Ukraine.' He described these rumours as a deliberate German attempt, made from above, to put German-Russian relations to a new test. It was the Russian intention to defend themselves from this to the very utmost. Filipoff requested me to make it clear to my foreign colleagues that there was no truth whatsoever in these rumours and that the Soviet Union had every intention of defending its own interests.

Visibly excited, he told me, 'The whole thing is a German provocation and altogether untrue. We have no intention of giving up our best land and surrendering the Ukrainian population to the fascists. The Germans will only get as much of the Ukraine as they can scratch with their finger-nails. We are absolutely certain of what Germany's true aims are, and sure that there will be a decisive struggle. We are prepared for it.'

(By the middle of June the Russians were again convinced of an impending attack. On 13 June Berlings reported:)

26069 Berlin, 13 June 1941

Filipoff said that the situation was extremely serious, and the concentration of German troops continued.

(One day before Likus had come up with a sensational bit of news.)

26068 Berlin, 12 June 1941

The Soviet Ambassador had told the wife of a Chinese diplomat that unfortunately he had gained the impression that Hitler wanted war with the Soviet Union. He thought such a development likely and therefore advised the lady to leave Berlin.

(In the same week Mr Filipoff went on record with a military forecast.)

26074 Berlin, 14 June 1941

. . . Russia could rely only on herself if Germany should in fact attack Russia; even German military successes, such as a conquest of the Baltic countries or the Ukraine, would not mean much in view of the vastness of Russian territory. 'What is Europe in comparison with Russia?' asked Mr Filipoff proudly. Military pressure could only be really effective if exerted on a concentrated point; any further expansion would imply weakening the whole of Germany and Hitler would surely not go for that. . . .

III

(THE FOLLOWING DOCUMENTS are of interest because they show that the Soviet embassy was ready to intervene on behalf of some Jewish families

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in Poland who held Soviet citizenship at a time when the Russians thought they could ill afford to antagonise the Germans.)

File 104/113244/5 Berlin, 5 April 1941

The Under Secretary of State:

The Councillor of the Embassy, Kobulow, was rather excited when he came back today to our conversation of yesterday about the Soviet Jews who live in the Warsaw Ghetto. He said he had informed the Ambassador about the affair, but the latter had not understood one of the details. I did not even mention this detail in my note of 4 April. In the conversation on that day I had made it clear, after Mr Kobulow had been taken aback when I mentioned the word 'Ausweisung', that there was an explicit agreement that certain German citizens would be deported from the Soviet Union. Mr Kobulow said that the Ambassador had not understood what I meant.

I told him that I had meant the many German citizens who were still in Soviet prisons and whose deportation had not made any progress.

Mr Kobulow replied that the Ambassador would not accept the validity of this comparison. On one side there were people who had been sentenced by a Court; on the other people who had done nothing illegal. The Soviet Union did not differentiate between Jews and other Soviet citizens.

I replied that he certainly knew that we made this distinction, and that we have special legislation for Jews. We had suggested the deportation of these Jews to the Soviet Union only in order to conform with the wish expressed by the Soviet embassy that these Jews should not live in the Warsaw Ghetto.

Mr Kobulow said that in the opinion of the Ambassador the deportation was not called for.

I answered that we thought of deportation only as the form of the arrangement. Perhaps other ways could be found if the Soviet Government agreed in principle to take over the Jews. I therefore asked for a reply to the question of whether the Soviet Government was ready to take them back.

Mr Kobulow said that he could not reply to this question and asked for a written communication. . . .

(Signed) Woermann

File 104/113246 Berlin, 5 April 1941

Under Secretary of State:

Yesterday Councillor Kobulow again mentioned the wish that had been frequently expressed to bring back the Soviet children who still remain in the 'Generalgouvernement' (Poland).

After I had made inquiries about the state of this affair (Pol. V 1775), I told him today that we were ready in principle to return the children

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but only in exchange for German children from the Soviet Union. There have been negotiations about this in Moscow for a long time.

Mr Kobulow replied that as far as he knew these children could not be returned, because either the children themselves or one of their parents were opposed to it. He wanted to investigate the question and would make a communication about it at a future date.

Woermann

(The following cable from von Papen displays an abysmal ignorance of Russian affairs; the German Foreign Ministry files contain not a few such reports based on inside information and bogus documents fabricated in various parts of the world.)

File 105. *No.* 114161 Ankara, 25 November 1941

The following report was received from circles which have apparently good connections with Russia.

There are three groups. The first consists of communists and many military people. Their head is Major-General Morozov. The second group is anti-communist and consists of people who are not party members or party members who were never really communists. The third group comprises Jews, Social Revolutionaries, Constitutional Democrats, and members of the Peasant's Party (Maslow), and other communist groups.

In the event that one of these groups should come to power it will try to make peace with Germany. The first group would be ready to accept any sacrifice on the part of Russia if only the communist regime were saved.

The second group, which is of nationalist persuasion, would accept only such conditions as were not too humiliating from the Russian point of view. This second group has many supporters in the newly recruited Army units and among the peasants. Both these groups are anti-British.

The third group wants to form a Government of National Defence and to continue the war against Germany with British and American help. According to these sources the chances of this third group are growing daily, in view of the German intention to introduce in the occupied territories a regime which does not conform to the Russian national interests.

Von Papen

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Caveat Lector

A PREFACE TO STALIN'S *SOCHINENIIA*

Robert H. McNeal

STALIN'S significance as an historic figure has been growing in recent years, thanks—inadvertently—to the efforts of Khrushchev. If the present leader of the USSR has shattered the incredible image of a deity-*vozhd*, he has also enhanced the stature of Stalin the dictator. To be told by Stalin's historians—as we once were—that he was the genius of his age was not in itself justification for regarding him as a major figure, but it is indeed worthy of attention that the present Soviet leaders and historians regard the year of Stalin's death as a turning point only slightly less significant than 1917 itself. This, too, may be a partisan and inadequate appraisal of Soviet history, but it is safe to say that as the ludicrous and tragic communist hagiography recedes, a new era in non-communist studies of Stalin begins. In the study of his career and era, his writings must play a significant part, not as an adequate or wholly self-explanatory source, to be sure, but still fundamental. This being the case, it is pertinent to consider the reliability and completeness of Stalin's widely disseminated and oft-cited *Sochineniia*.

The publication of Stalin's *Sochineniia*, commencing in 1946, was a natural part of the cult of the leader and a corollary to the theory of an apostolic succession, for Lenin's *Sochineniia* had long been established as a sacred work. Most likely the war delayed the completion of this monument to the leader, for as early as the gala sixtieth birthday festival of 1939 a Soviet writer indicated that the bibliographical work then appearing was a prelude to publication of a full collection. When the first volume did appear, to the ringing acclaim of the Soviet literary world, it was announced that the project would require sixteen volumes to cover Stalin's career through the Second World War. Before his timely death, thirteen volumes had been published, bringing the work up through the seventeenth party congress of January 1934. Two of the remaining planned volumes would certainly have been of little consequence, since one was to be the *Kratkii kurs* on the history of the party, previously published in mountainous quantities and belatedly attributed to Stalin's own pen, while the other was to be his wartime speeches and orders of the day, which already existed as a separate and widely circulated anthology. Thus the death of the ruler in 1953 deprived the reading public of only one volume that might have been of much new interest, the fourteenth, covering the period from early 1934 through early 1941. Although such well known works as the speech on the 1936 constitution and the report to the eighteenth party congress in 1939 would have made up a good part of an average-sized *Sochineniia* volume, a rough calculation of the difference between the bulk of this material and the contents of a normal volume in the series

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indicates that it was intended to include some unpublished material. As if to tantalise the interested student, *Literaturnaia gazeta* on 12 January 1956, just when it seemed that there was no further hope of ever seeing volume fourteen, stated that it was about to appear—but we are still waiting.

In speaking of Stalin's *Sochineniia*, then, we are dealing only with the thirteen volumes which did appear and which have been widely used as reference works by both Soviet and non-Soviet writers. And of these we are bound to ask, who edited them? How faithful to the original versions are they? And how much of the available material do they actually include?

AS to the question of editorship, the volumes are nominally the anonymous work of the Institute of Marx-Engels-Lenin of the central committee of the CPSU, but in 1957 an official of this body told me that 'Comrade Stalin himself decided what would be included' in the *Sochineniia*. One is free to speculate on just what this meant in practice. It is not unimaginable that, while preoccupied with a host of domestic and foreign questions, Stalin found it possible to devote a good deal of time to the rather detailed editing of his works; on the other hand, he may have merely established general guidelines for the editors entrusted with the task. I am inclined towards the former view, for it seems improbable to me that anyone but Stalin would have had the nerve to apply the blue pencil to the leader's works—and a good deal of cutting did take place. Moreover, we have Khrushchev's assurance that Stalin personally edited in detail his *Kratkaia biografiia*, which is one of the other landmarks of the cult.

It is difficult within a limited space to give a very clear indication of the alterations in original published versions that were made for the *Sochineniia*. Such changes were many, and the careful scholar should be aware of this when using the *Sochineniia*, although it is true that many of them are stylistic rather than substantial in character.

The question of completeness is more important and more susceptible to treatment here. A comparison of the contents of the *Sochineniia* with various Soviet bibliographical listings and books and periodicals reveals not only numerous omissions, but also certain significant areas in which these are especially extensive. This is not what the reader would be led to expect, for the preface to the *Sochineniia* states that it includes 'nearly all the works of J. V. Stalin', and both Soviet and non-Soviet writers since 1946 have tended to regard the collection as pretty definitive. I should note here that my work is wholly dependent upon published Soviet materials; I have had no access to archival or manuscript materials, and not even to some publications. Soviet publications have recently alluded to such materials, especially in footnote references to unpublished writings by Stalin in the archives of the party, the Red Army, and elsewhere. One especially tantalising reference, by the Soviet scholar S. F. Naida, is to 'the Central Party Archive, Stalin Collection', the first

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definite reference to what seems likely to be one of the most important—and most jealously guarded—repositories of documents on twentieth century history. In short, it seems likely that what appears in the *Sochineniia* represents only the portion of the iceberg that is above water; my research reveals part of the iceberg around the water line, while an unknown mass remains more deeply submerged.

Stalin's pre-revolutionary writings, which occupy the first two volumes of the *Sochineniia*, pose some peculiar problems. Rather more than half of this material first appeared in Georgian; this is obstacle enough, but all of the publications attributed to Stalin before he left Transcaucasia for good in 1910 first appeared in editions which are almost wholly unobtainable outside the USSR—and almost equally inaccessible in that country. But bibliographical work carried on before the publication of the first volume of the *Sochineniia* in 1946 provides an interesting—often exasperating—frame of reference against which the official anthology can be checked. It shows that a good many of Stalin's early writings have been omitted by the editors of the *Sochineniia* even though the anonymous editors must surely have known of all the earlier research that has come to my attention as an outsider. Precisely how much of Stalin's early writing has been suppressed in the *Sochineniia* is much less clear.

According to the various Soviet sources that I have consulted, a total of one hundred and nine different articles, leaflets or booklets were published by Stalin in the Transcaucasian area before 1910. Of these, fifty-six are included in the *Sochineniia*, while fifty-three are not; of those items originally published in Georgian the score is thirty-seven in the *Sochineniia* and forty-three not. Two substantial Soviet research efforts of the nineteen-thirties form the basis for this statement. The first is Beria's book on the history of Bolshevism in Transcaucasia, published in numerous editions starting in 1935 and based on an extensive project under his direction at the Tiflis filial of the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute. Considering Beria's position and his close personal ties with Stalin for many years, one would expect that attributions to Stalin by Beria would not be omitted by the *Sochineniia* editors, especially when one bears in mind that Beria quoted at length—often in full—from many alleged works of Stalin, and that none of this was changed in the 1948 edition of Beria's book which appeared after the first volume of the *Sochineniia*. But the fact is that Beria cites—often with quotations—twelve articles or similar items, eleven of them originally in Georgian, that the *Sochineniia* does not include.

The other major piece of research was carried out by the very agency that later took responsibility for editing the *Sochineniia*, the central Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute in Moscow, which in 1939 celebrated the leader's birthday with the publication in *Proletarskaia Revoliutsiia* of a Stalin bibliography which still seems relatively complete and reliable today. Not only does this list include Beria's findings; it goes beyond them in source research, Georgian periodicals included, and on this basis

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attributes to Stalin thirty-four works that are neither included in the *Sochineniia* nor mentioned by Beria.

WHAT is one to make of this picture? Was almost as much of Stalin's published writing from his Transcaucasian period excluded from his *Sochineniia* as was included? In the absence of the original materials a definite answer is difficult, but several comments suggest themselves. First, it is quite likely that the pressure to glorify the *vozhd* induced researchers to attribute to him items that were really committee productions or the work of some other individual. It is quite likely that some of the proclamations and unsigned articles attributed to Stalin were only partially or indirectly his work, especially if issued in the name of a committee, as is sometimes supposed to be the case. It should be added here that Beria indicates (without giving any details) that Stalin wrote a number of articles (not counted in the estimate above) in 1905 for a Russian paper called *Elizavetpolskii Vestnik*. This is almost certainly an ill-considered claim, since Stalin was never active in Elizavetpol and was still publishing only in Georgian newspapers. On the other hand, there is little reason to think the *Sochineniia* more reliable than other Soviet sources when it comes to exaggeration of Stalin's literary works; both Isaac Deutscher and Bertram Wolfe have speculated on the non-Stalinity of several items from the Georgian appearing in the *Sochineniia*. In the absence of additional information, there seems as much reason to accept as Stalin's work the unsigned writings attributed to him by the pre-*Sochineniia* scholars as to accept similar materials in the official collection. This is especially true of certain works which Beria not only mentions but also quotes from at length, permitting the reader some chance to scrutinise the style (in Russian translation, to be sure) and the content. For example, Beria gives a long extract from an article of 15 March 1906, entitled 'Politicheskie Khameleony'. He does not say that it was signed, but it sounds like Stalin, consisting mainly of one awkward and overworked polemical metaphor. Moreover, the article is said to have been published in the Georgian newspaper *Elva* at a time when Stalin contributed other articles to this organ which are included in the *Sochineniia*.

In short, it is wise to treat with reserve all the early works said to be signed by a committee or unsigned, whether or not they appear in the *Sochineniia*. But it seems most unlikely that all this material—in or out of the official anthology—has been incorrectly attributed to Stalin.

We are on much surer ground when Stalin's signature is said to have appeared over a given article. In the many cases dated later than 1910 in which I was able to check Soviet bibliographies and the *Sochineniia* against original publications, I found that the Soviet scholars were scrupulous in their treatment of Stalin's signature or its absence. And if the signature provides some assurance of correct attribution, this helps both to verify the authorship of quite a few *Sochineniia* items from the early years, and to establish fourteen other items not in the *Sochineniia*

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but attributed to Stalin by an alternative source, usually the *Proletarskaia revoliutsiia* bibliography of 1939. Moreover, the pseudonymous signatures of these articles are the same as signatures appearing in the *Sochineniia*, such as 'Koba' or 'Besoshvili'. Thus, while the criterion of the signature tends to assure us that many of the items in the *Sochineniia*, volumes I and II, are really Stalin's, it also indicates that the official anthology is strikingly deficient in its coverage of Staliniana from the pre-1911 period.

AFTER 1912 Stalin's writings become less elusive in their original editions, for he worked under the direct supervision of the Central Committee, not in Transcaucasian backwaters. One can therefore be fairly certain that the *Sochineniia* is pretty complete and faithful to the original for the years between 1912 and the October Revolution. In this period, both before and after his last detention by the authorities, Stalin was active as an editor of party newspapers, and, as far as I have been able to check, it seems that the *Sochineniia* is almost wholly reliable in its republication of articles by Stalin from the Bolshevik press which he edited. There are, however, two notable suppressions of articles that originally appeared over the unmistakable signature 'K. Stalin'. One of these, appearing in *Pravda* on 1 December 1912, is entitled 'Iagello kak nepolnopravny chlen S.-D. fraktsii'. Obviously it was suppressed in later years because it revealed a 'soft' attitude towards a Polish Socialist Duma deputy who had been accepted by the Russian Social-Democratic Party Duma fraction over the objections of most Bolsheviks, including Lenin. The other short article, entitled 'Fakticheskaia spravka', appeared not in the Bolshevik press but in the joint Bolshevik-Menshevik 'thick' journal *Prosveshchenie* in January 1913. It must have been well known to Soviet bibliographers of later years, and it is difficult to explain its omission, especially as it is written in staunchly Leninist terms.

Otherwise, only a few miscellaneous letters and minor articles or statements at official meetings have been omitted from the *Sochineniia* for the period 1912 through October 1917. These are not without interest, including as they do Trotsky's well-known copy of Stalin's report at the Petrograd party conference of March 1917, which was implicitly authenticated in *Voprosy istorii* in 1956. But on the whole this period is not at all badly handled in the *Sochineniia*.

Not so the first years of the Soviet regime, when Stalin was vigorously establishing his reputation as a Bolshevik administrator in various fields, and in so doing was producing a substantial volume of official papers, many of which have appeared in one or another Soviet publication. It is very difficult to explain what policy or whim guided the editors of the *Sochineniia* in selecting official papers for inclusion in their collection. A formal greeting of one hundred words to the workers and sailors of Petrograd in December 1919, and a routine military communiqué to Lenin in June 1920, were not deemed too unimportant to include in the *Sochineniia*, while a considerable volume of roughly similar or more

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interesting material, well known to Soviet compilers, was omitted. It is especially difficult to present an accurate quantitative picture of the omissions because of the frequency of joint or multiple signatures, the existence of a number of items that are perhaps really too brief to count, and similar considerations. But it is approximately accurate to say that from the October Revolution through 1922 there are about 120 known letters, telegrams, orders and the like attributable to Stalin, of which only thirty appear in the *Sochineniia*. Of the roughly ninety that do not, perhaps twenty could be disqualified on the ground that Stalin's signature was simply a formal affirmation of a document drafted by some co-signer, such as Voroshilov or Egorov. But even after all reasonable paring it seems that as much of this type of material was omitted from the *Sochineniia* as was included. Most disconcerting of all is the small proportion of the communications from Stalin to Lenin that are included. By my reckoning only sixteen out of approximately fifty known communications from Stalin to Lenin in the period 1918–22 appear in the official anthology, even though many of the omitted items were published in so obvious a source as the *Leninskii sbornik* series. Some of them are admittedly brief; perhaps one or two should be attributed to a co-signatory rather than Stalin; and one case—Stalin's well-known critique of Lenin's draft theses for the Second Comintern Congress—is clearly a matter of political embarrassment. But it remains difficult to account for this treatment of Stalin-to-Lenin communications in the first years of Soviet power, considering that Stalin was usually so eager to demonstrate his close working relation with the founder. It is possible that, although this material would help to establish Stalin's importance as an early Soviet administrator, it might not sufficiently support the Stalinist myth that he was Lenin's co-worker rather than a trusted subordinate. On the other hand, the omissions may be due to a caprice that defies logical analysis.

Stalin's particular sphere in these early years of the Soviet regime was nationality affairs, and in regard to materials connected with this activity the *Sochineniia* has some noteworthy shortcomings, mostly from the October Revolution through 1919. Of the articles and speeches by Stalin relating to the nationality question in this period the *Sochineniia* carries twenty-six, while twelve articles and speeches and fifteen other documents, such as messages or decrees, are omitted. This calculation treats as an omission a rather long doctrinal essay which appeared in *Pravda*, 6 November 1919, under the title 'Oktiabrskii perevorot i natsionalnyi vopros'. Actually this title does appear in the *Sochineniia* over another *Pravda* article, dated 19 November 1918, which was originally entitled 'Oktiabrskii perevorot i vopros o natsionalnostiakh'. Substantial portions of the two articles are identical, so it may not be entirely justified to state that one was omitted from the *Sochineniia*. But appreciable passages of some real doctrinal significance were omitted and the titles were curiously swapped around without any explanation, which is hardly the kind of editorial policy that one would expect of a definitive collection.

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On the whole the omitted material on the nationality question in 1918 and 1919 does not consist of major doctrinal statements, but it is certainly not without its interesting items. These include published decrees abolishing the central cultural organisation of the Bashkirs and the Jews, and articles of 8 December 1917, and 24 November 1918, dealing respectively with the Ukrainian Rada and the organisation of Moslem communists; these are certainly the kind of document that any close student of the period would want to find in such a collection. In most cases the omission can be explained as retroactive political embarrassment, and is less puzzling than some of the cases mentioned earlier. Probably Stalin felt that his article on the Rada was too lenient; in later years the Rada was condemned root and branch. The same principle explains the suppression of the piece on the Moslem communists, who were offered a certain degree of autonomy within the Party. It also applies to an interesting letter of 17 June 1920, in which Stalin proposed to offer the Galician Ukrainians an independent state, even a non-Soviet one, if they would help the Soviets against the Poles.

ON a purely quantitative basis, the period 1923–33 is more completely covered in the *Sochineniia* than the earlier years of Soviet power, as far as can now be determined. True, an arbitrary editorial policy governs the inclusion of Stalin's formal greetings to various individuals and groups; a fifteen-word greeting to the Magnitogorsk workers does appear, while over thirty such items, originally published in 1923–33, are ignored. But this is not a matter of great substance.

More important is the impact of intra-party disputes, which is reflected not only in the systematic excision of *tovarishch* before the names of oppositionists, but also in a number of textual revisions, too numerous and detailed to take up at this time. The disputes impinge most keenly on substantial articles and speeches connected with international communism, which are known through Soviet publications or opposition accounts but are omitted from the *Sochineniia*. Six significant items of this sort may be definitely identified, including the longest single work by Stalin to be published in the Soviet Union and yet omitted from the appropriate volume of his *Sochineniia*. This is the series of three speeches of May 1929, which were published in *Bolshevik*, 1930, No. 1, under the title 'O pravykh fraktsionerakh v amerikanskoi kompartii'. This might have been suppressed for various reasons; perhaps its generally high-handed attitude towards a fraternal party seemed too pertinent to current problems of intra-party relations by the later 1940s; this may also account for the suppression of a somewhat similar speech of 30 March 1925, on the affairs of the Czech communists. On the other hand, Stalin's paternal lectures to other communist parties from time to time were not omitted from the *Sochineniia*, so there may be some deeper explanation.

Another omission is Stalin's famous speech of 5 April 1927, in which he referred to the Kuomintang as a 'jade' and a 'lemon' to be used and

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discarded. However, we know this important speech only incompletely through the opposition, thanks to Stalin's prompt measures to prevent its reproduction immediately following its delivery. Finally, I would mention one of the short pieces that has been suppressed, a letter to Frunze on 29 October 1925, two days before the military leader died under suspicious circumstances. This was a rough but friendly note of apology from the party secretary for having failed to pay an intended bedside visit to the dying soldier. There are plausible reasons enough why Stalin chose to forget this letter, but one wishes that one could know which considerations were crucial in suppressing it.

To sum up: No quantitative measurement of the omissions from the *Sochineniia* can be quite adequate, but for what it is worth it can be stated that the *Sochineniia*, covering the period through January 1934, contains 480 separate entries of varying length, while I have identified approximately the same number of items that should have appeared in the official collection but do not. This is not to say that a large number of important writings have been suppressed, although some fairly substantial items are among those omitted. The significance of the omissions to different researchers will inevitably vary greatly, ranging from the negligible to the vital. All that can be said in general and without qualification is that Stalin's *Sochineniia* is the product of an exceedingly unreliable editorial method and is far from complete.

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VIEWS AND REVIEWS

COMPULSION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH

Andrew Shonfield

THE SUDDEN FORCED MARCH to industrialisation, undertaken by the Soviet Union at the beginning of the 1930s, continues to present a number of puzzles. What really happened to bring about this drastic change of policy from which so much of both the grandeur and the misery of subsequent Russian history derives? Isaac Deutscher has tried to explain the about-turn at the beginning of the 1930s by reference to the individual quirks of Stalin's character. He describes the collectivisation drive and the new commitment to industrialisation at breakneck speed which went with it, in the evocative language of irrationality—it was a 'surrealistic' enterprise dominated by the 'half somnambulistic' vision of the dictator who presided over it.

An alternative explanation is offered by Alexander Gerschenkron.* In his view, the Bolshevik revolution occurred when the process of industrialisation in Russia had already advanced sufficiently to leave the revolutionaries with an impressive stock of capital. The New Economic Policy of the 1920s was well designed to mobilise these capital assets and to put them to full productive use. The high rates of economic growth in the middle twenties were caused by the characteristically favourable capital-output ratios of a country concentrating its investment on the repair of existing industrial equipment. By the end of the twenties, however, this process of recovery was complete, and in order to continue the advance of production at anything like the same speed, far larger sums were required for new industrial investment.

The sequence of what actually happened, as described by Gerschenkron, was as follows. First the slowdown in the rate of industrial output —of consumer goods—made the peasants unwilling to deliver their supplies in sufficient quantities to the towns. Since the towns did not provide them with the things that they wanted, they devoted more of their labour and agricultural resources to the production of goods which would make them more independent of the industrial sector of Soviet society. (Gerschenkron mentions the diversion of resources to 'fibrous crops for home spinning and weaving'. One would like to have the evidence that this drive for peasant autarky did occur on any significant scale.) This relationship between Soviet town and countryside was perceptively analysed by the Economic Commission for Europe in one of its early Annual Economic Surveys in terms of a 'balance of payments problem', with Soviet industry striving desperately for equilibrium in its 'external' payments with the countryside. In the late twenties the countryside may be said to have tried to move the terms of trade in its favour by making its own economy more autarkic. The answer of the

* **Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective.** Alexander Gerschenkron, Harvard University Press, $2.75 (distributed in Britain by OUP).

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Soviet authorities was to invade the countryside and to extract from it larger forced deliveries at lower prices.

But, according to Gerschenkron, this was regarded at the time as being a strictly temporary expedient. The intention of the authorities was to build up, as fast as possible, Soviet industry's capacity for producing the consumer goods which the peasants wanted. It was essentially a matter of buying time. Once the investment had been successfully completed, the 'terms of trade' between industry and agriculture would be restored to their former level and matters would proceed as before. It was only the accident of the peasants' massive resistance and the Government's subsequent victory over them in an all-out civil war which made the Soviet authorities feel that they could force the countryside to provide on a much larger scale the investment funds needed by industry. In other words, the temporary device of turning the terms of trade forcibly against the peasant was made permanent.

Throughout these essays Gerschenkron lays heavy emphasis on fortuitous factors of this kind which have made Russian history deviate from the common pattern of development. His tale is one of missed opportunities—the accident of the 1914 war which interrupted the first really self-sustaining phase of capitalist growth from 1906 onwards; the frustration of a reformist movement of moderate socialism through the same cause; and, most important of all, the political accident which prevented NEP from completing the task of civilising economic relations. It is this last which he sees as the greatest failure of the Bolshevik regime.

The story of these accidents is set against the background of Gerschenkron's general theory of development. He sees the aggrandisement of governmental power in the economic sphere as belonging essentially to a particularly early stage of growth; and in several of the essays he analyses the circumstances of the *étatiste* phase in different European countries, notably Germany, France, and Italy. In each case the predominant role of the state is later reduced as the power and efficiency of the banking system is established. Industry is then liberated from the trammels of state power, but exchanges this for the tutelage of the banks. The third stage comes when businesses coalesce into larger units—partly as a result of mergers stimulated by the banks themselves—and are then able to stand independently against the power of the banks. He suggests that German industry, which had been particularly subject to the authority of the banks, reached the third stage, when the big capitalist enterprise comes into its full birthright, at the turn of this century. The tragedy of the Russians is that they were only just beginning to get over the *étatiste* phase in the boom of 1906–1913, when the war and the revolution flung them back again—and clamped down the state power on the economic system more firmly than ever.

The result, in Gerschenkron's view, is that although Russia has achieved huge successes in industrialisation, 'this has created curious incongruities and actually prevented, or at least delayed, the mental adjustment of the population to the normalcy of a fully industrialised society'. These incongruities are delicately traced by the author in a series of perceptive essays on modern Russian literature. This is, as he

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says, 'a neglected source of economic information on Soviet Russia'. Nevertheless, one is left in some doubt in the end about the author's own view of the economic quality of the Soviet system. At times he seems to suggest that the spiritual malaise which it creates must in the long run affect its economic performance. He describes in evocative detail the inefficiencies that result from the vast gulf that separates Soviet theory from the realities of economic management. Yet the facts which he himself has so meticulously established in his 'dollar index of Soviet output' show that the Russians have succeeded in maintaining a significantly higher rate of growth for longer periods than has been recorded in any other country to date. Indeed, the author admits that he never guessed that the Russians would be able to maintain anything like the 10 per cent rate of industrial growth per annum of the late 1950s. His expectation had been that the process would slow down markedly as soon as the phase of post-war reconstruction had been completed. The reason why it did not, he says, is that the 'quality' of Russian labour improved sharply during the period. Above all, it was much better trained.

But that still leaves unanswered the question why the Soviet rate of growth should continue steadily at a higher rate than that of capitalist countries which devote a comparable proportion of their national product to investment. In view of the inefficiencies of the system, it might be supposed that the capital-output ratio would be less favourable in Russia than in the capitalist world. But on the face of it, the opposite seems to be true. Or is the progress to date of the Soviet system and the expected progress in the future—for Gerschenkron anticipates a continuing rate of industrial growth at 10 per cent per annum—due to the specific advantages of 'backwardness'?

The economic advantages of 'backwardness' provide the central theme of this book. A country which comes late to industrialisation tends to borrow the most advanced technology, so that the average of its plants will tend to be more up to date than that of more advanced industrial nations. In this way it is able to offset such disabilities as the shortage of a disciplined and trained labour force. Because it concentrates on the most advanced equipment which is characteristically labour-saving, it is able to economise resources which are scarce. The question which is prompted by the application of this theoretical pattern to the Russian case is: How long do the advantages of backwardness continue to produce a higher than average rate of growth? Obviously it cannot any longer be regarded as a major factor in the USSR today. The more important cause of the exceptionally rapid industrial growth in contemporary Russia is, in Gerschenkron's view, that the resources devoted to productive investment continue to increase each year at a faster rate than the increase in consumer goods output. This implies that productive investment as a proportion of the national product steadily rises. The author asserts that there is no reason 'within the Soviet institutional framework' why this process should not be continued *ad infinitum*. It is just a matter of deciding to go on making more capital goods which are themselves designed to make more and more capital goods.

It is a pity that the underlying arithmetic of this contention is not

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deployed in more detail. Is it really the case that the difference between Soviet and, say, Western German rates of industrial growth per person employed is due exclusively to the fact that investment is increasing at an increasing *tempo* in the former, but has been increasing (at any rate until recently) at a steady rate in the latter? Plainly the actual quantitative difference between the two cases—rather than any difference in the principle of the thing—is the decisive factor in judging the plausibility of this argument. For the level of West German gross investment, at around 25 per cent of GNP, is probably not far short of the Soviet figure. Moreover, the technological bonus from almost any new fixed investment nowadays—whether it is a replacement or part of a new enterprise—means that even a static volume of annual investment would tend to produce a higher return from year to year. What has to be shown, in order to prove the Gerschenkron thesis, is not merely that the proportion of the Soviet national product taken by productive investment is increasing, but that the actual increase each year is significant enough to account for the much more rapid increase in industrial output than in a country like Germany. It might be, after all, that a given amount of capital is more productive in the Russian context—perhaps because of lack of variety or low quality of goods produced, or possibly because technological innovation tends to spread faster through any given Soviet industry.

Here, as in one or two other places, the essays collected in this book, for all their brilliant suggestiveness leave the reader with a faint feeling of dissatisfaction. Perhaps this is inevitable in a book of essays, each containing a crop of original ideas, loosely tied to one another around a single theme. The ideas have some of the sweep and imagination of a Schumpeter: there is behind them the same kind of richly stocked and cultivated mind. It moves with equal facility through a niggling series of statistical problems connected with the construction of an index of production or when it flings a luminous generalisation across a hundred years of political, economic, and literary history. The trouble is that the reader or reviewer, having been given so many insights into the author's mode of thought, feels more keenly than he would with a lesser writer the absence of a systematic presentation of the story. The body of ideas presented here has plenty of flesh on it; what is missing is the full revelation of the bone-structure underneath.

WRITERS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Jaroslav Dresler

THE THAW DID NOT GATHER momentum in Czechoslovakia until some time after Stalin's death; it was only in summer 1955, the time of the Geneva summit conference, that Czech literary magazines gave vent to a somewhat freer exchange of views. At that time the Czech State Publishing Office was criticised for 'neglecting' authors like Hemingway, Mauriac, and Graham Greene. This was, of course, grotesque. The real culprit was not the State Publishing Office but the Party's narrow-minded cultural policy. The tone of the debate gained in intensity so rapidly in

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the ensuing weeks and months that the then President, Antonin Zapotocky, was forced to intervene. In the *Literarni Noviny* of 24 December 1955 he wrote: 'Many of our artists are suffering from belly-ache. They wish us well and are all for socialism . . . but they say: give us complete artistic freedom! My answer is: we shall not give artists that sort of freedom because we shall never succeed in building socialism in that way.'

The second Writers Congress, held in April 1956, turned into a demonstration. The following demands emerged from various contributions to the debate: first, that imprisoned authors 'who have suffered enough and paid sufficiently for their mistakes' should be released; secondly, that literature should at last be freed from the restrictions of censorship, socialist-realism, and Party dogma; and thirdly—a self-imposed challenge—that writers should once more become the conscience of the people.

At the same time, certain implicit political demands were made. These were that the central committee of the Czech Communist Party should resign and an extraordinary congress of the Party be convened in Prague.

In its uncertainty as to the implications of the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, the Czech central committee displayed no immediate aversion to these demands. True, it did not convene a Party Congress or release any detainees, but Stalinists were ousted from the leadership of the Writers Union and censorship vanished at least from the surface of literary life. New periodicals were founded, authors who had hitherto been banned or regarded as undesirable were published once more, and it looked as though cultural life might perhaps gradually return to normal. The practical consequences of this situation were seen principally in cultural publications and in two fields in particular: poetry and literary criticism.

Jan Grossmann, a thirty-year-old critic and dramatist, wrote after the second Writers Congress (*Novy zivot*, 1956, p. 1294 *et seq.*):

> In the cultural field, the basis adopted was one of contrasts between two spheres, the socialist and the capitalist . . . Thus, the complex problems affecting literature were obscured and its development retarded. Literature, which came up against a whole series of problems after the German occupation, was incapable of solving them publicly and openly. It began to resemble someone weathering a severe illness which was bound to flare up again with increased violence later on. The vigour of published writing was undermined by an unworthy form of patronage. . .

FROM THE BEGINNING of 1958 onwards, old Party officials slowly began to return to their posts, and before long few traces of a change of course were detectable. One legacy was the improved and typographically richer appearance of cultural magazines and book jackets, but the actual contents of publications soon reverted almost to what they were in Stalin's day. For all that, the Czech 'cultural spring' of 1956, as it came to be known at the time of the second Writers Congress, did yield a harvest—though an exceedingly belated and somewhat meagre one. The reason for the time-lag was mundane in the extreme. Because Czech printing houses give such incredibly long delivery dates, manuscripts

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which had been approved and sent for setting in spring 1956 did not appear until autumn of the following year, or more often, the year after that. Consequently, much of what was sown in spring 1956 did not bear fruit until two and a half years later—a harvest which in Party eyes contained far too many weeds.

After a preliminary critical reaction which was cautiously acquiescent, the Party's displeasure centred upon three novels. The first was *Follow the Green Light* by Eduard Valenta, an author of the older generation who spent several years in a communist gaol after 1948, while the other two were *Frontier Town* by Karel Ptacnik and *Cowards* by Josef Skvorecky, both of whom belonged to the younger generation of writers. Soon after the last book appeared in Prague, several West German publishers competed for the rights. After a long delay, the following answer came back from Prague: 'The author Josef Skvorecky does not wish his novel to be published in other languages.' Surely, an unparalleled example of professional modesty! Since Czechoslovakia adheres to the Copyright Convention, nothing can be done even with the best books if the Party refuses to sanction their translation.

All three novels have something in common. Their action takes place in the years 1940–48, and in all three the protagonists are, from the Party angle, 'negative heroes'. More than that, these 'negative heroes' are creatures of flesh and blood, whereas the 'positive heroes' of books acceptable to the Party are bloodless clichés. All three document, each in its own way, the Czechs' resigned but negative attitude towards communism.

* * *

For many years, a key position in Czech cultural circles was occupied by the literary critic and staunch Party loyalist Ladislav Stoll, now sixty years old, who edited the Party newspaper as long ago as the inter-war period and is a fierce opponent of all things modern, particularly surrealism and abstract art. He was Minister of Culture for a time during the Stalin era, and even after that managed to secure control of the Party's cultural machine by dint of skilful manoeuvring. At the second Writers congress of 1956 he indulged in self-criticism and promised to revise his pamphlet *Thirty Years of Struggle for Czech Socialist Poetry*. This booklet, originally the text of a lecture in which Stoll launched massive onslaughts against Czech modernists, including Halas, Teige, and many others, was long regarded as an important, if not the most important, foundation stone of Party cultural policy. Many people have indeed regarded Stoll as the evil genius of Czech cultural life.

Stoll's self-criticism at the second Writers congress was followed by his removal from the central committee of the Writers Union, but barely three years later, having meanwhile become principal of a Party-sponsored college, he again became dictator in the domain of cultural ideology. In 1959 he got himself re-elected to the central committee of the Writers Union, formed a 'Committee for Socialist Culture', convened several literary conferences, and in summer of the same year organised a Congress of Socialist Culture at which he assumed the role of chief speaker and re-expounded his old theories on socialist-realism. For the next two or three years, Stoll once more became arbiter of the line to be adopted by periodicals, and exerted an authoritative influence on the selection of theatrical repertoires and art exhibitions. He again became,

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and with justification, one of the most feared pillars of the Stalinist establishment.

However, the changed atmosphere in Prague since the 22nd Congress of the Soviet Communist Party was demonstrated at the end of last winter at a private session in Prague to which Stoll invited representatives from writers, artists, composers and other associations in the name of the 'Committee for Socialist Culture'. When the chairman, Professor Mukarovsky, tried to give the floor to Stoll, the delegates made such a din that Stoll eventually left the hall without uttering a word. Instead, the floor was taken by Dr Eduard Goldstücker, a long-time communist who was condemned to life imprisonment in connection with the Slansky trial but later amnestied. (He is now lecturer in German philology at the Charles University, Prague.) Loud applause greeted Goldstücker's declaration that Soviet principles and experience would no longer be automatically applied to the cultural life of Czechoslovakia. Naturally enough, no newspaper reported this incident, but the assembled representatives of cultural associations wasted no time in proclaiming the news from the rooftops.

THE PARTY RECEIVED a second rebuff from the conference of Slovak writers which assembled at Bratislava at the end of April 1963. On this occasion, the author Laco Novomesky was enthusiastically acclaimed and solemnly readmitted to membership of the Writers Union. Novomesky had been sentenced to ten years' imprisonment in 1954 for 'bourgeois nationalism' coupled—curiously—with cosmopolitanism, but was released in autumn of the following year. At his trial, Novomesky was also accused of being a Bukharinist, surrealist, capitalist spy, friend of the executed Foreign Minister Vlado Clementis, etc., charges which he explicitly and methodically admitted. His release at first sparked off talk of an act of clemency, but it was not until his recent readmission to the Writers Union that he was regarded as fully rehabilitated. On the other hand, none of the non-communist writers, most of whom had spent more than ten years in prison, was publicly rehabilitated. Moreover, although the Writers Union has substantial funds at its disposal, several of the released authors are said to be in dire financial straits because most of them were ill and were not entitled to a pension when they emerged from prison; nor could they secure permission to republish their earlier works. It appears that destalinisation has by and large been confined to the few communists, like Novomesky and Goldstücker, who have been permitted to return to public life.

It is also to be assumed that the repeated postponements of the Third Writers congress were inspired by a wish to avoid spontaneous developments like those of 1956, and by the Party's desire to arrive at a long-term compromise or *modus vivendi* with writers in advance of the congress. In present circumstances, the Party requires their neutrality, if nothing more; hence its avoidance of open hostilities. When the congress finally assembled in Prague between 26 and 28 May of this year, the speakers included a representative of the Party's central committee, Jiri Hendrych, who spoke with extreme moderation and caution and avoided any direct criticism of authors. Ivan Skala, a Stalinist and one of Stoll's henchmen, was re-elected as general secretary of the Writers Union, it is true, but there was a change of personnel in the three secretarial posts. Two of

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these new officials may be assumed to be anti-Stalinists: Karel Ptacnik, the author of *Frontier Town*, referred to above, and the Slovak author Ladislav Mnacko, who endeavours to keep his criticism within the bounds of 'Party spirit' but often brings a pitiless light to bear on awkward facts. The last of the newly elected secretaries, Ivan Kriz, was regarded during the early fifties as a provincial champion of the official line (he was secretary of the Brno branch of the Writers Union), but in 1960 he published a noteworthy novel entitled *Velka Samota*, in which he described the reign of terror imposed by the Party when establishing the *kolkhozy*. At least two if not all three of the new secretaries can thus hold Stalinist Skala in check. The Party probably insisted on his retention because it feared that, as a precedent, his downfall might release too much pent-up explosive material. To avoid this, it was prepared to make certain compromises, and the writers apparently exploited the Party's dilemma to good advantage.

The election of the presidium by the committee of the Writers Union, meeting in June, gave a clear majority to the 'revisionists', and endorsed the decisions of the third congress. In the same month, *Literarni Noviny* published an attack on Stoll's writings by the critic Jiri Brabec; Stoll's defence of his views in the following issue received support from Hendrych, speaking on 28 June to graduates of the Party School; he suggested that such polemics should not be conducted in public. To a further attack on Brabec, by the presidium of the Academy of Sciences, the presidium of the Writers Union replied that this was 'an attempt at intimidation': Stoll's writings were published, and therefore open to public discussion. And there, for the time being, the matter rests.

* * *

The second Writers Congress of 1956 was held in an atmosphere of open revolt against the Party. The third Writers Congress, by contrast, was preceded by months of negotiation with the Party leadership. The outcome was a compromise which opened the door to reform. How far it will go depends on a number of events and trends, principally in international relations, but potential reform could prove a source of danger to the present central committee of the Czech Communist Party. It is probable, for instance, that writers will press the Party to honour its undertaking to compromise by granting literature a measure of independence. However, it has been demonstrated several times in the past that a lifting of the ban on artistic and literary criticism is often followed swiftly by political criticism. Sparks which set artistic dogma ablaze may alight on other types of doctrine.

PHILOSOPHIES IN POLAND

George Lichtheim

THIS WEIGHTY MONOGRAPH*—one in a series of East European studies published by the Catholic University of Fribourg (Switzerland) under the

* Z. A. Jordan, **Philosophy and Ideology: The Development of Philosophy and Marxism-Leninism in Poland since the Second World War.** D. Reidel Publishing Company. Dordrecht, Holland. 1963. Pp. 590.

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general editorship of Professor J. M. Bochenski—makes considerable demands on the reader and is clearly not intended for the general public. The same might no doubt have been said of earlier works in the Fribourg *Sovietica* series, such as Professor Müller-Markus' voluminous study of the Soviet discussion on Einstein, or Dr Lobkowicz's brief analysis of the Moscow conference of logicians in 1958. The last-named, however, was largely a scissors-and-paste job, while Dr Müller-Markus' work, though useful for reference purposes, has seemed to some readers to lack the critical cutting-edge. Mr Jordan's study of post-war philosophy in Poland is another matter. It ranges widely, deals exhaustively with both the historical and logical aspects of its subject, and compresses a vast amount of material into something like manageable space. Of the several volumes of *Sovietica* studies known to the present reviewer, it is by far the most impressive.

There is something to be got out of this densely packed and closely reasoned work even by the reader who is not primarily interested in the fortunes of Marxism-Leninism in Poland before and after 1945. Polish philosophy and sociology forms a sufficiently important subject in itself, and the author devotes some space to the intellectual background of the post-war controversies. Students of philosophy do not need to be told that between the wars Poland was one of the great centres of the modern movement in logic, mathematics, and the philosophical implications of post-Newtonian physics. The war years brought immense losses, but after 1945 the country's intellectual life was reconstructed with impressive speed. Until 1949, moreover, there was something like peaceful coexistence among the three major trends: traditional Catholic philosophy, the positivist 'Warsaw School', and the newly imported Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy. (There had been a few Marxist sociologists and historians in pre-war Poland, but no Marxist-Leninist 'philosophers'.) Between 1949 and 1956 the Stalinist ice-age descended, and the future of non-Soviet thought, including Western (i.e., existentialist or revisionist) varieties of Marxism, looked problematic. Then came the upheaval of October 1956, and with it a return to the pre-1949 situation 'at a higher level', some of the more ardent Marxist-Leninists having meantime repented of their doctrinaire excesses, while on the part of Catholic and Liberal scholars there was now greater readiness to take Marxism (though not Leninism) seriously as a competitor. The upshot has been to transform Poland into one of the two East bloc countries—Hungary being the other—where something like genuine intellectual life has been preserved or restored. There has even been a revival of the once flourishing school of empirical sociology founded before the war by Znaniecki.

This complex story is unravelled by the author with impressive fairness and objectivity: itself an index to his philosophical commitment. It is not the least noteworthy aspect of this publishing enterprise on the part of a Catholic institution that a representative of the liberal-empiricist 'Warsaw School' should have been chosen to render an account of how Catholic, Marxist, and positivist forms of thought have fared in Poland since the war. Mr Jordan's work, for all its ostensible detachment, is in fact a learned and heavily documented defence of positivism, and therefore (by implication at least) agnosticism: published by a research institute whose directors are Thomists. Such tolerance is praiseworthy,

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though in Marxist-Leninist eyes this Catholic-Liberal alliance may simply constitute further evidence of 'idealist' solidarity against the claims of *Diamat*. How complicated the situation really is, and how little is to be gained by applying ordinary political criteria, the reader can discover for himself by studying Mr Jordan's exhaustive analysis of the post-1945 discussion. He will at any rate find that the author is scrupulously fair to all concerned and willing to assign merit wherever it can be found. Nor does he try to hide the fact that Soviet Marxism for a while gained some notable adherents who were *not* opportunists and who, moreover, had already made their reputation before 1939. Their subsequent evolution reflected both the collapse of the old pre-war society, and the failure of Marxism-Leninism to demonstrate its intellectual superiority over the various schools of 'bourgeois' thought.

In developing this subject the author is inevitably obliged to take issue with the naïve dualism which sees Poland as a battleground between the Catholic faith and 'atheist communism'. He does so politely, but without mincing his words. The Catholic Church was and is the greatest social force in opposition to the regime, and it still provides the only ideology with a genuine hold over the people; but the philosophical dispute has had to be fought out at another level. 'Only a handful of Catholic intellectuals was concerned with philosophical questions. In academic philosophy the Christian school had no influence and was tolerated rather than accepted. Philosophically it was not, therefore, a serious opponent to Marxism-Leninism' (p. 184). The remark is instructive, notably when taken in conjunction with a hint that 'there exists wide-ranging correspondence between certain fundamental categories of thought in Soviet philosophy on the one hand, and those of Thomism on the other' (ibid). This suggestion indeed, as the author hastens to make clear, was deeply resented by the communists as well as the more militant Catholics, but since 1956 it has become the link between the old empiricist school (which represented Western liberalism in pre-war Poland) and the new revisionist and existentialist Marxism typified by Kolakowski. The revisionists thus stand midway between the Church and Soviet orthodoxy. The historical roots of this curious line-up—ultimately a consequence of Lenin's success in committing Soviet philosophy to something resembling a modified Aristotelianism—cannot be gone into here. The subject is dissected at considerable length by the author, whose conclusions on this point correspond to those of a Thomist writer such as Professor Wetter. But we must move on to the theme of social analysis.

'The two most serious and influential opponents of Marxism-Leninism in the field of academic philosophy . . . were the Warsaw school and Znaniecki's sociology' (p. 185). The latter was empiricist and made light of Comtean or Marxist 'historical laws'. It was therefore unacceptable to the prophets of the new dispensation, even though in pre-war Poland it had managed to coexist quite peacefully with what Mr Jordan describes as 'the Marxian tradition' in social science, i.e., the more or less positivist (and therefore not *weltanschaulich*) sociology of writers like Czarnowski, for whom Durkheim and Marx had provided the analytical tools. This kind of eclecticism (though in Czarnowski's case quite consciously an application of historical materialism to the study of society) was not to the taste of embattled militants like Schaff who took over in 1945. In their eyes Marxism-Leninism was a total

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Weltanschauung, not a philosophically neutral tool of social analysis. They were doubtless right to maintain that only as a universal faith could it triumph over its enemies: bourgeois liberalism and the Church. The ensuing three-cornered struggle has by now left all parties somewhat exhausted and baffled: the usual fate of such historic confrontations. But there was also an intellectual element in the situation which must not be overlooked: Marx and Engels (the former rather reluctantly) had by the 1880s rejoined the positivist mainstream from which their youthful Hegelianism had originally separated them. It was therefore possible—notwithstanding Marx's poor opinion of Comte and his followers—for empirical sociologists to employ Marxist concepts without altogether losing touch with what was being done in academic sociology; and some such line came to be pursued by Polish Marxists of the older generation, while after the collapse of Leninism as a 'total' or 'holist' creed in 1956 their successors needed only to revive the traditional view of Marx as a sociologist and founder of historical materialism, meantime tacitly ignoring Engels' (and Lenin's) attempt to construct a holist metaphysic. In this fashion Polish sociology—principally in the person of Ossowski—eventually rejoined the European mainstream.

Being professionally concerned with philosophy rather than sociology, the author does not perhaps do sufficient justice to the importance of Ossowski's work. *Class Structure in the Social Consciousness* (recently published in an English translation by Routledge *; the book appeared in 1957, i.e., immediately after the 'Polish October' had broken the doctrinaire stranglehold) is a work of genuine originality which combines some traditional Marxian themes with a lucidly dispassionate (and in its implications decidedly pessimistic) analysis of industrial society in the modern age. Mr Jordan, who has a good deal to say about Marxist historicism (much of it along familiar Weberian and Popperian lines) might have made more of Ossowski's commitment to a de-mystified historical materialism which recognises that new social determinants have in part invalidated the old optimistic (liberal *and* socialist) world picture. It is one of the weaknesses of his otherwise admirably lucid and exhaustive treatise that he pays more attention to methodology than to the analysis of the raw material of thought. His valuable chapter on 'Prediction in the Social Sciences', for all its analytic stringency, remains at a level of abstraction where the critic of historicism is more concerned to make the point that 'a forecast is not a prediction' than to enquire how specific social processes can be analysed. It is also somewhat surprising—especially after an acknowledgement that 'the sociology of knowledge is a field of study which is clearly Marxian in origin'—to find the absurd Sorokin listed (along with Weber, Durkheim, Mannheim, and Talcott Parsons) among the 'major contributors' in this field. By comparison with the recent development of Western *Wissenssoziologie* it is no doubt true to say that 'Marxism-Leninism . . . remains at the stage where Marx left it'; but regrettable though this sterility is, one cannot seriously lament the inability of Polish Marxists to make use of Sorokin's 'discoveries'. The other writers listed by the author will no doubt gradually make their influence felt.

* Reviewed in this issue.

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On the whole this is an admirable work. It is learned, lucid, and written in a spirit of judicious fairness which does honour not only to the author but to the school he represents, and indeed to the national tradition from which he stems. There used to be a time when works of this stamp were representative of Central European, and in particular of German scholarship. Indeed the Germans once prided themselves on the unique blend of solidity and detachment which in the nineteenth century made their universities Europe's chief centres of learning. Their loss—or default—has been the gain of their neighbours: among them Germany's intended victims.

CLOSER TO THE GROUND

Irina Chymanovsky

THE newspapers of the Soviet republics follow up most of the campaigns initiated by the central authorities, but they also give some very interesting information which cannot be found elsewhere. One of the most striking examples is the 'Ukrainian hour' or 'Lugansk hour' campaign.

The Ukrainian newspaper *Sovetskaia Ukraina*, has been constantly referring to this for several months now, and other republics have joined in, as for instance Azerbaidzhan, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation. The movement started at the end of 1961, but reached large proportions only recently. It consists in doing all the work meant to be done in a day or a shift quicker than usual, thus saving a full hour of working time. The hour gained is devoted to extra work and over-fulfilment of the plan. It was at first called 'Luganski chas', but is now more and more often called 'Ukrainski chas'.

At the beginning of this year the articles were full of praise but the tone changed in May. The most interesting article was written by Academician Strumilin, who points out that the gain in productivity would every year be four times greater than that planned. (The plan envisaged an overall rise of 6 per cent, whereas the Ukranian hour would lead to 20 or 25 per cent.) Strumilin also insists that such an effort, especially if it ought to be constant and continuous, is completely impossible for the majority of workers, and suggests that the best system would be for everybody to save twenty, or even five minutes a day for extra work, but to do it every day. The management and the central authorities should also help to raise productivity, which it is unfair to leave entirely to the purely physical efforts of the workers: the best way to raise productivity is to increase the quality, quantity, and range of machinery, and to give the workers a free field for their initiative in rationalising their jobs. Strumilin concludes that the condition of success is to renounce any predetermined cliché, identical for every man in every job or profession, for that hampers and kills all initiative. He adds that if the ruling principle is 'from each according to his capacity', it is not

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only humanly, but also ideologically and politically unjust, to demand an equal amount of extra work and an equal increase in productivity from every worker, whatever his capacity.

The discussion of this new campaign is still going on in *Pravda Ukrainy*, and some surprising facts turn up from time to time. One Party secretary says in an article attacking the principle of campaigns in general that he missed the importance of the 'Ukrainian hour' and even the Ukrainian hour campaign as such, because it was just one of the fifty campaigns sent 'from the top' which he had had to carry through over the last twelve months.

It is quite possible that the 'Ukrainian hour' will never reach the pages of the central press, as the articles in the republican press are becoming more and more critical. *Sovetskaia Ukraina* quotes an enterprise which is carrying on this campaign and recently set itself the goal of 'lowering the percentage of waste to forty per cent of total production'. The number of similar cases is steadily increasing, but there are still some articles praising the idea of the 'Ukrainian hour', so that it may go on for some time yet in those enterprises which are lagging far behind the bulk of the local industry.

These are examples of organised movements. Whether started in Moscow or locally, they are a manifestation of Party control and do not reveal local opinion. But the republican press does also give the reader an opportunity of discovering things that cannot be explained by any action of the central authorities, and which are therefore far more interesting to anyone interested in Soviet opinion at other than official levels.

Some of these manifestations of genuine public opinion come to the surface as a result of some centralised move. After the discussion throughout the press of the CPSU draft programme, several republics took up the problem of the attitude of young Soviet citizens towards communism. At least nine articles appeared in different newspapers at approximately the same time, but it is very difficult to believe that they were part of a campaign, as the context in each case was very different, even if the conclusions were similar and in some cases identical.

Sovetskaia Litva (2 January 1962) published an article by a school director, saying: 'In discussing the Party programme and the future communist society with students and schoolchildren, one sometimes hears this sort of judgment: "Communism is a social system under which everybody will be well provided for. If you need a pair of shoes, you just go into a shop and choose the shoes you like best. If you feel like eating, you enter any restaurant and eat whatever you want." Such a consumer's approach to life in a communist society has nothing in common with the principles of communist morality. Where could these young people have got such distorted ideas of the future?'

Three days later, in its report on the annual Komsomol meeting of the Republic, the same newspaper quoted a secretary of the central committee of the Republican Young Communist League as having said: 'It has

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become evident that many students have a very one-sided understanding of communism. Their approach is over simplified and sometimes that of a consumer. The majority of students write about communism from the point of view of an outside observer.'

Sovetskaia Moldavia took up the same question (26 January 1962), adding to the same complaints evidence of a conciliatory attitude, 'appeasement' and 'hiding behind quotations while discussing communism'. It appealed to teachers to put written questions and subjects for essays in a way that would oblige the student to give his own personal opinion. *Sovetskaia Rossiya* wrote of a young man who was considered a very good communist on the evidence of his essays and speeches, but who proved to be the head of a literary group which 'dissociated itself from the life of the country'. The Azerbaidzhan newspaper, *Bakinski Rabochi*, went further and protested against the indifference of the local Komsomol authorities when people handed in their membership cards.

These problems were discussed on and off in nine republics throughout the early months of 1962, and the newspapers gave fairly detailed information about some trends of public opinion. What is most interesting is that people talk and even write quite openly, as for instance the Lithuanian student at an agricultural academy who wrote in answer to a questionnaire circulated among young people during the CPSU draft programme discussion: 'In my opinion, the Soviet regime gave me only what it was *obliged* to give'. Commenting on this and other statements, *Sovetskaia Litva* (4 February 1962) again pointed to the 'widespread consumer's approach to life and communism', and to the difficulty of making people appreciate the achievements of communism. This is not very difficult to understand in a republic that has not, after all, been part of the USSR for very long, but it is far more striking in the case of the Ukraine. *Pravda Ukrainy* quoted a report by a secretary of the central committee of the Republican Komsomol, who said: 'The Communist Party appeals to us not to be on the defensive in our ideological work, but to attack. We cannot allow young people to be penetrated by a psychology of private ownership, of indifference towards politics and our ideology, and also of nihilism.'

A GOOD deal can also be learned about informal associations, and the ways and means by which people exploit, or overcome, or get round some specific regulation or arrangement in order to achieve their own aims. In January 1962, *Pravda* and *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda* took up the case of a collective farm, said to be the richest in the Kazakh Republic. It buys fruit juices in the Ukraine and Uzbekistan, and sugar in Dzhambul, and makes wine on an industrial scale, selling it even beyond the borders of the Republic, using all forms of transport—air, rail, and road. The farm also produces jam, but on a smaller scale. The profits are distributed among the members of the collective according to the amount of work done throughout the year: the 'work days' accumulated in routine farming, not in wine production. Thus, in 1959, 6,500,000

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(old) rubles were distributed to the farm members in addition to their basic earnings. Of this sum, only 100,000 rubles came from ordinary farming profits: in fact, from the basic work of the farm.

This is labelled ' speculation ' and the chairman of the collective farm periodically gets into trouble. When this happens, he turns for help to the regional Party committee and to the central committee of the Kazakh party. The newspapers gave an example; Didkovsky, the farm chairman, was attacked in the press for these activities. The head of the department of agriculture of the Kazakh central committee ordered the head of the capital's television service to demonstrate in a special broadcast the achievements of the farm and to let Didkovsky make a speech. The broadcast was made and both farm and chairman highly praised. It is interesting to note that although several articles attacking Didkovsky and his collective farm for speculation were published in both the central and the republican press, he was subsequently highly praised by Khrushchev.

This, of course, is a rare example of cooperation by the authorities at a high level, but at the district level such cooperation is very frequent and has great social and economic significance. Directives coming from the centre, especially if they are in fact propaganda moves, are either ignored or not obeyed in practice. The approach at local level is very businesslike; Didkovsky's case shows to what lengths the authorities will let successful people go, so long as they really are successful. The ' mayaki ' case shows to what lengths the local authorities are prepared to go in order to prevent a propagandist move from spoiling the work of a reasonably successful community.

The ' mayaki ' campaign—the campaign of beacons in agriculture—started in 1958 as a new kind of Stakhanov movement, the idea being that in the agricultural dusk very successful people would shine as beacons for others. According to the newspapers, the movement spread like wildfire all over the country, but the facts do not bear this out. The difficulty was, presumably, that the beacons, like the earlier Stakhanovites, were a purely artificial creation, receiving special facilities and dislocating the general work of the community. They were welcomed neither by the average worker nor by those responsible for production. Another difficulty was that this was an entirely materialist movement, empty of any romanticism or spiritual appeal. The only appeal was to the pocket. This, and its artificial nature, explain the marked lack of enthusiasm for it amongst those for whom the campaign was mainly intended—the young generation.

Most republics let the ' beacon ' movement die out quietly, publishing only one or two short articles on the subject. *Sovetskaia Moldavia*, however, gave a full account of its death in one district and also published several articles on other districts, recounting the birth, growth and decline of the movement, and revealing the attitude towards it of local leaders and workers.

On 26 December 1961 it examined the case of a field-team leader, Ekaterina Terzi, who wanted to become a ' beacon ' in maize culture.

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She went to a conference of maize growers and there challenged the best maize grower in the country—Anna Chebotar. The farm chairman and the girl's team heard about this only when she came back, her pledges duly signed. The Party district committee sent extra fertilisers, a tractor, and other help. The farm leaders, however, adopted a different attitude. They allotted to the team four fields in different parts of the farm, provided a poorer sort of maize than the one Terzi wanted, refused to give the 'beacon' team more fertilisers than anybody else, confiscated thirty kilograms of maize from every load during the harvest (this was to provide fodder for the horses, and applied to every team on the farm), and finally refused to weigh the maize as silage instead of grain, which cut down considerably the total results of the harvest. The other farm workers did the rest: cutting down plants (up to 1,500 a night), stealing whole loads of grain, refusing any help. As a result, only about half the promised harvest was collected and the team was dissolved.

Together with this article, the paper published an editorial note, commenting on the lack of responsibility shown by the local Party and production leaders and calling on the authorities to prosecute the leaders of the farm. Two months later the tone changed, and on 18 February, the same newspaper published an article entitled 'Extinguished Beacons', giving a sort of post mortem of the movement in the Lipkany district. Nine cases were examined, amongst them that of Evgenia Shuparskaia, the best milkmaid of the Republic, decorated with the Order of Lenin, delegate to the village Soviet and the district Soviet. The newspaper says she worked every day from 4 a.m. to 10 p.m. and eventually became ill. Shuparskaia was sent to the nearest hospital and from that day her earnings were cut down to the usual minimum, which had never happened in the history of the farm. When she left the hospital, she went to the collective farm chairman and complained about this. According to *Sovetskaia Moldavia*, he answered: 'You are asking in vain, Shuparskaia. The regulations of our community say that when a person leaves work without permission, his pay is automatically suspended. And anyway, I am not quite sure that you were really ill. You must produce a medical certificate.' (Incidentally, the wife of the chairman is the local medical assistant and was the first medical officer to treat Shuparskaia.) She had to walk several miles to the hospital to get the certificate, and was then admitted back to work. The article continues: 'We cannot conceal the fact that there still are envious people in the village. They say she's an upstart, she doesn't think of anything but money. She works out of greed, she has got such a lot of money already, why does she go on like that?' And the paper adds: 'Nobody ever tried to protect her. There was not one responsible person, not one leader who said a kind word to her. They had all forgotten that such a short time before she had been their pride. Yes, once upon a time there was a beacon. . . .'

These attacks on the milkmaid were made from material and financial motives. The same article, however, gives examples of a different kind.

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It takes the case of one of the very first followers of the 'beacon' campaign, a teenager decorated with the Order of Lenin, who promised to get every cow to produce about six thousand litres of milk a year and who, finding herself in difficulties, went to the chairman of her collective farm for help, 'to save the honour of the farm and her own honour'. He replied: 'I see. You could work before and now, all of a sudden, you cannot work any more. It's hard, yes, your glory weighs you down to the earth. Well, if you don't want to work, you can leave. Do as you like. But there's one thing—don't imagine that you're irreplaceable. If you leave, there will be others.' The district Party committee gave her no help either.

Another 'beacon', the maize-grower Maria Gushevataia, one of the three who started the movement in the republic, resigned from the Party. 'She came to the district Party committee and laid her Party card on the table. What was it that forced her to do this? It was people with hard hearts, who had forgotten that she was first of all a living person', says *Sovetskaia Moldavia*. It lays the responsibility for the failure of the movement on the district Party committee, especially since it forced the workers to pledge themselves to impossible tasks. It quotes the example of a young milkmaid who promised to get 4,500 litres of milk from every cow in the current year. 'Five thousand!—came a voice from the platform. I am afraid this is too much, answered the girl, I don't think I shall be able to manage that, but I do promise 4,500 litres.—Five thousand litres, repeated the same voice from the platform with force, and this sounded like an order.' The girl accepted the order—and left the milk farm. She even left the collective farm altogether and now lives in a town. The paper adds: 'Those who insisted so much on her agreeing to undertake the task felt their mission was finished. They had suggested the figure and seen to it that it was accepted. The rest was her concern and the concern of the collective farm leaders if they would condescend to do the job.'

THIS appears to be an entirely new development in the Stakhanovite idea. Stakhanovites and their successors in different campaigns received all the help they needed to reach their targets for both production and propaganda reasons, whether it was useful for the given enterprise or not. Today, the local men in charge of production seem reluctant to take under their protection the ambitious 'beacons' who may achieve good production results, but largely at the cost of extra work for everybody else, and also at the cost of envy, indignation, and general discontent among the other workers. 'Beacons' may be useful to some farms which have very low production standards and want to get extra help (Terzi did, after all, get additional fertilisers), but in the case of a richer community, a 'beacon' is undoubtedly a nuisance, disorganising the whole work of the enterprise. It is interesting to note that most of the nine 'extinguished beacons' mentioned in the Lipkany district were

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milkmaids—the district held the first place in Moldavia for milk production and does not, therefore, need any extraordinary measures to boost output.

In Lithuania similar methods seem to be used. *Sovetskaia Litva* (4 March 1962) wrote up the story of Stasse Vitkene, Hero of Socialist Labour, who had been dismissed from her post as manager of the pig-farm in her collective. 'The whole republic knew her. Her kind eyes looked at you from the newspapers, from the cinema screen . . . Labour brought her glory and the golden star of a Hero of Socialist Labour. But now she hears: "Well, where's your star now? You don't say anything, do you? Well, I know what you thought. You thought everything would be done for you, you thought you would be made a fuss of, didn't you?"' Vitkene left the farm.

Uzbekistan found a pleasanter method of getting rid of local 'beacons'. *Zvezda Vostoka* reports that they are given white-collar jobs by the local authorities in charge of production. An appeal to the district Party committee is useless if they want to return to field work, a decision of the regional Party committee helps, but not for long. The newspaper quotes the case of several Heroes of Socialist Labour in this position, such as cotton-growers serving as nursery school managers.

The majority of cases, however, are of the Moldavian type and are found in industry as well as in agriculture. One example may be sufficient. *Sovetskaia Rossiya* writes about Aleksandr Zhulin, a driver and a much publicised inventor. There was a special stand devoted to his work and inventions at the Moscow Permanent Fair of Economic Achievements. This 'beacon' was extinguished very thoroughly: his driving licence was suspended for a year.

THIS concerted fight against a central propaganda campaign is an excellent example of an unofficial form of association and cooperation between local Party and business officials, founded on the common aim of achieving the best possible results in the job they have to do. There are, however, numerous examples of an entirely different form of association: one which, while quite formal in outline and framework, is in fact quite informal. The example given here shows what a group can do, if it is genuinely united, to use official societies and institutions for their own purposes. This is not only a question of developing the work of a given association in a direction which does not correspond exactly to its official aims. It can be the straightforward use of an officially created body for wholly unofficial purposes. The organisation in question is an association of amateur gardeners in Minsk. It was founded in May 1958—there was at that time a widespread move started from the centre for factories and other enterprises to be given some land where members of staff could do some gardening and even build a small cottage. This Minsk association (the story is told in *Sovetskaia Belorussiya*, 4 January 1962) had very influential members: the manager of the Minsk group of textile enterprises which had founded the association, the deputy manager

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of the group, the head of the Minsk Canal and Water Supply Trust, etc. At the first meeting, when the association came officially into being, the members decided that it needed money. 'Someone got a bright idea: the textile combine has a frame-saw, and the association has a rubber-stamp and influential members.' This combination of an official body with its own rubber-stamp, influential members, and a sense of enterprise, led to an agreement between the association and the textile combine, approved by the Sovnarkhoz. By this agreement, the association could use the frame-saw for their own purposes. 'Boards and planks, slabs and other products were invoiced to different building-sites, and payment went into the current account of the association at the State bank. The income gained by exploiting state-owned equipment went to the private enterprise.'

A year later, the association started to organise the water supply in a suburban settlement where the houses were privately owned. The head of the Minsk Canal and Water Supply Trust—a member of the association—undertook to provide both labour and equipment to dig the wells and lay the pipes. The project was very successful. After two years, each member of the association had a house on the garden site, the water supply in the settlement was working well and there was even a swimming-pool.

Such activities, according to *Izvestia*, were going on throughout the country. The article it published under the title 'Mildew in Collective Gardens', was followed by administrative measures which cut the allotted holdings by half and prohibited the building of houses on the site. This move, according to *Sovetskaia Belorussiya*, had no effect on the association apart from doubling the number of its members in order to keep the same area of land. Nor did subsequent restrictive measures have much effect. The association answered the charge that its members were individualist money-grabbers by claiming that it was a genuine collective body in which there was no private ownership. As they had no fences, how could they have individual plots? 'We have an association. We have a board of management. We cannot even drive a nail in without the management adopting a resolution to that effect. You cannot accuse us of being individualists.'

The position of this group seems to be almost impregnable; it has mastered to perfection the art of staying within the letter of the law. The very existence of this group, which has had a difficult life from the very beginning, shows a most heartening respect for the rules and the laws in contemporary Russia. The position of the association is perfectly legal, even if its actual work is not entirely within the spirit of the law, and the authorities seem to respect the legal strength of this position. The same situation has often arisen in districts where individual plots are far bigger than is usually allowed: when collective farms have confiscated the extra land they have been forced by the legal authorities to pay damages or even to return the land, as the user-owners had put much work into it.

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The republican press indicates that there is a great variety of associations of all kinds: private enterprises (mainly building societies, employing up to forty workers and clerical staff), associations of deserters from collective farms, cultural associations, religious sects (some of them equipped with printing presses), and even some political groupings. It would seem that the republican newspapers have a far more business-like approach than the central ones: the controversy about the Ukrainian hour is closely linked to the killing of the 'beacons' campaign and shows the same care for genuine improvements, combined with a deep distrust of old-fashioned and artificial propaganda measures. The desire to stay within the legal framework seems to show that a genuine new era of at least the partial rule of law may well be starting in the country. From the republican press the reader can get priceless information about social and economic movements that are missed by the central press. It may well be the best source available in the West for research on public opinion in the Soviet Union.

THE ROAD TO HAPARANDA

Winfried B. Scharlau

'A GOOD DEAL IS KNOWN', writes Michael Futrell in his book, *Northern Underground**, 'about the life in Western Europe of the chief Russian exiles, such as Herzen and Lenin. Much is known about revolutionary organisations and ideas inside Russia. But the link between the leaders in the West and their friends and followers in Russia have seldom received even cursory mention.'

To uncover the operations of the underground link between Western Europe and pre-revolutionary Russia, running through Scandinavia and Finland, was not an easy task; illegal undertakings rarely find their contemporary chronicler. What has been published since the revolution is uneven, consisting of self-justification, apologia, or exaggerations to glorify early communist heroism.

Dr Futrell has spared no effort and shirked no hardship in his attempt to penetrate as deeply as he could into the darkness of the Northern Underground. His knowledge of the Scandinavian and Finnish tongues opened up for him an astonishing range of new and contemporary sources which, presumably because of linguistic difficulties, had been virtually untapped by western researchers. He followed the trail of former Underground members with the passion of the master detective; indeed, his knowledge of the area might have matched that of the professional smugglers in Haparanda-Tornio. He ferreted out surviving participants and go-betweens and persuaded them to speak, among them the self-confident ('Lenin was my protégé'), grand-seigniorial, and

* **Northern Underground**, by Michael Futrell. Episodes of Russian Revolutionary Transport and Communications through Scandinavia and Finland 1863–1917 (London, 1963), 32s. 6d.

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cunning Esthonian, Alexander Kesküla, and the ever-helpful Axel Rönnmark in Haparanda, whose inventive genius never failed when it came to guiding Alexander Shlyapnikov across the Swedish-Finnish frontier.

There is no doubt that the excursion into the wilds of Northern Europe was worthwhile. An examination of the Branting and Kruse papers and the Danish police files on the Jacob Fürstenberg-Hanecki case handed Dr Futrell the Ariadne thread that was to lead him far into the labyrinth of the underground. However, the deeper he went, and the more material he amassed, the more modest and cautious he was forced to become, and he has to admit at the end that the whole truth is still only partially unravelled. With justification he compares the underground to an iceberg, the larger part of which remains submerged.

From the times of Alexander Herzen, Bakunin, and Ogarev till 1917, the land route via Sweden and Finland represented the safest connecting bridge between emigrés in Western Europe and the revolutionary movement inside Russia. For this reason, Dr Futrell opens his narrative with a report about the transport problems of *Kolokol* and about Ogarev's scheme for coordinating national and socialist opposition in battling Tsarism. Indeed, until the emergence of the Swedish Social-Democratic party at the end of the last century, communication with Russia would have been unthinkable without the support of Finnish and Swedish nationalists. Long before Hjalmar Branting could offer assistance, Konni Zilliacus (father of the British politician), had transported Russian propaganda material to Finland along with his own Finnish independence declarations. Zilliacus, emerges as a brilliant amateur, a pungent journalist and pamphleteer, and fantastic adventurer; none of his enterprises reflected so completely the strengths and weaknesses of his character as the legendary trip of the *John Grafton*, which was ferrying weapons and munitions from Western Europe to Finland and Russia in the revolutionary year 1905. The money for these arms had been provided by the Japanese military attaché Colonel Akashi. The execution of this piece of modern piracy lay in the hands of Zilliacus. His imagination and talent for improvisation, however, were to prove insufficient on this occasion. Only a fraction of the consignment reached its destination; the rest was confiscated by Tsarist police or blown up with the *John Grafton* on 8 September 1905.

With the growth of Swedish Social-Democracy under Branting's leadership, the Northern Underground began to take on a strong socialist coloration. New figures would constantly surface and submerge: Alexandra Kollontay, elegant, frivolous, and politically inscrutable; Jacob Fürstenberg-Hanecki, a silent, hard, and, in his methods, unscrupulous practitioner of revolution; Alexander Kesküla, agent and pocket-size statesman; and Alexander Shlyapnikov, an inexhaustible organiser for whom no venture proved insuperable, but a gentleman-bolshevik, who in fact understood as little about the politics of his Central Committee as Kerensky about the motives and ideas of Lenin.

With a sure feeling for characteristic biographical details, Dr Futrell follows their varied careers as smugglers, businessmen, illegal frontier-runners, and revolutionaries. A substantial part of his narrative is based on the memoirs of Shlyapnikov, itself a little-known biographical

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rarity. The activities of Fürstenberg-Hanecki are reconstructed, on the other hand, from totally new material. Hanecki figured prominently in the documents published by the Kerensky government to prove its allegation that the Bolsheviks were financed from German funds. That the Bolsheviks received German money through various channels in 1917 can no longer be disputed since the publication of documents from the German Foreign Office, but Dr Futrell is able to demonstrate that the business telegrams published by the Provisional Government need not necessarily have been coded secret messages. As Danish police files establish, Hanecki carried on fairly profitable commercial dealings, involving all imaginable kinds of freight, including thermometers for the Russian Red Cross and contraceptives for the German army. Undoubtedly, part of the profit flowed into Bolshevik party coffers. The question of the origin of the Bolshevik party funds in 1917 has not become any simplier through Dr Futrell's research, but rather more complex. Perhaps this is a sign that we have come somewhat closer to the truth.

Dr Futrell is both a thorough scholar and an observant traveller, and he has written an elegant and fascinating book. Possibly he likes his characters just a bit more than is permissible for the historian. The photographs make this weakness all too understandable.

THE KPD

Günther Nollau

THE PUBLICATION OF a collection of documents on German communism * was very necessary, in the first place because so many were destroyed during the Hitler regime. There is, for example, no library in the Federal Republic which has a complete collection of the KPD congresses, or a complete series of *Die Kommunistiche Internationale* and *Inprekorr*. Hermann Weber, who has added commentaries to the documents, is an expert in the field; he covers the entire span from 1916, when the Spartakusbund was founded, to the present day. The material is divided into three parts, the first dealing with the years of the Weimar Republic; the second with the KPD as an illegal body and in emigration; the third is devoted to the post-war years—the KPD-SED in power.

A comparison of Weber's documents with the historical legends put out by the SED is not without interest. Of the Kapp putsch (March 1920) the SED maintains that it was defeated by the workers 'under the leadership of the KPD'. Weber includes in his collection a KPD manifesto of 14 March 1920, in which that party opposes the general strike called by the unions. The SED makes no mention at all of the dependence of the KPD on the Comintern; Weber includes a number of documents—for example, letters from Radek to the KPD *Zentrale*, and the 'open letter' of the ECCI against the left-wing in the KPD—which reveal the true relations between the two bodies. The SED

* **Der deutsche Kommunismus—Dokumente**, herausgegeben und kommentiert von Hermann Weber, Köln-Berlin, 1963. 629 pp. DM. 38.

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myth that the KPD was always in favour of a united front with the social-democrats can hardly survive Stalin's theses on social-fascism, the KPD theses on social-fascism, or the slogan, coined in Moscow and echoed by Thaelmann, that 'SPD and NSDAP are twins'. Also included in Weber's volume is the statement of the SED central committee, of 1950, on 'Contacts between former political emigrants and Noel H. Field'. This statement was the prelude not only to a purge in the SED, but also to a series of arrests which included such prominent communists as Paul Merker (member of the political bureau), Kurt Müller (deputy chairman of the KPD), and Leo Bauer (chief editor of the East German broadcasting station). These men were sentenced at secret trials before the Soviet authorities, not in open show trials, as happened to Kostov, Rajk, Slansky, and their fellow victims. Why the trials were not held publicly in Germany has still not been explained, but in any case the reason is not that now given out in East Berlin, that 'Leninist norms of party life' were always observed in the SED.

Weber has erred on one point. Among the documents destroyed was the book by 'A. Langer' with the title of *Der Weg zum Sieg* ('The Road to Victory'); but 'Langer' was not, as Weber says, Kippenberger, at that time the head of the KPD anti-military apparatus, but Ture Lehen, a Finnish communist on the staff of the Comintern military division, who frequently spent some time in Germany on Comintern missions. Because of his size he was nicknamed 'der Lange', and so chose the pseudonym 'Langer'.

BEFORE THE REVOLUTION

D. Pospielovsky

AT LEAST TWO EXTREME views of Russia have found many followers both at home and abroad. According to one Russia is unique in all respects; a Eurasian or even Oriental country of a special kind. According to the other there is nothing autochthonous about Russia and no characteristic traits except backwardness. Now Jacob Walkin, in his most thorough study of Russia's institutional evolution towards democracy,[1] largely avoids both extremes.

Such institutions as the 'zemsky sobor' were similar to contemporary Western European institutions (p. 15). We have also early examples of the struggle of the most enlightened sectors of the Russian aristocracy for a constitutional government, such as 'the written agreement granted by the boyar czar Shuisky, and, even more important, . . . the agreement signed by king Sigismund of Poland . . . that would have made Russia a constitutional monarchy on the Polish model' (p. 15).

Then there was the attempt of prince Golitsyn to introduce an aristocratic constitution in 1730 (which unfortunately Mr Walkin does not discuss). Why did these attempts fail, and why was a limited constitution at last introduced only in our century? Mr Walkin believes that

[1] Jacob Walkin, **The Rise of Democracy in Pre-Revolutionary Russia.** Thames and Hudson, London, 1963.

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the Russian autocracy was essentially not unlike Western absolutism, and it is easy to agree with him that the failure of Russian constitutional attempts in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was to a great extent due to the lack of a strong independent aristocracy (not to speak of bourgeoisie); this in its turn was the outcome of two Russian traditions: first, the equal division of land and of all the wealth among all the sons; this prevented the Russian aristocracy from accumulating wealth, which would have made it financially independent of the Crown. Even in the sixteenth century Fletcher observed the impoverishment of the Russian nobility. Secondly, the tradition of the 'serving gentry', though morally more justifiable than Western serfdom (which was to be introduced into Russia in the eighteenth century), prevented the Russian gentry from establishing itself firmly in the provinces and acquiring esprit de corps.

The cultural backwardness of the great majority of laity and clergy was another important factor in the failure of the constitutional projects of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and early nineteenth centuries; so was the special structure and nature of the Orthodox Church. It could not form a strong organisation parallel to the state power and often challenging it, as did the supranational centralised Roman Catholic Church. The Orthodox Church was subdivided into national churches independent of each other, and always put a greater emphasis on the separation of powers than did the Roman Catholic Church; it concerned itself more with the liturgy, with individual salvation, monasticism. But Mr Walkin's statement that 'When Christianity was first introduced to Russia, the Russian people were too backward to assimilate its inner spiritual meaning', needs further qualification, since it is known that eleventh century Kiev, for instance, was one of the most cultured cities of Europe, with good schools and libraries and a very liberal code of law which had no death penalty. There were also such enlightened churchmen as Metropolitan Hillarion, St Theodosius, and others. One should therefore distinguish between early Kievan Russia and the later Muscovy period.

Before Peter the Great there was no great difference between the average peasant and the average member of the gentry: clothes, food, customs, language, and the level of education of both were similar. But even more important was the hierarchy of service: the peasant served his squire, so that the latter could serve the tsar, i.e. the state, and this the squire was obliged to do, or be deprived of his land. When the eighteenth-century reforms forced members of the gentry to spend more time in the capital or in the new regular army, the gentry began to behave in a manner completely foreign to the Russian peasantry, to wear foreign clothes, to speak German, French, or a new artificial Russian language which could scarcely be understood by the peasants, themselves almost untouched by the reforms. But most important in creating the gulf between the nobility and the peasantry, and in removing the raison d'être of serfdom, was the Law of 1762, which granted freedom from state service to the nobility. The egalitarian principles proclaimed in October 1917 (not peculiarly Russian, but akin to those of the French Revolution) were much closer to the hearts of the backward Russian peasants than the abstract constitutional ideas of the liberals; 'the idea of equality was deeply rooted in the traditions of the Russian peasantry' (p. 29).

Mr Walkin rightly attaches great importance to the zemstvo. He shows that it played the key role in the struggle for a constitution. It was

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the only practical school of self-government in Russia, and had originally possessed enough healthy constructive elements to form a real nucleus for future collaboration between the state and society, had it not been for the deeply hostile attitude of the Government, especially in the last two reigns. In fact the Government treated the zemstvos with such suspicion and distrust, and mutual antagonism was so deep, that when a Constitution was granted the first two Dumas, elected on a wide male suffrage, proved unworkable: the Cabinet and the Duma sabotaged each other's efforts. The experiment was too limited in scope and time to produce able politicians who could have taken over the government in February–March 1917.

Mr Walkin's convincing account of the almost meteoric advance of the national economy, the cooperative movement, social and political institutions, the press and literacy, in the last decades of pre-revolutionary Russia, supported by statistical data and illustrations from the personal memoirs of opponents of the tsarist regime, explodes the popular myth that the 1917 Revolution was a necessary precondition for the country's development.

For all its great merits, the book has some shortcomings. If as the author says in the preface, he meant this book to be 'comprehensible to Western readers without prior familiarity with the subject' (and in fact it makes very easy reading) he should have discussed the institutional differences between the pre-Tatar Russia of Kiev-Novgorod, and Muscovite Russia as it evolved under and after the Tatars; this would have shown the reader that originally Russia had very much in common with the rest of Europe; and perhaps the October 1905 Manifesto and the 1906 Constitution might have been analysed in greater detail.

CLASS AND CONSCIOUSNESS

Leopold Labedz

WHEN PROFESSOR OSSOWSKI'S book * appeared in Warsaw in 1957, this concluding sentence, printed on an erratum slip, was attached to it, visible sign of a victory over the reluctant censor:

> One of the important consequences of the events which took place in Poland in 1956, and above all the events of the so-called Polish October, was the destruction of the official myths which concealed our reality. Since then wide possibilities have opened up for deliberate and direct endeavours to form a socialist culture; the scholar should not overlook, amongst the tasks awaiting him, the duty of watching out for the social consequences of habits of thought left to us by the past. I am thinking here not only of the relics of capitalist culture but of thought-patterns of more recent origin, dating from the times of the grim myth with which those who were reconciled to the existing state of affairs salved their consciences: the myth of historical necessity as revealed to those who wield power.

* Stanislaw Ossowski, **Class Structure in the Social Consciousness,** International Library of Sociology and Social Reconstruction, London, 1963, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 25s.

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It is ironical that, when the English translation of the book—with this conclusion incorporated in the text—reaches the Western reader, the theoretical organ of the Polish Communist Party, *Nowe Drogi*, offers the following comment in its July 1963 number:

> We have been dealing here with a book which (while maintaining the appearance of political neutrality) supports the wrong and politically reactionary theories about the allegedly fundamental conflict of our times, between the rulers and the ruled, and about the alleged decline of class conflicts in contemporary society.

Professor Ossowski not only provided a warning against intellectual practices which are now being resumed in Poland, and for which his own book is a good target; he analysed in it, on the basis of wide comparative material, the mechanics of the myth-making apologetics used by the ruling groups in different societies and in different historical periods. His analysis has a double focus: the social structure—class structure in particular—and its reflection in social consciousness. It is thus as much concerned with social stratification as with the sociology of knowledge. It is the task of a sociologist to demystify the conceptual categories based on the ruling myths by a rigorous comparative analysis which combines a systematic approach with the imaginative understanding derived from the historical method.

There is little doubt that such an approach inevitably implies a revision of Marxism. It does not however amount to a rejection of Marxism *in toto* (whereas the orthodox critics insist on its total acceptance). It does demand a critical approach, which a ruling doctrine cannot tolerate. Professor Ossowski's book will not achieve the celebrity of Burnham's *Managerial Revolution* or of Djilas' *New Class*, and yet in the scope of its analysis, in its methodological clarity, and its avoidance of over-simplification, it is much more interesting than either of them, as well as incomparably more scholarly. It deals with some of the most important problems of our time with a perceptiveness rarely present in comparable Western studies, the result not only of a perspective widened by historical experience, but also of the author's encyclopedic knowledge. One should note, however, that the book contains many passages couched in slightly involved language, and some of the problems posed are left in mid-air as the logical implications of the analysis may carry the argument too far. But this of course is no fault of the author's. In any case he is concerned with social understanding and not with the political implication of this or that element of sociological analysis. Although it may not be developed beyond a certain point, it clears the ground on so many basic preliminaries that it should be compulsory reading for both the old thinkers of the New Left and the new thinkers of the Old Right.

THE PEASANT AS PRIME MOVER

David Shapiro

THE IMPULSES OF MEN may never be referable to any single source, but the disregard of this maxim has rarely failed to be stimulating. Professor

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Vakar [1] is merely the latest of the interpreters of Soviet history to try to reduce explanations to one key. His claim to originality lies in his selection of a key. While much has been written on the consequences of building socialism in a backward country—and still more on Russia's historical heritage—Professor Vakar takes to an interesting extreme the interpretation of Stalinist Russia as a peasant culture overthrowing an urban, intellectual pattern.

The most convincing portion of the book, intended for the general reader but equipped with a good bibliography, is the analysis of the pre-revolutionary culture of the peasants. The author's sympathetic understanding of life on the land is obvious, but hampers his attempt to systematise his analysis. He argues that 'the family was unified under the absolute authority of the head'; and comments that it was 'a totalitarian society in miniature'; but there is a reference to the social effects of the Stolypin reforms suggesting that more sense of the responsibilities and duties of the head of the family existed in the late nineteenth century. At one point the peasants are regarded as practising a primitive communism, 'from each according to his ability, to each according to his need', but later as tending 'to reward the effective rather than the merely needy'.

The application of the analysis to Soviet society, and in particular to Soviet history after the 1920s, therefore seems over-facile. The purges are interpreted in the light of peasant suspiciousness; but this does not quite square with the suggested derivation of official meddling in every concern from the facts of peasant life. The role of the Party is equated with that of the family; in the light of the objection noted above it is interesting to find Professor Vakar citing as evidence on this point two non-Russian, non-peasant members of communist parties in advanced industrial societies. In general, while grateful for many stimulating ideas, one would have welcomed some curtailment of the later chapters on culture and the conflict of generations in favour of a lengthier and more systematic exposition of the key idea. For Professor Vakar outlines a neglected theme.

[1] Nicholas P. Vakar, **The Taproot of Soviet Society**: The impact of Russia's peasant culture upon the Soviet State. New York, Harper, 1962. $4.75.

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Our Contributors

JEREMY AZRAEL, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, is at present completing a study of the Soviet managerial elite from 1917 until the present day.

J. F. BROWN, a History graduate of Manchester University and former Research Fellow at the University of Michigan, now lives in Europe and has written a number of studies of East European affairs.

IRINA CHYMANOVSKY is a graduate of Paris University.

JAROSLAV DRESLER was born and educated in Czechoslovakia where he studied philosophy and the history of art. He moved to Paris in 1949 and now works as a journalist and broadcaster.

LEWIS FEUER, Professor of Philosophy and Social Science at the University of California, is the author of *Spinoza and the Rise of Liberalism* (1958), and editor of *Marx and Engels: Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy* (1959).

PIERRE FORGUES, a student of Russian literature, collaborated with Claude Ligny in writing the special issue of *Les Lettres Nouvelles* devoted to *Les Ecrivains Soviétique D'Aujourd'hui* (May 1962).

MAX HAYWARD is a Fellow of St Antony's College, Oxford.

GEORGE LICHTHEIM is the author of *Marxism: an Historical and Critical Study* (1961) and *Europe and America* (1963).

ROBERT MCNEAL, Associate Professor of History at McMaster University, Ontario, is preparing an annotated bibliography of Stalin's published works for the Hoover Institution series and is the author of *The Bolshevik Tradition: Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev*.

FRANK OSVALD is a student of Czechoslovak affairs.

HERBERT RITVO was a Fellow of the Center for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

DAVID SHAPIRO is a Research Fellow of Nuffield College, Oxford.

WINFRIED SCHARLAU is a Research Student at St Antony's College, Oxford.

ANDREW SHONFIELD is Director of Studies at the Royal Institute of International Affairs and the author of *British Economic Policy Since the War*, etc.

ARTHUR SPENCER is a student of East European history particularly interested in the relations between the Russian and West European socialist movements.

FRANCIS WATSON, author of a number of books and radio programmes, has extended an eight years' experience of India to the general study of Asian history and affairs.

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East Wind—West Wind

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